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ABSTRACT
What Structuralism Could Not Be Stephen Ferguson
Frege’s arithraetical-platonism is glossed as the first step in developing the thesis: 
however, it remains silent on the subject of structures in mathematics: the obvious 
examples being groups and rings, lattices and topologies. The structuralist objects to this 
silence, also questioning the sufficiency of Fregean platonism is answering a number of 
problems: e.g. Benacerraf’s Twin Puzzles of Epistemic and Referential Access. The 
development of structuralism as a philosophical position, based on the slogan ‘All 
mathematics is structural’ collapses: there is no single coherent account which remains 
faithful to the tenets of structuralism and solves the puzzles of platonism.
This prompts the adoption of a more modest structuralism, the aim of which is not 
to solve the problems facing arithmetical-platonism, but merely to give an account of the 
‘obviously structural areas of mathematics’. Modest structuralism should complement an 
account of mathematical systems; here, Frege’s platonism fulfils that role, which then 
constrains and shapes the development of this modest structuralism. Three alternatives are 
considered: a substitutional account, an account based on a modification of Dummett’s 
theory of thin reference and a modified from of in re structuralism.
This split level analysis of mathematics leads to an investigation of the robustness 
of the truth predicate over the two classes of mathematical statement. Focussing on the 
framework set out in Wright’s Truth and Objectivity, a third type of statement is identified 
in the literature; Hilbert’s formal statements. The following thesis arises: formal 
statements concern no special subject matter, and are merely minimally truth apt; the 
statements of structural mathematics form a subdiscourse — identified by the similarity of 
the logical grammar — displaying cognitive command. Thirdly, the statements of 
mathematics which concern systems form a subdiscourse which has both cognitive 
command and width of cosmological role.
The extensions of mathematical concepts are such that best practice on the part of 
mathematicians either tracks or determines that extension — at least in simple cases. 
Examining the notions of response dependence leads to considerations of indefinite 
extensibility and intuitionism. The conclusion drawn is that discourse about structures 
and mathematical systems are response dependent but that this does not give rise to any 
revisionary arguments contra intuitionism.
PREFACE
The position developed in this work is the result of trying to balance together a 
number of wildly different and sometimes apparently incompatible sources in the 
philosophy of mathematics. This is due in no small part to the different stages in my 
intellectual history: as an undergraduate I read mathematics and philosophy, taking a year 
out to study at Erlangen University in Germany where I had my first taste of philosophy 
of mathematics proper — I attended Prof. Christian Thiel’s lecture course “Bine 
Einfuhrung in die Philosophie der Mathematik”, which had a characteristic constructivist 
flavour. Returning to St Andrews I took Honours Courses with Bob Hale, reading 
Frege’s Grundlagen and tackling issues from a neo-Fregean standpoint, as well as 
studying Mathematical Logic with Peter Clark and Proof Theory with Stephen Read. On 
graduating I headed for Bristol for a year to study Mathematical Logic; I took the 
opportunity to hear John Mayberry lecture a course on “The foundations of mathematics” 
and was greatly influenced both by his approach to transfinite set theory but also by his 
attitude towards structuralism.
Returning once again to St Andrews, to begin work on this thesis, I have had the 
opportunity to work with both Crispin Wright and Stewart Shapiro, which has stretched 
my understanding of logicism and challenged my appreciation of structuralism, as well as 
heightening my awareness of the connections between the philosophy of mathematics and 
other areas of analytic philosophy — most obviously philosophy of language, 
metaphysics, epistemology, but also picking up on issues in metaethics and the 
philosophy of objectivity.
This background of diversity is evident throughout this work — there is no 
position in the literature I agree wholeheartedly with, yet I think that I agree to a large 
extent with each of the main positions in the market today: platonism, formalism, 
intuitionism and stmcturalism.
I would like to thank the many people with whom I have discussed and sharpened 
these ideas, in particular: Andrew Aberdein, Alan Baker, Jon Barton, Helen Billinge, 
John Cleave, Peter Clark, Bill Demopoulos, Michele Friend, Bob Hale, Janet Folina, 
Fraser McBride, Duncan McFarland and John Mayberry. Special thanks to Stephen 
Read, for his comments on an earlier draft. Most of all, however, I would like to thank 
Stewart Shapiro, for his constant interest in my work and his enthusiastic support both 
while he was in St Andrews and after, and Crispin Wright, for all his effort over the past
PREFACE
four years: he has constantly caused me me to refine and clarify my ideas, and to try to 
express them more lucidly: if any of this work shines, it is due to his supply of top 
quality polish.
I should also like to thanks those who have contributed less directly: my parents; 
Clare, Jennifer and Kath, for being patient and supportive flatmates; Alistair, Gavin, 
Caroline, Jo, Melissa and Beverley, for their interest and encouragement; Janet, Barbara, 
Anne, Roger and Chris, for making my time spent working for the Quarterly so painless; 
Malcolm and Barbara, for many happy hours spent relaxing in the Wine Bar, Derek and 
Graham, my Fencing Masters, and all my Fencing pupils, especially Tom.
I would like to dedicate this to my sister, Helen.
Stephen Ferguson 
St Andrews, March 1998
CONTENTS
Chapter 1 (DVI) IN T R O D U C T IO N
I  Introduction
II Philosophical Questions about Mathematics
III A Variety o f Positions 
Godelian Platonism 
Quinean Platonism 
Fregean Platonism
iv Intuitionism
v Formalism
IV  Foundationalism
V The Philosophy o f Mathematics today.
i Moving the debate forward
ii The horns o f the dilemma
Hi The first disanalogy
iv The second disanalogy
V Truth and positing mathematical entities
VI Outline and plan of attack
Chapter 2 (V ID XIII) L O G IC ISM
VII Introduction
VIII Frege's account o f arithmetic
i The Context Principle
ii Problems with the neo-Fregean argument
IX  Singular terms
i Syntactic criteria for singular terms
ii Refining the criteria
Hi Criticisms o f the syntactic approach^^
iv NxFx is a syntactic singular term
X  Tolerant Reductionism and Identifying Knowledge
i Dummett's Tolerant Reductionism
ii Thin reference and semantic role
Hi Reference andA-infaUibility
iv Problems with Thin reference
V Identifying Knowledge
X I  Hume’s Principle
X II  To bury Caesar, or to praise him?
i N= and the Sortal Inclusion Principle
ii Criticisms o f this approach
X III Conclusion
CONTENTS
Chapter 3 (X IV-XXI) S T R U C T U R A L IS M  
X IV  Introduction
i Structuralist Strategy
ii Structures and Systems 
X  V Philosophical Structuralism
X V I Abstract-structuralism
i Offices and Objects
ii Structural relativity: Offices and Objects
X V II Pure-structuralism
i Mathematics without numbers, sets or functions.
ii Objections to an objects-free account.
X V III Further problems with stmcturalism
i Determinacy o f reference
ii Pattem-recognition and Causal Theories of Knowledge
Hi The translatability o f epistemologicalproblems**
X IX  The Extension Argument
i What Numbers could not he
ii Structure
Hi The argument for structuralism
X  X  Tlie relationship with logicism
i Hale's attack on structuralism
H Wright on structuralism
Hi Analysis
X X I  Conclusions
Chapter 4 (X XIH X XVI) M O D EST STR U C T U R A L ISM
X X I I  Modifying the structuralist account
i Structures and Systems
ii Frege on mathematical systems
Hi Benacerrafs insight and some desiderata
iv Some desiderata
XXIII  Substitution & Divided Reference
i Systems, structures and substitution.
ii Problems with the divided reference account
X X I V  Structural refei'ence
i Narrow and wide reference
ii Modest abstract-structuralism
Hi The status o f axioms
iv The theory o f narrow reference
V Problems with modest abstract-structuralism
vi Sortal and characterising concepts
X X V  Modest structuralism: Context and supposition
i Subjunctives and Suppositions
ii Problems with pure-structuralism overcome
CONTENTS
V Problems with modest abstract-structuralism
vi Sortal and characterising concepts
X X V  Modest structuralism: Context and supposition
i Subjunctives and Suppositions
ii Problems with pure-structuralism overcome
Hi Caesar
X X V Î  Conclusion
Chapter 5 (X X V IL X X X II I )  M I N I M A L I S M  
XXVII Introduction
XXIX Formalism and Deflationism
i Hilbert’s Formalism
ii Formalism and Minimalism compared
Hi Formalism and modest structuralism
XXX Cognitive Command 
Cognitivism, Representation and the A Priori 
Proofs, refutations and cognitive command 
Distinguishing features o f cognitive command.
XXXI Width o f Cosmological Role
i Application and Indispensability
ii Application and Explanation
Hi Ideal Mathematics and Real Explanations
iv Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s
XXXII Problems and Objections
i Indispensability and Mathematical Explanations
ii Real and Complex Analysis
XXXIII Conclusions
Chapter 6 (XXXIV-X XXX ) E P ISTE M IC  C O N STR A IN T
XXXIV Introduction
XXXV Response Dependence
i Wright on Response Dependence
ii Realism or Response Dependence
XXXVI Mathematics and response dependence.
Mathematical concepts and C-conditions.
Arithmetic, Real Analysis and Euthyphronic conception o f truth. 
Mind independent objects and ed-concepts.
XXXVII Epistemic Constraint 
Open sentences 
Undecidable results
Mathematical proof, ed-concepts and C-conditions
XXXVIII Revisionism
i Dummett
ii Objections
CONTENTS
H Undecidable results
ili Mathematical proof, ed-concepts and C-conditions
XXXVIII Revisionism
i Dummett
ii Objections
iii The concept ‘finite ’
iv Category theory
XXXIX Conclusions
XXXX Summary and Final Comments
i Strategy
ii Conclusions
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
I  In troduction
The philosophy of mathematics is an exciting and diverse area of philosophy; not 
only is there a large variety of issues — from questions about reference to abstract 
objects, considerations of special results and theorems, such as GodeTs incompleteness 
theorems, to the justification of axiom schemes and arguments over the nature of 
representation and its role in mathematical methodology — but there are also many 
approaches to the subject, in part relating to the different backgrounds of those taking part 
in the debates: mathematicians who are interested in philosophy, for example, tackle the 
subject in a way quite different from philosophers who happen to be interested in 
mathematics. Before getting into the details of any particular position, it is worthwhile to 
looks at some fairly representative questions which are found in the literature.
I I  Philosophical Questions about M athematics
A  list of problems in the philosophy of mathematics should have, perhaps, four 
different sublists: questions which relate to mathematics and mathematical results directly; 
philosophical or meta-philosophical questions concerning the relationship between 
mathematics and philosophy; as well as questions in epistemology involving the special 
nature of mathematical knowledge, and the twin concerns of truth and reference.
Li What is the subject matter o f mathematics?
According to some philosophers, mathematics is the study of an abstract realm of objects, 
causally inert but nevertheless actual and real; this is common in the platonist conception 
of mathematics. Others, such as Immanuel Kant, have taken mathematics to be based on 
intuitions of space and time;* Jan Brouwer and Arend Heyting have gone further to 
suggest that the subject matter is the mental constructions involved in generating 
mathematical objects and exhibiting the properties of such objects.' Whether mathematics 
does involve an external, abstract reality, or it is the purely mental activity that Brouwer 
claims it is, this does not delineate the domain of mathematics from the non-mathematical.
Where does mathematics stop and say, computer science or theoretical physics start?
' Kant (1787) Transcendental Aesthetic §§1-8, pp65-82.
* Brouwer (1949):
I hope I have made it clear ... that intuitionistic mathematics is inner architecture, and 
that research in the foundations of mathematics is inner inquiiy with revealing and 
liberating consequences.
A similar train of thought is found in Heyting (1971).
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LU What is the appropriate subject matter o f philosophy o f mathematics?
Much of the philosophy of mathematics literature concentrates on arithmetic and set 
theory, subjects, as it were, at the foundations of mathematics. Notable exceptions 
include the discussion of particular results — such as the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems,^ 
C oders incompleteness th eo rem so r the results (due to Kurt Godel and Paul Cohen) 
which show the independence of Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis.^ The concentration 
upon arithmetic, prevalent in the literature, may stem from a conception of the philosophy 
of mathematics as a branch of epistemology or general metaphysics — as everyone 
encounters arithmetic, its problems are entirely general; the approach which places 
emphasis on mathematical practices is more akin to the philosophy of science.
More philosophical or meta-philosophical questions might include:
ILi What is the relationship between mathematics and the philosophy o f mathematics?
Stewart Shapiro has drawn attention to what he calls, the philosophy first and the 
philosophy last conception of this relationship.® Those that adhere to philosophy first 
claim that philosophical results will have impact on the way mathematics is carried out — 
the revisionism of Jan Brouwer and Michael Dummett are examples of this. On the other 
hand, the thought that philosophy has little or no place in the on going process of 
epistemological endeavours, including mathematics, is due largely to Willard van Quine
 ^The Lowenheim-Skolem (downwards) theorem states that any theory expressible in first order logic with 
a model of infinite cardinality, has a model with the same cardinality as the natural numbers. For a 
detailed exposition see Boolos & Jeffrey (1987) Chl3.
■* GodeTs First Incompleteness result shows that there is a sentence U, formalisable in first order Peano 
Arithmetic, such that if PA is consistent, then neither the sentence U, nor its negation is provable in PA. 
The Second Incompleteness result shows that the consistency of first order Peano Arithmetic is not 
provable in PA, if PA is consistent.
 ^ Godel (1953). Godel showed that CH is consistent with the axioms of first order ZF. Cohen (1963) 
showed that the negation of CH is also consistent with the axioms of ZF, thus establishing its 
independence of the axioms of ZF.
' Shapiro (1997).
'' This theme occurs repeatedly in Quine — for example, in Quine (1953b) and in Quine (1969a).
“—  2 —
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
IIM Need there be one account o f mathematics, or will there be an eclectic solution, 
given the patchwork or motley, as Wittgenstein described it, o f mathematical techniques?^ 
It has been common to argue that all mathematics is truth apt, or a creation of the mind, 
formal or structural. Wittgenstein warns of the dangers of looking for an overly general 
solution — there may be several overlapping accounts, given the diverse nature of 
mathematical techniques.
Epistemological worries will include:
Ill.i What is the source o f certainty in mathematics?
Mathematics is thought of as involving a priori knowledge and dealing in necessary 
truths. Where does this conviction come from? Many different solutions have been 
proposed, from platonism — where the certainty is attributed to the a priori knowledge of 
objective states of affairs — to radical conventionalism, where the certainty is a result of 
an attitude towards mathematics, that it it ‘antecedent to truth’  ^ and therefore beyond 
doubt.
n i.ii Does mathematics have — or need — a foundation? What is the status o f this 
foundation?
The process of mathematical proof appears to rely on true axioms and truth preserving 
laws of inference. Do the many areas of mathematics reduce to one single foundation 
(e.g. set theory) or several foundational theories, or is this based on a mischaracterisation 
of mathematical epistemology, in which case mathematics may have no foundation. If it 
does have a foundation, does it have any epistemic priority over other areas of 
mathematics?
* Wittgenstein (1964) 11—46
I should like to say: mathematics is a MOTLEY of techniques of proof.—And upon this 
is based its manifold applicability and its importance.
’ Briefly — Mathematics is ‘antecedent to truth’ in that mathematics is so closely tied to the the standards 
of judging propositions to be true or false, that it is not possible to apply these standards to appraise 
mathematics. Wittgenstein likens it to trying to measure the yard-stick by which measurements are made, 
e.g. Wittgenstein (1964), 1-155:
There is not any question at all here of some correspondence what is said and reality: 
rather is logic antecedent to any such correspondence; in the same sense, that is, as that 
in which the establishment of a method of measurement is antecedent to the correctness 
or incorrectness of a statement of length.
See also Wright (1980),§IV, pp60//, §XIV, pp260-79.
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III.iii I f  mathetnatical proofs are to be surveyable, then in what sense do they show 
necessary results?
The theorems of mathematics are taken not only to be true, but necessarily true. This 
seems to be accepted by all, yet spelling out what this amounts to is difficult, as the most 
obvious ways of developing the notion of necessity, when applied to mathematics, imply 
that mathematical knowledge should be infallible. The tension becomes clearer in the 
writings of those, such as Imre Lakatos and Ludwig Wittgenstein, where not only is there 
a background fallibilism, but also the thought that it is through mathematical proof that the 
meanings of the terms involved are produced. Proofs have to be surveyable as working 
through the proof forges meanings of the terms and leads to a grasp the meaning of the 
conclusion. One way to resolve the tension between this and the requirements of 
necessity is to follow Wittgenstein and take the necessity of mathematics as a corollaiy of 
his ‘antecedent to truth’ notion.
Ill.iv Is mathematics really the deductive, a priori practice that it is often portrayed as 
being?
Lakatos and others have objected to the characterisation of mathematics as a peculiarly 
deductive practice, arguing instead that it has a methodology of conjecture and refutation 
similar to all other sciences. This is taken as a rejection by them, of the a priori status of 
mathematics: Stewart Shapiro and Michael Resnik also at times lean towards an a 
posteriori epistemology for parts of mathematics with their talk of pattern recognition.’”
III.v What is the relationship between pure mathematics and its application?
If the platonist is correct, and there is an abstract realm of mathematical objects, how is it 
that knowledge of these abstracta is useful in science? Alternatively, if mathematics is 
merely conventional, what explains its applicability?
Issues relating to truth and reference will centre on the following:
IV.i Should pure mathematical statements be appraised in terms o f truth and falsity at 
all, and if  so, in terms o f what specific notions o f truth and falsity?
If there are mathematical states of affairs, then mathematical statements will be truth apt;
or, it may be argued that mathematical notions are too close to the standards of assertion,
Resnik (1975), (1981) and (1982); also Shapiro (1997), Ch3-4.
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and that mathematics is too much involved in the way in which judgments are considered 
to be correct or not, for it to be up for assessment as true or false.
IV.ii Are pure mathematical statements true, when truth is substantially conceived? 
There is a difference between correct and incorrect mathematics, and these norms of 
correctness can be construed as norms of truth. However, this would be insufficient for a 
substantial conception of truth; what would be required would be some stronger 
connection with truth conferring states of affairs.
IV.iii What makes mathematical statements true?
If mathematical statements are true, then in virtue of what are they true? Corresponding 
mathematical states of affairs, mental constructions, or conventions?
IV.iv How may the true statements o f pure mathematics be known to be true?
As the states of affairs supporting mathematics are objective but abstract, then how can 
there be any epistemological access to such inert facts? Alternatively, such facts can be 
taken to be mental constructions; the challenge then is to explain the apparent objectivity 
of mathematics in the face of such subjectivity.
IV . V Can truth transcend proof in pure mathematics?
Classical mathematics is committed to the existence of statements which are true, but 
which we cannot prove are true: what are known as evidence transcendent truths. A good 
example of a claim the truth of which, at the moment, goes beyond our ability to prove 
its truth, is Goldbach’s conjecture that every even number is the sum of two primes. Most 
mathematicians are reasonably certain that this is true, but as proving it would entail 
finding the prime components of infinitely many even numbers, such a proof could never 
be completed. Dummett’s arguments concern how mathematics is learned: not only do we 
have to learn it, someone has to teach us; moreover, we have to be able to show that we 
have understood what we have been taught. He argues that if knowing the meaning of a 
statement is Icnowing how to use the words in the statement, we could never acquire the 
meaning of words that occur in evidence transcendent statements, nor could someone try 
to teach us what that grasp consisted in, as they could not manifest their understanding of
-  5 -
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the meaning of such words. While it looks on the surface that we do understand what is 
meant, for example, by Goldbach’s conjecture, we have no way of recognising what its 
truth conditions are, and so Dummett’s claim is essentially that while grammatically 
classical mathematics may appear to make sense, logically it does not.
Not only are there statements which intuitively appear meaningful but which 
transcend current proof techniques, there are results such as Godel’s incompleteness 
theorems, which suggest that there must be undecidable statements in any formal system 
which is of a certain strength. Matters are complicated further, as despite the formal 
undecidability of, for example, the Godel sentence U, informally it is possible to 
demonstrate the truth of such statements, suggesting to some that there may be a gap 
between truth and provability, or between formal and informal proof techniques."
One interpretation of the philosophy of mathematics is that it seeks to provide a 
philosophical account of the foundations of mathematics, and so sees the subject closely 
connected to mathematical logic. Although this is less popular than it once was, this is 
still a major influence on the subject. Another approach focusses on the language of 
mathematics — rather than develop a philosophical account by way of investigations 
using mathematical tools, this way relies on methods developed in philosophy of 
language and applies them to questions concerning mathematics. Dummett, Benacerraf 
and Putnam are all examples of such an approach to the philosophy of mathematics.
In this study, answers are sought predominately to the questions about truth and 
reference in mathematics, which will give an insight into questions about the ontological 
status of mathematical objects. While the epistemological questions (the third list) will 
largely be ignored, many of the answers to the questions about reference and truth will 
have implications for the epistemology of mathematics. Some brief comments are made in 
this direction in the final concluding chapter.
H I A  Variety o f  Positions
Platonism is an intuitive and at least prima facie  appealing approach to 
mathematical objects and the nature of their existence: the main supporting argument for
" For example, Shapiro (1991), p l92 writes: “In particular, Godel held that the human ability to 
understand and work with mathematical concepts goes beyond the mechanical, or the formal.” Dummett 
(1978), pl86 writes: “It follows [from GodeTs Theorems] that our notion of natural number, even as used 
in statements involving only one quantifier, cannot be fully expressed by means of any formal system,”
-  6 -
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such a position comes from a simple theory of correspondence between true propositions 
and facts. If mathematical statements are true, then they will be true in virtue of certain 
mathematical facts. Before I sketch three of the main forms of platonism which are still 
advanced today, let me note that each of these is a refinement of an older and less 
sophisticated form of what I shall call Traditional Platonism. This is the view that 
mathematical objects exist independently of the human mind; the position attributed to 
Godel (below) is the closest to Traditional Platonism in this respect. It is usually 
supported by a view of set theory as discovering the basic building blocks of 
mathematics. Opposing accounts of mathematics — such as Formalism and Intuitionism 
— arose partly due to worries resulting from the set theoretic paradoxes and partly as a 
result of genuine philosophical worry over the justification of set theoretic foundations.
There are two main problems with this realist picture of mathematics that has 
become the default position of most mathematicians. Both worries have their modern 
roots in papers by Paul Benacerraf.’^  Essentially, the challenges are taken to be: if we take 
mathematical language seriously, then we are committed to abstract objects such as 
numbers, sets and even functions. The first worry concerns how we can have knowledge 
of such abstract objects, given their metaphysical inertness, and the simple proviso that in 
general, knowledge of the objects x  of a particular domain of discourse, should depend in 
some way on those %’s. The second concern also revolves around the inertness of 
mathematical objects, this time with respect to reference to such objects: as mathematical 
theories at best only succeed in picking out structures up to isomorphism, how can we 
have the notion of determinate reference to a particular mathematical object? Benacerraf 
concluded, that if numbers are sets, there is no way to distinguish which sets they are, 
and so numerical terms do not have determinate singular reference.
Two avenues are open to the platonist in response to such problems: the first 
strategy is to argue that there are sufficient resources to gain direct or indirect access to 
mathematical objects, a route taken by Godel and also by Quine. Crispin Wright, 
following thoughts found in Gottlob Frege’s writings, has opted for the road less 
travelled, to argue that the sorts of problems raised by Benacerraf rely on a mistaken 
notion of what it is to have referential or epistemic access:
It has become commonplace to refer to platonism a view endorsing the mind independent existence of 
abstract objects, and to Platonism as such a view, coupled with the epistemological stance that the access 
to such objects is thorough direct mental contact or acquaintance.
" Benacerraf (1965) and (1973)
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Abstract objects are sometimes thought of constituting a ‘third realm’, a state of being 
truly additional to and independent from the concrete world of causal space time. It is 
this conception of the abstract which generates the well known epistemological 
problems to which nominalism and various forms of reductionism and structuralism 
attempt to respond."
This approach, which is also taken to greater or lesser extents by Jody Azzouni and 
Stewart Shapiro, concentrates on showing that while the objects of mathematics are 
causally inert, this is not a stumbling block on the path to mathematical knowledge.’® 
These three approaches, that there is direct access to mathematical objects (Godel); 
indirect access, mediated by empirical considerations (Quine), and linguistic or semantic 
access to the objects (Frege) are the main modern articulations of Traditional Platonism: 
they are glossed below, followed by accounts of the main lines of opposition to such 
platonist interpretations — Intuitionism and Formalism.
i Godelian Platonism
In some guises, platonism is thought of as a form of idealism,’® and certainly 
interpreting Godel as an idealist about mathematics would be consistent with some of his 
other views (for example, his thoughts about time). At any rate, Godel is often thought of 
as championing platonism, even when it is thought of as a realist cause. One passage in 
particulai* supports this:
But, despite their remoteness form sense experience, we do have something like a 
perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms 
force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see any reason why we should have 
less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition, than in sense 
perception, which induces us to build up physical theories and to expect that future 
sense perceptions will agree with them."
For Godel, there will be no problems of referential or epistemic access to mathematical 
objects — there is essentially the same access to mathematical as to physical objects. This
" Wright (1997), p8
ct. Godel (1944) and (1947); Quine (1953b) and (1969a); Maddy (1980) and (1990a); Resnik (1975), 
(1981) and (1982) with Wright (1983);, Azzouni (1994), and Shapiro (1997)
" e.g. Curry (1951) Ch III, pp5-8 
" Godel (1947)
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is usually interpreted so that this faculty of mathematical intuition is substantial, and on a 
par with perception’®. On the other hand, Godel may just be trying to deflate the problem 
— if he is taken to mean intuition in the eveiyday sense that mathematicians mean it, in 
the course of working out problems — i.e. a sensitivity to hints and clues that comes with 
familiarity to the subject matter, then this becomes much less convincing as a solution to 
serious epistemological questions. It also becomes much, much less mysterious. In what 
follows, when reference is made to the philosophy of Godel, it is the strong, platonist 
interpretation of his thought which will be intended.
Penny Maddy once put forward a position called ‘physicalist platonism’;’® 
drawing her inspiration from the Godel quotation above, she argued that certain 
mathematical objects just are physical objects. For example: there is nothing more to a set 
than the (physical) objects that constitute it. As her views ruled out pure set theoiy (with 
0  as the only urelement) she included an exposition of impure set theory in her work. 
Although she has subsequently given up this position, the objections which forced her 
away from it seem to have been entirely specific to problems with her own position. A 
line will be considered below which, if sustained, will be completely general, and do 
damage to the philosophies of Godel, Maddy and Resnik, as well as others who model 
their accounts of epistemic access to mathematical items on the access which perception 
gives of physical objects.
Resnik holds a version of the thesis that mathematical objects are directly 
perceived — in three articles he has argued that pattern recognition is a major 
epistemological source for mathematics.^” He argues that all mathematics is structural, and 
that structures are discovered by way of directly perceiving instances of their pattern. 
While this shifts the perspective from objects to structures — and this might be 
independently motivated — much of what he says is similar to the Godel-Maddy 
position. Worries about epistemological and referential access are denied: sufficient 
resources are available to have the required access, and those resources are similar to the 
resources we have to gain access to physical objects.
" Note that Brouwer and Poincaré said similar things about intuition; Godel is taken to be a platonist 
because for him, intuition provides the link between the human mind and the objective — mind- 
independent — realm of mathematical facts, while for Brouwer, this faculty constitutes the realm of the 
mathematical.
" Maddy (1990a)
“ Resnik (1975), (1981) and (1982)
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ii  Quinean Platonism
The Quine-Putnam Indispensability argument claims that resources are available to 
solve the problems of epistemic and referential access/' However, unlike Godel, they 
make no claim that the mathematical objects are perceived; instead, the argument is based 
on the reliability of scientific knowledge about other imperceptible entities. Scientific 
realism is often characterised by a commitment to the theoretical, unobserved entities 
postulated by the best physical theories, for example, electrons, quarks and fields of 
force." Scientific realism is motivated by the thought that scientific theories attempt to 
describe the world, in order to explain it. The target is more than mere empirical adequacy 
— it is truth. Hence, acceptance of a scientific theory carries a commitment to the 
unobservable entities required for the formulation of the theory. The Indispensability 
Argument is directed at the scientific realist, who has a systemic commitment to the 
theoretical posits which are mentioned in the course of scientific theories. Based on 
Quine’s thoughts about the holism of knowledge, Putnam has argued that because the 
mathematics which is used to express scientific theories is as essential to the 
understanding of those theories as the theoretical entities are, so the scientific realist 
should be committed to the mathematical posits which are involved in the expression of 
scientific theories, in just the same way as they are to the theoretical ones. The result is an 
argument to the effect that a scientific realist should be a mathematical realist too.
The Indispensability Argument is therefore an argument against Nominalism, and 
the thought that we can take mathematical language roughly at face value without being 
committed to the objects ‘referred’ to in that language. So another way of interpreting the 
argument is to take it as showing that once the literal or face value semantics is accepted, 
then the involvement of mathematics with science forces the truth of mathematical 
statements, and hence leads to the ontological commitment to mathematical items.
Seen in this way, Hartry Field’s brand of irrealism becomes more obvious — he 
accepts scientific realism, or something very close to it, and accepts the literal
interpretation of mathematical statements, but he does not think that the involvement in
Quine (1953a) and (1953c); Putnam (1971) ChV-VIII. Quine argued in Quine (1953a) that ontological 
commitments are dependent upon which variables which are quantified over, and that the choice of 
ontology is decided in the same manner as the choice of scientific theory. Putnam picks up on these 
comments of Quine’s, as well as his general holistic attitude to knowledge, to put forward what is now 
known as the Quine-Putnam argument.
Dancy & Sosa (1992), p420.
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science by mathematics forces mathematical statements to be true. In fact, he argues that 
the statements of mathematics are generally false.
Of course, a Nominalist need not take at face value the occurrences of singular 
terms in mathematical statements — so someone like Benacerraf for example, is able to 
accept scientific realism and that the statements of mathematics are true, without being 
committed to mathematical realism, because he believes that mathematical statements do 
not have the logical foim which their surface grammar suggests.
There is a third alternative way to avoid the conclusion of the Indispensability 
Argument, based on a reexamination of Quinean themes. Azzouni considers Quine’s 
distinction between thin and thick posits, and argues not only that this is a sound 
distinction to draw {contra the later Quine) based on whether the objects posited are used 
merely for the organisation of our experiences, or whether they play a genuinely 
explanatory role. Moreover, Azzouni argues that while many mathematical items find 
their way into science, there is no demand on mathematics that it be applicable. In other 
words, where it happens, applicability is a bonus, and should not be taken as the norm. 
So Azzouni argues that mathematical items are not even thin posits, but are ultrathin 
posits.
i ii  Fregean Platonism
The arguments put forward by Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) rely on the reality of 
language. He argued that where language does genuinely engage with the world — where 
it is true — singular terms (or alternatively Proper Names) refer to, or stand for, objects. 
While this is not the case for all statements (examples of statements for which he thought 
this would fail include propositional attitudes and modal statements), he suggested that 
true indicative statements such as those of numerical identity 2+2=4 supply the requisite 
contexts to show that numerals refer to objects, and hence to infer that numbers are 
objects. This is variously called linguistic or semantic realism, because of the prominence 
of language in this account.
On this view, all contact with mathematical objects is linguistic, but is 
nevertheless objective. This general semantic approach is adopted by some, such as 
Crispin Wright and Bob Hale, who have tried to further develop Frege’s general train of 
thought; a similar train of thought is found in the work of others, such as Shapiro and
-  11
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Azzouni, whose accounts begin with the thought that language mastery and concept 
acquisition are the cornerstones of mathematical knowledge. Both Shapiro and Azzouni 
proceed on the assumption that:
the language of mathematics contains noun phrases and predicate phrases just like the 
language of any other subject matter; and whatever mathematical truths are about, 
naively, seems to be whatever these phrases refer to: numbers, relations, functions, sets,
Banach spaces, and so on, through the range of objects mathematicians study
Unlike Hale and Wright, Shapiro and Azzouni each see mathematical language as lacking
some of the features which ‘empirical’ language sustains: Shapiro takes the references of
mathematical singular terms to be theory dependent; Azzouni describes them as ultrathin.
On the neo-Fregean view which Wright and Hale have adopted, the abstractness
of mathematical objects should not be seen as a serious epistemic problem: simply, the
mastery of the language involved is sufficient for knowledge of mathematics; recognition
of the truth of certain particular statements about mathematical objects is all that is
required for epistemic access to the objects in question.
However, by taking language as the key to solving the first of Benacerraf’s
worries — that if mathematical objects are abstract, how can there be knowledge of such
objects — the second puzzle becomes more of a problem: to account for the actual
mechanism by which reference to such objects possible. The neo-Fregean project
concentrates on this and similar problems; on the other hand, some such as Azzouni,
Putnam and Shapiro have put forward arguments to the effect that concentration on this
problems is philosophically misleading, and that there are no philosophically enlightening
accounts of reference to be had, mathematical or otherwise. Other, such as Dummett,
have accepted that in general, such an account is forthcoming, but for one reason or
other, it fails in the mathematical case. Dummett has put forward what he calls a purely
semantic view of reference for mathematics, and argues that while singular reference is
usually a relationship between a name and the bearer of that name, reference is more
importantly to be seen as a contribution to the semantic value of a statement. He argues
that mathematical terms do not refer to external objects, but do have reference in terms of
contributing to the semantic value of mathematical statements in which they occur.
Dummett takes this as a serious threat to realism about such objects; Azzouni et aL on the 
“ Azzouni (1994), p4
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Other hand, argue that this referential thinness is harmless, and use it as a key notion in 
what they call realist interpretations of mathematics.
As this semantic approach to the problems in the philosophy of mathematics will 
be centre stage for most of the forthcoming chapters, little more will be said about it at 
this stage.
i V In tu ition ism
Intuitionism is generally associated with Jan Brouwer and with constructive 
mathematics, but the view is older than that, going as for back as Immanuel Kant. Simply 
put, the conceptualisation of the world in terms of objects, arranged in time and space 
imposes on reality a certain framework, and mathematical knowledge concerns features of 
that conceptual framework. Kant argued that arithmetic, for example, is based on the 
intuition of time, while geometiy that of space. Mathematics on this view is synthetic a 
priori.
Brouwer’s brand of Intuitionism starts from such Kantian origins, but begins 
with the Primordial Intuition, which in addition to temporal and spatial aspects, involves 
the ways in which the notion of object arises. He argued that such cognitive procedures 
are essentially mathematical. In 1886 David Hilbert produced the first existential proof of 
a mathematical result — he solved Gordan’s problem by showing that there must exist the 
required basis, but without showing that there was any means of constructing this basis. 
In 1904, Brouwer proved a similar result in topology, that any mapping from the surface 
of a sphere back onto that surface
/:S3-^S3
has a fixed point %, that is a point % such that 
f{x)-x
His method showed that such a point must exist, but does nothing to construct such 
points. However, if mathematics is about the way in which man conceptualises the 
world, and is an investigation into man’s conceptual architecture, then mathematics is a
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process of creation, not detection. But existence proofs smack of discovery, not creation: 
he argued that the methods which led to such unacceptable conclusions must be suspect. 
For example, he questioned whether it makes sense to claim that there are seven 
consecutive 7 ’s anywhere in the expansion of k. He argued that without a demonstration 
that there is such a sequence of 7 ’s, or a proof that there is not, the claim has no truth 
value. He suggested that mathematical existence should not be thought of as something 
external, but rather that the objects of mathematics are the result of mental processes or 
constructions. As a result of this, he argued that mathematical statements do not fall into 
two classes — the true ones and the false ones — but rather three: those that have been 
proven, those disproven, and those that have no value, as they have neither been proven 
nor disproven. While he was quite prepared to think that the logical principles of the Law 
of Excluded Middle held for empirical situations, he argued that it failed in mathematics, 
which led him to develop a form of real analysis which did not involve any non­
constructive elements. Brouwer’s Intuitionism differs most notably from earlier forms of 
Intuitionism (such as Kant’s) because of his ‘transfinite-scepticism’, that is, his dismissal 
of the notion of a completed infinite totality, which features heavily in Cantor’s work. It 
is often this, coupled with his denial of the Law of Excluded Middle, which is taken as 
characteristic of his Intuitionism, rather than his thoughts concerning the Primordial 
Intuition and the priority of mathematics over language.
Michael Dummett’s semantic anti-realism stems not from considerations of 
Kantian intuition, but, like Brouwer’s Intuitionism, shares a deep mistrust of transfinite 
set theory, and denies the Law of Excluded Middle. On this basis, his position is worth 
describing as ‘Intuitionist’. Over the past thirty years, Dummett, has argued for 
Intuitionism on the basis of the systematic breakdown of Frege’s semantic arguments for 
realism. Classical mathematics is committed to the existence of statements which are true, 
but which we cannot prove are true: what are known as evidence transcendent truths. A 
good example of a claim the truth of which goes beyond our ability to prove its truth, is 
Goldbach’s conjecture that every even number is the sum of two primes. Most 
mathematicians are reasonably certain that this is true, but as a direct proof would entail 
finding the prime components of infinitely many even numbers, such a proof could never 
be completed.^"* Dummett’s arguments concern how we could learn mathematics: not only
" Of course, this does not rule out the possibility of indirect proofs, of a kind with the indirect approach 
Wiles took to solve Fermat’s Last Theorem.
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do we have to learn it, someone has to teach us; moreover, we have to be able to show 
that we have understood what we have been taught. He argues that if knowing the 
meaning of a statement is knowing how to use the words in the statement, we could never 
acquire the meaning of words that occur in evidence transcendent statements, nor could 
someone try to teach us what that grasp consisted in, as they could not manifest their 
understanding of the meaning of such words. While it looks on the surface that we do 
understand what is meant, for example, by Goldbach’s conjecture, we have no way of 
recognising what its truth conditions are, and so Dummett’s claim is essentially that while 
grammatically classical mathematics may appear to make sense, logically it does not. This 
approach has become known as semantic anti-realism, and like the Intuitionism that 
inspired it, if correct, is generally taken to have revisionary consequences.
V Form alism
Formalism is an attempt to ground knowledge of mathematics in formal systems. 
There have been many different types of formalist approaches — some have rejected the 
existence of matliematical objects, but have sought to defend the practice of mathematics 
by describing it as a useful game. The most hopeful formalist line is due to David Hilbert, 
who rejected the revision of mathematics that the Intuitionist offered, while being 
sympathetic to many of the motivations that lead the Intuitionist to her conclusions. His 
work culminates in his Program,^ which was motivated by three main sources.
Firstly his formalism proper, which developed from his study of axiom systems. 
His realisation was that mathematics could be cut free of the meanings and intuitions 
which had inspired it. As he once expounded to a bunch of colleagues seeing him off 
from the railway station in Berlin, on his way home to Kdnigsberg:
Instead of ‘point, line, plane’, it must always be possible to say, ‘table, chair, 
beermug’.“
If the fifth axiom of Euclidean geometry could be negated, and a consistent theory
developed, then any of the other axioms could also be negated — again giving rise to 
Hilbert’s Program is an attempt to replace those idealised parts of mathematics which appeal to 
infmitary processes, with finite proofs and constructions. The Program had various articulations — most 
famously, the 1928 statement that the content of real mathematics is expressible in the lower predicate 
calculus, i.e. first order logic. (See Hilbert & Ackermann (1928).)
“ This anecdote is retold in Reid (1970), p57.
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bona fide mathematics.'^ If that much is granted, then what is there to stop arbitrarily 
chosen axioms counting as valid mathematics? Hilbert realised that the only qualification 
required was consistency.
Hilbert’s views on the minimality of content or meaning for mathematical 
statements is typical of earlier forms of formalism (such as that developed by Frege’s 
colleague Thomae); Hilbert’s position differed from earlier formalist accounts due to the 
nature of the problems facing mathematics in his time. Many mathematicians, such as 
Leopold Knonecker, had expressed worries over Cantor’s transfinite set theory, but the 
discovery of the set theoretic paradoxes in the first few years of this century led many 
mathematicians to be deeply sceptical about the transfinite. Hilbert shared with Brouwer 
many worries concerning the transfinite — he realised that Georg Cantor’s arguments fail 
to yield the appropriate justificational warrant for the use of transfinite mathematics, as 
they provide no guarantee of consistency.'® Unlike Brouwer, however, Hilbert did not 
take these as a reason to reject set theory, but instead as a motivation to provide the 
requisite warrant for the use of such techniques. In this way, Hilbert’s response to the 
paradoxes of the infinite are comparable to his reaction to existential proofs: given the 
introduction of new methods into mathematics, Hilbert struggled to provide coherent 
justification for what he saw as fruitful and worthwhile innovations; Brouwer, on the 
other hand, was dismissive of both existential proofs and Cantor’s paradise.
Realising that only finite mathematics could give the requisite foundational
^ Actually, Playfair’s axioms of Euclidean geometry are, with the exception of the fifth, dependent on 
each other. However, Hilbert’s formalisation of Euclidean geometry, which includes all of the tacit 
assumptions which Euclid neglected, does have independent axioms. Negating any one of these axioms, is 
just the same as negating the parallelism axiom. As consistency appears to be the only constraint on the 
coherency of the resulting system: it does not matter whether there is an intuitive picture or heuristic to 
accompany the mathematics. Hilbert argued that any set of axioms, even chosen arbitrarily, will be 
mathematically licit, so long as consistent.
^ Hilbert (1925) wrote:
“Let us admit that the present state of affairs which we find ourselves in with respect to the paradoxes is 
intolerable. Just think, the definitions and deductive methods which everyone learns, teaches, and uses in 
mathematics, the paragon of truth and certitude, lead to absurdities! If mathematical thinking is defective, 
where are we to find truth and certitude?
But there is a completely satisfactory way of avoiding the paradoxes of set theory without betraying our 
science. The considerations that lead us to discover this way and the goals toward which we want are 
these:
1) we shall carefully investigate those ways of forming notions and those modes of the inference 
that are fruitful: we shall nurse them, support them, and make them usable wherever there is the slightest 
promise of success. No one shall be able to drive us from the paradise that Cantor has created for us.
2) It is necessary to make inferences eveiywhere as reliable as they are in ordinary elementary 
number theoiy, which no-one questions and in which contradictions and paradoxes arise only through our 
carelessness.”
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security, Hilbert set out his Program to reconstruct all of mathematics from finite means: 
ideal (transfinite) mathematics was to be made safe by way of real (finite) proof methods.
A third source of motivation for his Program was personal: his former pupil 
Hermann Weyl had become a convert to Brouwer’s Intuitionism, and had written several 
articles and had begun to influence other mathematicians. Hilbert thought that if an able 
mathematician such as Weyl could be persuaded by what he considered to be dangerous 
ideas, then it was about time that someone, such as himself, did something about this.
Hilbert did not consider the referential puzzles that are of concern in modern 
philosophy, but his Program is one way to try to solve the problem of epistemic access. 
There may be no way to account for our grasp of finite arithmetic, but this should be one 
of the things about which we should feel most confident. So, given referential and 
epistemic access to finite arithmetic, the problems are solved for the rest of mathematics 
by the reconstruction of all ‘ideal’ mathematics by way of ‘real’ methods.
I V  F  oundationalism
Two thoughts naturally combine in thinldng about mathematics: that mathematics 
has a foundation and that the foundation has epistemological significance. With the 
process of the arithmetization of analysis earned out in the name of rigour by those such 
as Karl WeierstraB and Bernhard Bolzano, towards the end of the nineteenth century it 
became important to give a similarly rigorous treatment of arithmetic. Various equivalent 
axiomatizations were developed independently by Richard Dedekind and Gottlob Frege in 
Germany, and Giuseppe Peano in Italy. About the same time, Cantor was developing the 
theory of transfinite sets, while Felix Hausdoiff was applying essentially the same theory 
to functional analysis and topology. Ernst Zermelo produced the first axiomatization of 
set theory in 1908, in order to provide a platform from which to argue for his well- 
ordering principle. As various branches of mathematics are reducible in one sense or 
another to either set theory or arithmetic, a natural and appealing thought is to base a 
philosophy of mathematics on account of the epistemology of the intuitive arithmetical 
and set theoretic foundations, and the principles by which the rest of mathematics could 
be generated from those foundations.
The history of the project is complicated or, as some would have it, inspired by 
the set theoretic paradoxes, such as the Burali-Forti paradox (1897) concerning the
17  -
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ordinal number of the set of ordinals; the Cantor paradox (1899) concerning the 
cardinality of the set of all sets, and the Russell-Zermelo paradox (1902 and 1895) 
concerning the set of sets which are not self-membered. As set theory had become 
indispensable in mathematics — for example, in its use in Lebesgue’s 1901 measure 
theory — and because of its foundational role, solving the problems caused by these 
paradoxes became not only a mathematical goal but a philosophical one too, suggesting 
the following relationship between foundations and philosophy:
The business of the philosophy of mathematics is to provide the foundations of 
mathematics. Philosophy is kept in business by the fact that there are competing 
alternatives to the title of foundations.^’
There is some correlation between the different (Traditional) positions — Platonism, 
Formalism and Intuitionism — and the type of mathematical logic employed to express 
the foundations; elementary texts often advance the thesis that Platonists advocate set 
theory, Formalists proof theory and Intuitionists recursion theory. While this is not 
strictly accurate, it does suggest the tight connection which — at least at some point this 
century — existed between the foundations of mathematics (by which I mean 
foundational disciplines such as set theory, model theory and recursion theory) and 
philosophical enquiiy concerning mathematics.
Although one of the major trends this century has been the decline of 
epistemological foundationalism, it has lingered on as a tenable doctrine in the philosophy 
of mathematics far longer than in other areas of philosophy. In other areas, the onslaught 
of Wittgenstein’s thoughts about certainty, or Quine’s holism^" — leading to his ideas 
about naturalized epistemology — have silenced the foundationalist, but due to the tight 
connection between foundational studies and the way that the philosophy of mathematics 
is practised, foundationalism still has a major effect on the philosophy of mathematics 
today.
One reaction to foundationalism in mathematics rests on a rejection of 
foundational studies as important to the epistemology of mathematics, and in particular, to 
the way in which mathematics grows and develops. This anti-foundationalist attitude not 
only leads to the thought that foundational disciplines ought not to be the focus of
Tymoczko “Introduction”: InTymoczko (1985), ppxiii-xvii 
e,g . Wittgenstein (1969), Quine (1969a)
—  18  —
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
philosophical enquiry, but that by concentrating upon this area of mathematics, 
philosophers have repeatedly been misled in the past. One important example of such an 
approach to the philosophy of mathematics is that of Lakatos. In various writings, he 
attacked the foundationalist approach to mathematical knowledge, which he took to be 
captured by the thought that:
while science is a posteriori, contentful and (at least in principle) fallible, mathematics 
is a priori, tautologous and infallible.^'
In order to criticise this foundational epistemology, he concentrated on the underlying 
methodology. He argued that there are two types of theories: Euclidean and quasi- 
empirical. In his editorial preface, Tymoczko comments:
An image of Euclidean theories is that they begin by stating the essential nature of 
their subjects, and go on to describe its detailed variations. Knowledge, as given by 
proof, is infallible. The image of quasi-empirical thought, on the other hand, is that 
they begin while their subjects are still indeterminate, they describe and manipulate 
many variations and their goal is to get to the underlying principles
Foundational philosophies of mathematics support the Euclidean attitude to mathematics; 
Lakatos argued that the actual methodology employed in mathematics is not necessarily 
Euclidean, but that the quasi-empirical methodology is also employed.
It would not suffice for Lakatos to find that mathematicians are occasionally 
wrong, that they produce contradictions in the course of their work: obvious examples 
include Frege’s inconsistency, or tlie various flawed proofs of famous conjectures, such 
as Euler’s ‘proof’ of Feimat’s last theorem for M=5, or Kemp’s proof that every map is 4- 
colourable.
It is crucial for his argument that Lakatos find ‘potential falsifiers’ for mathematical 
theories, beyond the obvious logical falsifiers (inconsistency). Otherwise mathematics 
would not share in the fallibilism of science.^^
Lakatos does indeed produce such examples; he calls them ‘heuristic falsifiers’ to
Lakatos (1985), p30 
Tymoczko (1985), p29 
“ f6W.p30
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distinguish them from ‘logical falsifiers’. His best known work, Proofs and 
Refutations^'^ is a study in the method of heuristic falsification, and the avenues of 
response which such falsifiers offer.
The case he considers in greatest detail concerns the Descartes-Euler polyhedra 
formula. The paradigm cases of polyhedra include cubes, pyramids, decahedrons, etc,. 
These shapes are not taken to be solids, rather think of them as made of pipe cleaners. 
The following result can be shown to hold:
(DEF) V-E+F=2
establishing this relationship between edges (E), faces (F) and vertices (V) is 
straightforward, and relies on a method of triangulation: by removing one face of the 
polyhedron, it can be embedded in the plane; then by simply dividing up the faces into 
tiiangles in such a way that when an edge is added to form a triangle, a new face is 
created, the number of faces and edges increases in tandem. The triangles may then be 
removed from the complex (starting at the outside of the shape) until only a triangle 
remains: again, this removal preserves the relative differences of edges, faces and 
vertices. Finally, there will be one triangle left, so that V-E+F=l; by adding the original 
face that was removed to enable embeding, this gives the Descartes-Euler Formula (DEF) 
as required.
One of the heuristic falsifiers suggested is the ‘picture frame’ i.e. a cube with a 
‘square’ hole in the middle. Then DEF fails. A number of responses are possible — 
roughly, three responses are worth mentioning:
i the falsifier can be accepted with good grace; it shows that the paradigms upon
which the proof was based (in this case, polyhedra such as cubes and pyramids) 
are not representative of all polyhedra. The proof contains a hidden lemma 
(concerning plane embeddability) which the paradigms satisfy, but other 
polyhedra do not: the response is to amend the proof, making the lemma explicit, 
and showing how it can be extended to cover the new case 
a the proof is fine; the paradigms are also fine as they are: what is at fault is the
definition of the paradigm cases of polyhedra, which are plane embeddable. By
Lakatos (1976)
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giving a new more restricted scope to the result, the proof and the theorem stand, 
but they concern not all polyhedra, but the plane-embeddable or regular ones.
Hi ignore the ‘picture frame’ type of counter-example; it deviates too far from the 
central paradigms even to count as a polyhedron.
Lakatos took analysis to show that mathematical theories, like scientific theories 
are not necessarily Euclidean, and can use a quasi-empirical methodology, moreover he 
argued — by identifying Euclidean theories with a priori discourses — that mathematics 
is not a priori and infallible.
At this point I would like to suggest a number of points of departure from 
Lakatos. To begin with, rather than suggestively describe those methods which are not 
Euclidean as quasi-empirical, it is less pejorative to give the quasi-empiricist methodology 
a new name; call such a methodology Stratoan, after another Greek, Strato (288-268BC) 
also called “The Physicist” , who was sometime head of the Lyceum. Although Lakatos 
restricts his labelling to the methodologies underlying theories, there is no confusion if 
these terms are used quite generally, for example to talk of Euclidean knowledge or a 
Stratoan discourse.
I take it that Lakatos does establish tliat mathematics is — or at least, sometimes is 
— Stratoan rather than Euclidean, but I reject is his identification of the Euclidean with 
the a priori. This is justified by considering the counter-examples which he produced, and 
question just how they are adduced. Producing the ‘picture frame’ as potential falsifier 
could be the result of an empirical procedure; for example, one might try the DEF on a 
picture frame while putting a picture into it, or while looking at a picture, etc., and 
become convinced of the failure of the DEF on such grounds. But this alone will not 
establish the claim as an empirical one, as it is not the content of the judgment which we 
must consider, nor its formation process, but rather the justification of the judgment. 
Judging the picture frame to be a polyhedron, and that it heuristically falsifies DEF is 
something which is completely independent of any experience: it is an a priori matter. As 
a result, it is worth calling such falsifiers a priori ones. The notions of a priori falsifiers 
and the Stratoan methodology are considered in §XXX, ii.
If foundationalism is built on the thought that:
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whereas scientific generalisation is readily admitted to be fallible, the truths of 
mathematics and logic appear to everyone to be necessary and certain^
then the existence of a priori defeaters, and the applicability of Stratoan methodology in 
mathematics certainly ruins the foundationalist conception of mathematics as Euclidean, 
infallible and certain.
Another way of opposing foundationalism is to reject the epistemological strategy 
underpinning it, that is, to reject the model of knowledge which progresses from true 
premises via truth preserving laws of inference to generate all the he rest of mathematical 
knowledge. The net result may differ little from that of the Stratoan methodology, but 
deviates from Lakatos’ views in at least one important respect. Like other anti- 
foundationalists, he had little time for considerations arising from foundational disciplines 
— all relevant evidence was to be gathered from the mainstream of mathematics, and not 
from mathematical logic. Non-foundationalist epistemologies, on the other hand, accept 
that all areas of mathematics, foundational or otherwise, are important to the philosophy 
of mathematics, but grant epistemic priority to neither area. Two influential non- 
foundationalist strategies are due to Quine and Wittgenstein; however, going into the 
details of either the methods of naturalized epistemology, or the notion of a hinge 
proposition goes beyond what is necessary here. It suffices to think of non- 
foundationalism as a midpoint between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism: like 
foundationalism, it sees philosophical value in the investigation foundational disciplines 
such as set theory, but does not treat such investigations as having any greater weight 
than parallel investigations into more mainstream areas of mathematics, such as group 
theory or topology. At some points, a non-foundationalist interpretation of Lakatos’ work 
will be used, but generally in what follows, little will be said explicitly about the 
epistemology of mathematics; however it will become obvious that the underlying 
epistemological approach is non-foundational.
V  The Philosophy o f  M athematics today.
Much of the philosophy of mathematics practised today arises from consideration 
of two puzzles already mentioned, those put forward by Paul Benacerraf in the sixties. In 
two articles he challenged the then largely dominant position — Platonism. In the first of
Ayer (1936), p72
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these, “Mathematical Truth”, he considered the epistemological problems with the view 
that, for example, numbers exist, enjoy a mind-independent existence, and are causally 
inert. Philip Kitcher elegantly sums up the line of reasoning which leads to the dilemma 
which Benacerraf poses:
Benacerraf’s point is very simple: according to the Platonist, mathematics is concerned 
with mind-independent abstract objects and as such do not interact with human subjects.
Yet if we adopt an enlightened theory of knowledge, we should hold that when a person 
knows something about an object there must be some causal connection between the 
object and the person. Given that we know some mathematics, it follows that either our 
best theory of mathematical truth (Platonism) or our best theory of Knowledge (a causal 
theory) is mistaken.^®
There is however, a way out of this dilemma, avoiding both horns; this is to claim that 
“mathematical objects are, epistemologically speaking, posits.”®^ By positing such 
objects, there is no need to give an account of the mechanism by which we come to know 
such posits, nor to claim that the positing of such entities tracks the existence of actual 
mathematical objects. This has led to a standard line about mathematics, which is usually 
put forward by those not working specifically in the field of the philosophy of 
mathematics. This standard line is the form of mathematical realism put forward by Hilary 
Putnam, by way of a ‘Quinean’ argument, otherwise known as the Indispensability 
Argument, which was mentioned above.
Recall Putnam’s argument ran like this: if scientific theories are taken seriously, 
they involve a commitment to the entities postulated by the theories, even in cases when it 
is not possible to experimentally verify the existence of such objects. Commitment to the 
theory, however, entails commitment to the theoretical entities which are used to 
formulate the theory. If our knowledge is really holistic, as Quine claims, then the 
theoretical entities are not the only posits we are committed to by the acceptance of the 
theory: as mathematics is involved in expressing physical theory, we are also committed 
to accepting the existence of mathematical objects.
A number of positions have emerged to challenge this standard line — for 
example, Hartry Field has proposed a fîctionalist or irrealist interpretation of mathematics;
he claims there are no numbers, sets of functions, and as he is a scientific realist, it falls
“ Kitcher (1983), ppl02-3 
” Azzouni (1994), p59
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squarely on his shoulders to tackle the Indispensability argument and explain the 
usefulness of mathematics to science, if mathematics is to be read as being literally false.
He does so by redefining the logical notion of conservativeness; a theory of 
mathematics T is conservative over a scientific theory S just in case every result which 
can be proven using S and T can be proven using S alone. Wliat the mathematical theories 
do is preserve truth, although they are not true themselves.
His argument is that mathematics is useful only in speeding up calculations — it 
does not add anything substantial to the scientific theory: therefore as far as 
representational content goes, Field contends that mathematics is dispensable. In fact, he 
calls for a reconstrual of physical theory, so that large amount of mathematical modelling 
is built into the scientific theory, in order that there is no uninterpreted pure mathematics 
left free standing.
Field’s critics have focused on the account of conservativeness, and Field’s ability 
to articulate this notion. Hale points out:
Since conservativeness is defined in terms of consequence, which can in turn be defined 
in terms of consistency, we can focus on how Field is to understand the last notion.^
The usual route is through model theory — a theory is consistent, if it has a model. 
However, as model theory is dependent upon set theory, this proposal is a non-starter for 
a nominalist like Field. Proof-theoretic notions are likewise of little use: a theory is 
consistent if no contradictions are derivable from its axioms. However, Field 
acknowledges that this route is closed too — as it requires the derivations to be 
understood as abstract entities in their own right. Consequently, Field takes the notion of 
possibility to be primitive, and explains conservativeness in terms of possibility — but, 
even granted the legitimacy of this step, he is not yet out of the woods. Hale argues that 
with this primitive notion of possibility, the nominalist acceptance of the consistency of 
arithmetic amounts to the claim that while there are no numbers, there might have been, 
i.e. that arithmetic is, at worst, contingently false. Hale concludes:
It seems that, on the one hand. Field owes an account, in nominalistic terms, of how 
things would have had to have been otherwise, for mathematical statements to be true;
Hale (1993), p42
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but on the other, no such account can be forthcoming if mathematics is conservative.^
So Field is left requiring an explanation for the contingent non-existence of abstract 
objects, but apparently unable to provide an account.
Stewart Shapiro has argued that in addition these problems, Field’s account of 
conservativeness faces a separate difficulty His thought is that the initial appeal of 
Field’s work comes by way of an intuitive notion of possibility, which he uses to resolve 
problems which are harder to solve using the standard neo-Fregean or structuralist 
machinery. However, this intuitive modal notion itself runs into problems which are as 
difficult as those facing the original positions, and so in the long run, seems to have 
secured no distinctive advantage over them.
In another article, “What numbers could not be”, Benacerraf raises a second 
problem, which then led him to the structuralist position for which he is known. It is well 
known that it is possible to represent much of mathematics in a set theoretic framework. 
Now, Benacerraf claims that if natural numbers are genuinely up for singular reference, 
then there will be particular sets which are the referents of numerals. However, it is 
possible to represent the natural numbers in set theory in at least two well known ways — 
as Zermelo ordinals 0 ,  { 0 } ,  { { 0 } } ,  { { { 0 } } } ,  etc., and as von Neumann ordinals 0 ,  
{ 0 } ,  { 0 ,  { 0 } } ,  { 0 ,  { 0 } ,  { 0 ,  { 0 } } } ,  etc.. There seems to be no way to secure 
determinate singular reference, and so no way to tell, if numbers are sets, which sets they 
are. Benacerraf opens this up further, to argue that there is no way of telling, if numbers 
are objects, which numbers they are. Benacerraf argues that, while they look like singular 
terms, numerals must in fact have a misleading surface grammar, and that their genuine 
logical foim is not that of a singular teim at all. He argues that in general, statements of 
arithmetic will be hypothetical statements of the form: if there were an co-sequence, then 
such and such a result would hold. So rather than focus on the objects mentioned in 
mathematical theories, Benacerraf is suggesting that it is the structure which should be 
concentrated upon.
Structuralism has recently become very popular, almost dominating the literature 
with its presence. But it is not always the type of if-then structuralism which Benacerraf 
suggested; there are realist interpretations of mathematics which rely on the notion of a
“ Hale (1993), p42 
“ Shapiro (1993)
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Structure, in order to sidestep Benacerraf’s puzzles about knowledge to, and reference of, 
abstract objects.
Most recent expositions of platonism have concentrated on arithmetic — to the 
extent that such a typical platonist position is called objects-platonism or arithmetical 
platonism by Resnik and others (presumably to contrast with their broader platonist 
pictures of mathematics). The structuralist’s charge is that arithmetic is only one small 
part of mathematics, and that what is needed for a philosophy of mathematics is an 
account that covers all of mathematics, rather than arithmetic alone: e.g. analysis, set 
theory, group theory, topology and universal algebra need to be included in the account 
too. It is on these grounds that structuralists have sought to challenge the platonist — 
claiming that by considering other areas of mathematics, various insights are gained; these 
insights, when transfeired to the arithmetical case, solve certain philosophical dilemmas.
Placing the structuralist cleanly in the orthodox disputes between platonists, 
constructivists and formalists is a difficult task. Benacerraf’s original piece is easily 
interpreted as a new nominalist attack on platonism,'" while Resnik and Shapiro both 
claim to be realists;'*  ^Jody Azzouni is a fo rm alist,and  many who advocate category 
theoretic structuralism make a (tenuous) connection between their work and that of the 
constructivists,'”
One way of looking at structuralism — unlike the other positions — is to treat it 
as essentially orthogonal to the concerns of the realism/ anti-realism debate, and to think 
of it as arguing for a change in the context of the debate, and a change in the criteria by 
which the success or failure of a philosophy of mathematics is judged. As well as giving 
arguments for the appropriateness of such changes in context, structuralists also give their 
own views as to what an appropriate philosophy in the new context would be.
The structuralist argues that the data for philosophy of mathematics comes from
the working practices of professional mathematicians, which entails giving an account of
the mathematical notion of structure. As this is the single most important feature of
modern mathematics, any account which does not say something about structure, the
structuralist contends, is wide of the mark. This new perspective on mathematics, it is 
■" Benacerraf (1965)
Shapiro advances ante rem structuralism as being both realist in truth value and in ontology, see 
Shapiro (forthcoming); Resnik explicitly claims to be a platonist in Resnik (1981).
Azzouni describes his position as ‘platonism without problems’ or ‘nominalism for cheap’. Resnik 
describes him as a formalist in his review, see Resnik (1996).
” This point has been made informally, for example, by Michael Wright and John Mayberry.
— 26  —
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
claimed, then gives insight into various philosophical problems which have traditionally 
plagued the platonist, e.g. referential and epistemic access.
Finding the point of contact between platonism, say, and structuralism is 
complicated by two factors. Firstly, structuralism is not a single philosophical position, 
but rather an approach to the philosophy of mathematics in the non-foundationalist 
tradition. For a platonist who was also a foundationalist, the disagreement might take the 
shape of a dispute over foundationalism and non-foundationalism; even for a platonist 
who had no overt foundationalist inclinations, the structuralist is prone to accusing her of 
letting the residue of this foundationalism motivate her objects-based account.'*^ The 
second factor involves the realism debate: a good example of this is Hale’s attack on pure- 
structuralism,*^ which finds fault with the in re structuralist’s irrealist ontology, i.e. that 
one can have ‘Mathematics without numbers’.
Often these two factors intertwine, and the conflict is presented as turning on one 
point: whether structuralism or platonism gives the better account of arithmetic. I think 
this brings out the worst in each side of the debate. This dissertation is motivated by a 
desire to understand the nature of tlie relationship between platonism and the many forms 
of structuralism; to consider which issues should be grounds of contention, and which 
points of agreement. The reader will find it helpful to keep this underlying motivation in 
mind as the various Chapters unfold.
i M oving the debate forw ard
The development of these different positions seems to be neither as clear, nor as 
well worked out, as they could be. The initial Quinean view of mathematics, later 
developed by Putnam via the Indispensability argument, is at first sight an adequate 
response to the Benacerraf puzzles; yet this fonn of realism seems quite consistent with at 
least some of the structuralist interpretations which have emerged from considerations 
which are really quite different ways of trying to solve these same puzzles.
Something has gone wrong in the dialectic — the avenues of approach have 
become confused, and positions have arisen that are a mishmash of different ways of 
tackling the problems. To untangle and unravel the many intertwined threads would be 
difficult and time consuming — it is easier to look at the initial lines of response to the
See for example, Heilman (1991) or Mayberry (1994). 
Hale (1996)
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twin puzzles of Referential and Epistemic Access, and to work backwards to the original 
problems, and then develop a cleaner position in the light of this. Cutting the knots in this 
way will take up all of the next section; then the following section will sketch an 
alternative view, which will be developed in the following chapters.
ii  The horns o f  the dilemma
Benacerraf’s puzzles offer a clear and simple dilemma, yet the Quine-Putnam line 
fails to engage with either horn, and instead finds a middle way — which ultimately adds 
little but confusion to the debates. In closing off this third line, the debate is thrown back 
onto solving the original dilemma.
There are a number of problems with the Indispensability Argument — some of 
which are potentially disastrous, others which are merely inconvenient to anyone trying to 
sustain this line. One of the problems which might be described as ‘merely inconvenient’ 
arises from the scope of the argument — the Indispensability Argument is targeted at the 
scientific realist. Anyone who was not already persuaded by some form of argument for 
scientific realism, would find the Indispensability Argument wholly unpersuasive. As 
there are well worked out forms of scientific anti-realism, such as Instrumentalism, quasi- 
Instrumentalism {e.g. Bas van Fraasen’s constructive empiricism or Arthur Fine’s 
reconstruction of a Blackburn style quasi-realism) or Fine’s own NOA, the argument 
would seem to require some rather significant hostage taking.'*’
Worse still, the argument itself may not even persuade the scientific realist. The 
argument works by drawing an analogy between the unobservables of scientific theory, 
and the unobservable items of mathematics. Azzouni has put forward some rather 
compelling reasons for thinking that, between these two classes of entity, there are not 
simple analogies, but striking disanalogies. Without there being some sort of analogy or 
similarity account, the argument does not go through. Drawing on one set of 
disanalogies, Azzouni has also proposed a further set of problems which show that 
mathematical objects cannot be on par with any ‘empirical objects’ observable or 
otherwise.
For a fuller discussion of realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science, see Fine’s survey 
article: Fine (1986a)
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Hi The f ir s t disanalogy
The Indispensability Argument trades on an analogy between mathematical objects 
and the unobservable theoretical entities of science. It is only because of this analogy that 
the claim can be made, that the ontological commitment to theoretical entities should be 
extended to also include a commitment to mathematical items. That the two types of object 
share certain similarities is straight forward and fairly plausible — it is even more 
compelling if Quine’s analysis of the role of evidence in scientific theories is added'*®. 
However, there is one factor which has been forgotten, and it relates to the original 
tenability of the scientific realist’s position. Azzouni uses this to point out that there are 
disanalogous practices in mathematics and in the empirical sciences, relating to the 
treatment of objects.'*^
One of the arguments in favour of the scientific realist’s stance is that:
A crucial part of the practice of empirical science is constructing means of access to 
(many of) the objects that constitute the subject matter of that science. Certainly this 
is true of theoretical objects such as subatomic particles, blackholes, genes and so on.
Empirical scientists attempt to interact with most of the theoretical objects they deal 
with, and it is almost never a trivial matter to do so. Scientific theory and engineering 
know-how are invariably engaged in such attempts, which are often ambitious and 
expensive.®®
While the realist commitment to the theoretical entities of a scientific theory are 
part of a broader understanding of the role of scientific theories and explanation, unless 
this were supported by the attempts of scientists to access the objects, then the realist’s 
approach would be unconvincing. However, in the mathematical case, there is no way to 
make such attempts to interact with mathematical objects. So while certain entities may be 
unobserved by the standards of today’s science, judged by the standards of tomorrows, 
they may well be observable — but this could never be the case with abstract objects such 
as mathematical objects.
Notice that this does not turn on there being differences in the epistemology of 
mathematical and empirical objects — the notions of a prioricity and a posteriority are not 
being contrasted; rather what is a contrast is the importance of access to each of these
^ Quine (1969a)
Azzouni (1994), Introduction, pp4-5 
“ ibid., p5
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disciplines. While physical theory may license a scientist to believe in the existence of an 
unobserved theoretical entity, the warrant given by the theory amounts to little more than 
a search warrant: it grants the scientist grounds for thinking it worth while (in time and 
money) to plan experiments to gain access to such objects. The mathematical case is 
profoundly different — the mathematician is never concerned with trying to gain this sort 
of access to mathematical objects — because these objects are causally inert. So 
mathematical items should not be thought of as ‘on par’ with the theoretical entities of 
physical science.
iv  The second disanalogy
Not only does Azzouni argue against there being any analogy between the 
unobservable entities of physical science, he also has an argument to suggest that contra 
Gddel, mathematical objects cannot be on par with physical objects. His analysis begins 
with object-dependent thoughts, that is, those thoughts or propositions which focus on an 
object — these are also called de re or singular thoughts. The analysis can be generalised 
to cover de dicto propositions too, but it suffices to consider the de re case. The two main 
approaches to object-dependent thoughts currently discussed in the literature are due to 
Burge and to E v a n s o n  either analysis, there are two ways for a singular thought to fail: 
by successfully concentrating on an object, but upon the wrong object, or by failing to 
concentrate upon an object at all, in which case, according to Evans, there is no genuine 
thought at all. Azzouni concentrates on the first case, and considers both ways in which 
the use of proper names and definite descriptions can lead to linguistic mishaps. He calls 
such mishaps primary where they concern the use of names, and secondaiy where they 
involve definite descriptions. A primary-A mishap occurs when a singular thought takes 
the ‘wrong’ object as its reference: mistaking Tweedledum for Tweedledee for example. 
A primary-‘A’ mishap involves picking out the ‘right’ object in a singular thought, but 
misnaming it.
Azzouni argues that while both primary-A and primary-‘A ’ mishaps are possible 
with “empirical objects”, this is not the case with mathematical objects. His reasoning is 
not based on hard argument, but rather on a number of compelling examples, which will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. At this stage it suffices to present his
®‘ Burge (1979), Evans (1982)
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conclusions — that in the case of small numbers, primary-A mishaps do not occur, and in 
the case of large numbers, any putative A-mishap can always be written off as an ‘A’ 
mishap. He calls this phenomenon A-infallibility, and concludes that it is not possible to 
have mastery of the linguistic practice of mathematics, and fail to refer. Whether this 
conclusion is warranted or not, his analysis is sufficient to think that there is a disanalogy 
between the referential access, via perception, to physical objects and the comparable 
access to mathematical objects, which is sufficient to block the development of Godelian 
Platonism.
V Truth and positing mathematical entities
In a recent article,^ Arthur Collins has suggested what may be a third disanalogy, 
or it may simply be an elegant corollaiy to Azzouni’s first disanalogy. Collins suggests 
that unlike the scientific case, when we make mathematical assertions, we already know 
that the entities mentioned in such expressions exist. He gives the following example:
Since we know that there are four prime numbers less than 8 we know that there are 
numbers.
He calls this the ‘short argument’ for the existence of numbers. This ‘short argument’ 
seems to rely on the following: that when the surface syntax is taken ‘at face value’, the 
truth of certain mathematical statements ensures that there are objects, i.e. numbers, 
which make those statements true. So there are no strange goings on with third realms, 
imaginary objects, or such like, but rather the objects appear as ‘shadows’ of the syntax, 
non-physical but nevertheless real.^ ® But this is merely to suggest that we should be 
developing a philosophy of mathematics along neo-Fregean lines.
The ‘short argument’ turns out to be not so short when it is taken as being the 
general guiding principle behind a philosophy of mathematics. Certainly, from Frege’s 
Context Principle, we know that singular terms in true indicative statements refer to 
objects, but this Fregean principle requires more unpacking than Collins realises, before 
the short argument will run.
For example, how are we to Icnow that numerals are genuine singular terms?
“ Collins (1998), pp23-37.
The metaphor is Wright’s; see Wright (1992), ppl81-2.
-  31 -
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
(Dummett devotes a whole chapter to this issue, which has since been criticised by Hale 
in at least two articles, as well as there being other criticism by, for example, Linda 
Wetzel.^ So the ‘short argument’ is definitely a misnomer.)
How do we know that mathematical statements provide the appropriate kinds of 
contexts — indicative ones — from which the Fregean Principle proceeds? Paul 
Benacerraf’s structuralist account of mathematics explicitly denies this, as does Geoff 
Heilman’s more recent modal structuralism: they claim that mathematical statements when 
properly analysed, are subjective or hypothetical statements, and they advocate using an 
explicit translation to make it clear just what is happening, and to show that there is no 
singular reference occurring. In the light of such opposition, it cannot just be assumed 
that the the surface grammar is indicative; some substantial argument will have to be given 
for this view.
Frege argued that identity statements at least, do provide a secure indicative 
context from which to run the argument — provided of course that statements such as 
‘2+2=4’ can be shown to be genuine identity statements: a task which in itself requires 
the solution to the notorious Caesar Problem. I think that the general strategy outlined in 
Wright’s Frege's Conception o f Numbers as Objects, and refined in various subsequent 
papers, does solve the Caesar problem; nevertheless, this again shows that the ‘short 
argument’ is once again, not so short.
V I Outline and plan o f attack
As already mentioned, the following Chapter will look at Collins’ ‘short 
argument’, and fill in the gaps along the lines of ‘Scottish platonism’. This continues 
what is essentially ‘stage-setting’ for the later debate, the clash between structuralism and 
platonism.
Chapter 2 starts with a gloss of Wright’s resuscitation of Frege’s original
statement of logicism, as it is the most worked out example of the semantic approach to
problems in the philosophy of mathematics. While most of the debates between Wright,
Hale, Dummett, Boolos and Heck will be entertained, this is not a highly detailed nor
systematic treatment of the problems facing logicism. I take it that the neo-Fregean line is
tenable; the issues raised are brought up more in terms of setting the stage for a latter
enlargement of the scope of the neo-Fregean argument, rather than to prove the viability 
See Dummett (1973), pp54-8I, Hale (1995), (forthcoming), and Wetzel (1990).
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of this line. However, enough of the objections to arithmetical platonism will be 
canvassed that most should be convinced of the success of this endeavour. The argument 
will begin with the linguistic thesis — that singular terms in true indicative sentences refer 
to objects, and that mathematical statements are truth apt. Criteria of singular termhood 
will be considered, as will some of the problems with this approach.
Dummett has broadly accepted this way of tackling the problems, but has also 
advocated a causal theory of knowledge and of reference, thus clearly grasping one form 
of Benacerraf’s dilemma. Hale and Wright, however, have given an account of 
identifying knowledge which accounts for both causal and non-causal means of referring 
to and having discriminating knowledge of objects, thereby defusing Benacerraf’s first 
puzzle.
In the third Chapter, recent structural philosophies of mathematics are introduced. 
As typically presented, structuralism is the view that “All mathematics is structural” . 
Certainly, some areas of mathematics are structural: any position taking such a stance will 
be described as modest stmcturalism, while that stressing the importance of stiucture in 
arithmetic is radical, in that it offers a new (and hence radical) ontology for arithmetic. 
Full blown or extreme structuralism expresses the view given by the slogan above, that 
“All mathematics is structural” . The aim of the Chapter is twofold. Firstly to examine 
various notions of mathematical structure, and various theories as to what role structures 
play in the philosophy of mathematics, and to try to reconstruct the historical move from 
modest structuralism as a methodological approach to mathematics, to the philosophical 
accounts of extreme structuralism. Secondly to advance various problems connected with 
the different extreme structuralist positions, which will show that extreme structuralism is 
untenable, and that any attempt at blanket solutions in the philosophy of mathematics 
based on replacing problems with objects by structural considerations will turn out 
unworkable.
The fourth Chapter returns to considerations of modest structuralism, and by 
focusing on the distinction between structural and non-structural areas of mathematics, 
leads to a new approach based on taking seriously a set of new problems for the 
philosopher: the challenge to the philosopher of mathematics is — rather than give an 
account solely in terms of mathematical objects or structures — to give an account of both 
structural and non-stractural areas of mathematics, as well as an explanation of how the
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two areas relate. Taking the neo-Fregean line from Chapter 2 as the appropriate 
interpretation to give of mathematical systems, that is, the non-structural areas of 
mathematics, three alternative modest structuralist accounts are sketched, how they relate 
to the non-structural areas, and also some problems facing each alternative are developed.
Chapter 5 takes the third of these accounts of structure, and considers it — and 
the explanation it offers as to the relationship between structures and systems. Rather than 
continue to focus on issues surrounding reference, truth becomes the central notion for 
this and the next Chapter. These considerations then lead on into Wright’s account of 
minimalism, and the differences between minimal and robust notions of truth, based on 
different levels of objectivity of the truth-conferring states of affairs concerned. Wright’s 
notions of minimalism will be examined, and contrasted with Hilbert’s deflationary 
attitude to truth in mathematics. The realism relevant properties — cognitive command 
and width of cosmological role — will be introduced, and their aptness for a priori 
discourse discussed; this will lead on to an application of this analysis to mathematics.
In the sixth Chapter, Wright’s further contrast, between evidentially constrained 
and unconstrained truth will be picked up, looking at the ways in which structural 
concepts are introduced to fix the meaning of new concepts, while concepts belonging to 
arithmetic already have their extension determined prior to the formalisation of 
mathematics. This distinction gives way to the more usual notions of response 
dependence and independence; it is therefore necessary to show how certain areas of 
mathematics can be response dependent without inviting a revision of mathematics.
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V ÎÏ  In troduction
In the previous Chapter, three main alternatives were sketched for the platonist — 
either to take mathematics as referring to an abstract world which is somehow perceptible; 
that reference is mediated by theoretical needs of science, or to take the reality of language 
as the key ingredient for platonism. In order to separate these three different approaches, 
two disanalogies were introduced: the first suggests mathematical objects and the 
unobservable entities of physical science are not on par with each other, hence blocking 
the conclusion of the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument; while the second 
disanalogy reveals that mathematical objects are dissimilar to any “empirical objects”, 
whether observable or not, due to the impossibility a certain sort of referential mishap in 
the mathematical case — which Azzouni describes as A-infallibility — hence blocldng 
any line such as Godel’s which takes the reference of mathematical terms to be fixed by 
the same processes as that of other teims.
Not only do these disanalogies rule out the first two of these alternatives: i.e. 
Godelian and Quinean platonism, but Collins’s further disanalogy motivates what he calls 
the ‘short argument’ for the existence of numbers, which when fleshed out, is the third 
platonist account mentioned above, that of Frege. The key thought behind this approach 
is that it is the discipline of certain assertoric practices which secures reference, and 
provides insight into the ontological issues in mathematics. Standardly, the problems 
which face a platonist revolve around the abstractness of mathematical objects — if these 
objects are conceived of as inhabiting some “third realm”, a platonic heaven as it were, 
then there will be problems of referential and epistemic access. Much of this depends on a 
pictorial notion of what the mathematical universe must be like, Wright comments:
remarkably little has been done to provide an unpictorial, sustainable account of what
platonism as a philosophy of mathematics comes to in essentials.'
The account of platonism given by Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is to be found in
two main works — Die Grundlagen der Arithmetikj and Die Grundgesetze der
Arithmetild . It is perhaps the most worked out, or well-developed, account of platonism
in the literature. Although Frege — especially in his later work the Grundgesetze — took 
‘ Wright (1980), ppl-2 
' Frege (1884)
® Frege (1893)
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numbers to occupy an abstract third realm, Wright’s interpretation of Frege makes no use 
of this notion, and focuses on Frege’s Grundlagen, which makes no explicit appeal to the 
third realm and instead introduces the concept Number comes by way of re­
conceptualisation of some area, for which the epistemology is not in doubt/ Frege uses a 
biconditional formula, the motivation for which he takes from Hume, to introduce the 
concept Number. This is Hume’s Principle, which Wright (1983) calls N=. By the 
Grundgesetze, Frege had replaced this Principle with something stronger, his Basic Law 
(V):
(V ) (V F )(V G )(([x ]F x= [x]G x)<^ (V x)(F x«>G x))^
It is this Basic Law (V) which is responsible for the famous inconsistency in Frege’s 
system; it is because of this flaw that few mathematicians have paid any attention to his 
work. In the past few years, it has come to light that there are well-motivated ways to 
remove this inconsistency, relying on Hume’s Principle rather than Law (V), which it has 
been shown, when added to second order logic, results in a system equiconsistent with 
second order Peano Arithmetic.
In the first section of this Chapter, a neo-Fregean reconstruction will be given, 
based on the train of thought in Crispin Wright’s Frege’s Conception o f Numbers as 
Objects. This will trace the main threads of the argument for the objecthood of the 
numbers, based on the truth of certain arithmetical statements. The second, third and 
fourth sections look at recent problems that the resuscitation of Frege’s project has 
encountered, in particular, dealing with questions relating to singular terms, Dummett’s 
tolerant reductionism and the status of Hume’s Principle. The fifth section looks at the 
arguments in the Grundlagen which led Frege away from his second definition of number 
onto his third — the so called Caesar Problem.
The aim in looking at Frege’s work — and the revival of his project, is to
highlight the tenability of the linguistic approach to problems in the philosophy of
mathematics. Strategically, some of the themes discussed in this chapter would be better 
“* The notion of re-conceptualisation is central; the left hand side of the biconditional is taken to have no 
more meaning than is given by the stipulation of the biconditional, consistent with its own internal 
syntax. As this stipulation is conceptually primitive, there is no gap between the meaning of one side and 
the other, and so the left hand side is a re-conceptualisation of the right. This ensures that there is no 
possibility of reference failure for the terms on the left, as reference is guaranteed by the right hand side.
® where [x]Fx stands for the extension of the concept F
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placed later on, between the fourth and fifth chapters. However, as some of the 
techniques used here are required later on, it seems more sensible to introduce them 
earlier rather than later, and use the to deal with the simpler, arithmetical, cases before 
treating on the more complicated, structural, ones.
V III  F  regels account o f  arithttietic
In order to explain Frege’s arguments for arithmetical platonism, it is easiest 
(although not historically most accurate) to use various notions which he himself did not 
develop until well after he had written his logicist manifesto. Die Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik. These notions are the semantic categories of object and concept and the 
components of a theory of meaning: sense and reference. In what follows, while 
references are made to Frege, often the views expressed are a result of a distinctive 
interpretation of Frege, given by Wright, which certainly deviates from the views held by 
the historical Frege. Context will usually suffice to disambiguate Frege’s actual views 
from those Wright develops from Frege’s writings.
Frege developed his Begriffsschrifi:, a language of pure logic, because he felt that 
natural languages contain many features which are misleading. One example he gives is 
that there is no uniform principle governing the formation of compound nouns. What, for 
example, is it which makes both ‘death-bed’ and Tife-boat’ intelligible? A death-bed is 
something in which one dies, but a life-boat is not something in which one lives. A 
logically perfect language avoids such incongruencies; instead the meaning of statements 
is regimented: every proposition which is either true or false consists of a number of 
components, which contribute to the determination of the propositions’s truth value. Not 
only does this key thought explain how the parts of a statement contribute to the meaning 
of the whole, it also picks out the semantically salient features of language as those which 
play a role in determining truth value.
There are three types of term which contribute to the meaning of a statement: 
saturated expressions such as singular terms or proper names which stand for objects; 
unsaturated expressions which require an object or objects to complete then, such as 
predicates or relations which stand for concepts, and logical terms — e.g. ‘and’, ‘or’, 
‘not’, ‘for all’, ‘there exists’ etc. — which combine the truth values of completed 
expressions. Logical terms are truth functional: they are functions from truth values to
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truth values. Predicates and relations contribute to the meaning of a proposition by 
mapping objects to truth values, that is, they act as functions with objects as their 
arguments; singular terms contribute by standing for or referring to objects, which are the 
arguments or values of these semantic functions.
In the Introduction to Grundlagen, Frege insisted on the following principle:
Never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a 
proposition.
Which has become known as the Context Principle. He also expanded this in Grundlagen 
§66; he writes:
Only in a proposition have the words really a meaning. It may be that mental pictures 
float before us all the while, but these need not coiTespond to the logical elements in the 
judgment. It is enough if the proposition taken as a whole has sense; it is this that 
confers on its parts also their content.
Clearly, this shows that it is by its contiibution to the meaning of a complete expression, 
or Thought as Frege called them, that a term has a semantic value.
However, it is not just reference or semantic value which is important. By 
consideration of identity statements such as:
(LC) Lewis Carroll is Charles Dodgson
Frege concluded that reference alone would not provide the requisite guide to the 
meaning: he conjectured a second component, sense. The sense of a term or expression is 
that part of its meaning which determines its reference. If reference were the sole 
constituent of a theory of meaning, then by interchanging co-referrential terms, an 
informative statement such as (LC) becomes the trivial
(CD) Charles Dodgson is Charles Dodgson
Each of these terms, ‘Charles Dodgson’ and ‘Lewis Carroll’ has a sense which relates to 
how the reference of the term is known. Sense also has a role in explaining how non-
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referring terms (empty names), which should lead to a collapse of the meaning of the 
statements in which they occur, can nevertheless be understood in the context of 
meaningful statements. For example
Lewis Carroll’s wife is very beautiful
is perfectly intelligible, yet fails to refer, as there never was a Mrs. Dodgson. If meaning 
were dependent on reference alone, failure to refer would result in a failure of meaning — 
which is obviously not the case.
In intensional contexts, such as
(LC*) Alice believes that Lewis Carroll is Charles Dodgson
Frege argued that the reference of the tenns involved was that which is customarily their 
sense; this is known as indirect reference. Due to complications arising from 
consideration of statements such as
(LC**) Henry Liddell believes that Alice believes that Lewis Carroll is Charles Dodgson
it becomes clear that semantic value is not a function of sense alone: context is also 
important. In the two statements (LC*) and (LC**) a term may have the same sense, yet 
secure differing referents, due to the differences in context in which they occur, whether 
embedded in one or two belief statements.
In indicative contexts, that is, those of normal declarative sentences, the singular 
terms that occur in true propositions refer to objects; in non-indicative contexts — e.g. 
subjunctive contexts — they need not.
i The Context Principle
To argue for the existence of numbers, Frege singled out statements of numerical 
identity as supplying the appropriate indicative contexts in which to apply the Context 
Principle as a guide to ontology. He wrote that:
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To obtain the concept Number, we must first fix the sense of a numerical identity.®
As Frege does not mention the Context Principle again in his writings, once he has 
developed his notions of sense and reference, it is contestable how these two sets of 
notions are to interact. Applying the Context Principle to the sense of expressions seems 
natural; Wright has argued that it should also be applied to reference, to the effect that 
once it is decided that an expression functions as a singular terai in truth apt statements in 
the appropriate indicative contexts, there can be no further doubts as to whether it is 
genuinely apt to refer.
This is the key idea behind Frege’s project, and can be summarised as follows: 
singular terms in true propositions, occurring in normal, indicative contexts, refer to 
objects. This is Frege’s thesis, or simply the linguistic thesis. Applying this thesis to 
arithmetic, the further two premises are required: that numerals are singular terms, and 
that numerical identity statements are truth apt and afford the appropriate context. So 
numerals refer to objects, i,e, numbers are objects.
This does not go veiy far to developing arithmetic: what is needed is a definition 
of number. At the start of Grundlagen §55, Frege gives his first definition, based on the 
notion of self identity — zero is the number of things falling under the concept ‘not self 
identical’; one is the number of things which are zero, and so on. If the definition were 
sufficient, then it would yield a proof that to each concept a unique number belongs to it, 
"the number belonging to the concept F’.
But Frege argues that these definitions are not yet sufficient to draw the required 
conclusions. He offers two examples of how the definitions fail to meet our needs — for 
we cannot “decide by means of our definitions whether any concept has the number 
Julius Caesar belonging to it” , or even whether Caesar is a number or not. His second 
objection — rewritten in Wright’s notation, with NxFx for ‘the number belonging to the 
concept F’ — is essentially that if NxFx=a and NxFx=6, we cannot yet conclude that 
a=b. The problem lies in the failure of the contextual definition to guarantee that we are 
dealing with genuine identity statements here, and in light of this, we cannot apply the 
rules of identity as if they were identity statements. If we could, then not only would the 
identity a=b be resolvable, so too would the questions about Caesar.^
® Frege (1884), §62 
’ Frege (1884), §64-8
-  40 -
CHAPTER 2: LOGICISM 
Frege’s second contextual definition is one step closer to providing identifying 
reference: he focusses on fixing the sense of numerical identity statements, Lg. fixing the 
sense of claims such as the number falling under one concept is the same as that falling 
under another, formally NxFx=NxGx. He proposes to do this by showing that the sense 
of the numerical identity is a re-conceptualisation of something of which we already know 
the sense. Recognition of the truth of arithmetical identities, rests on Hume’s Principle, or 
N= as Wright (1983) names it.
When two numbers are so combined as that the one has always an unit answering to 
every unit of the other, we pronounce them equal®
that is, in Frege’s interpretation, for any concepts F and G, the number of F’s is the same 
as the number of G’s, if and only if, F and G can be put into one-to-one correspondence; 
which we write (in short and in full) as N= as follows :
N=(short) (VF)(VG )(NxFx=NxG x«*(Vx)(Fx —1:1— Gx))
N=(long) ( V F ) ( V G ) ( N x F x  = N x G x  ** ( 3 R ) { ( V x ) [ F x - ^ ( 3 y ) ( G y & R x y
& (Vz)(Gz & Rxz~>z=y))]
& (V y)[G y^(3x)(F x & Rxy 
& (Vz)(Fz & Rzy -> z=x))]})^
This is Frege’s second contextual definition, which is dismissed in the 
Grundlagen due once more to the Caesar problem — that it does not give grounds for 
settling questions such as “Is Julius Caesar the number of the planets?” Certainly the 
contextual definitions are re-conceptualisations of truth-conditions which we are already 
familiar with: but we need some way of telling when, if <7 is a singular term which we 
know to fall under a certain sortal concept, whether ^ is a number. Frege introduces 
extensions of concepts for two reasons; partly to try to try to solve this problem, but also 
in order to develop a theory of real analysis, which for cardinality reasons, cannot be 
generated simply by extending the treatment given to arithmetic.
 Technically, N= is all that is required to furnish arithmetic — second order logic
® Frege (1884), §63
® This requires that R be a 1-1 equivalence with respect to F and G; Frege’s requirement seems to have 
been stronger, with R being 1-1 across the domain, and not simply on F and G.
Frege raises this problem in Frege (1884), §56
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plus N= is Strong enough to derive the Peano axioms: Boolos has called this Frege’s 
Theorem. Hume’s Principle (N=) does two things — firstly, it gives a context in which 
questions about the meaning of NxFx can be asked — it gives a handle on the questions 
about syntactic singular terms. But more importantly, it can be seen to be true. As the 
notion of identity is the same in arithmetic as outside of it, there are no complicating 
factors to recognising the truth of statements of the form N=. Frege claimed that such a 
principle would be analytic — this may not be supportable, but nevertheless, it is difficult 
to see how it could fail to be true.
ii  Problems with the neo-^Fregean argument
Before Frege’s platonism can be judged successful, a number of questions need 
to be settled. Firstly, the argument relies, in a crucial way, on the Context Principle, and 
its use construed as a tool of reference. It appears quite natural to suppose that the 
Context Principle will apply to what Frege was later to call sense, but it is not 
straightforward that it will also apply to reference. The second problem turns on the 
identification of singular terms. Obviously, for fear of circularity, this cannot be decided 
by way of their reference. One suggestion canvassed in the literature is that syntactic 
criteria can be supplied to isolate singular terms — based on the role they play in simple 
inference patterns." Given that this can be done, a number of hostile objections may still 
arise: the reductionist could claim that the contextual definition N= does not warrant the 
reading that Frege gives it, and argue that there is insufficient semantic structure on the 
left hand side to justify the realist reading. This is the austere or reductionist line.
A second objection is that
reference properly construed, requires identifying knowledge of the referent, and that such
knowledge is causally constrained*^
In his discussion of the subject, Dummett recognised three forms of identifying 
knowledge, all of which are causal. Perhaps, issues of austerity aside, the reductionist 
might have independent reasons for reading the biconditional from right to left, and 
eliminating the reference to numbers by reducing them to 1-1 equivalences between
" for example, Dummett (1973) and Hale (1987) and (1995) 
*® Wright (1990), p77
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concepts. One such reason might be that demonstrative knowledge of numbers is not 
possible, at least not when such identifying knowledge is construed as a causal process. 
However, by analysing these three forms of identifying knowledge which Dummett 
highlights, it may be possible to give an account of their underlying similarities, so that 
this account is not tied to causal notions.
A third objection of Dummett’s focuses on the introduction of terms by way of 
contextual definitions, such as N=: Dummett claims that there are disanalogies between 
concrete and contextual terms, so that the contextual terms should not be taken as being 
properly referential. These relate to the role played by reference in the explanation of the 
meanings, and the description of the abilities that constitute mastery of the two sorts of 
expression:
it is proper to regard a (syntactic) singular term as genuinely referential only if the 
notion of reference plays an essential role in establishing its use — a point which it 
cannot play if that use is established by contextual definition"
These sorts of responses all accept that Frege has something by way of strategy 
here; however, some — such as Field — have objected, not to the use of contextual 
definitions, but to the truth of N=; others such as the Richard Heck and the late George 
Boolos have objected to the status Frege attributes to it as a truth of logic.
I X  Singular terms
Frege’s arguments for the existence of numbers as objects, rests on his general 
account of language and the division of language into saturated and unsaturated 
expressions. Singular terms (proper names) are saturated, and aside from complete 
propositions, constitute the category of saturated expressions. According to Dummett, it 
is:
essential for Frege to be able to maintain that each expression may be recognised as 
belonging to its logical category or type from a knowledge of the way in which it is 
employed in the language'"*
Frege leaves this discrimination at the intuitive level — which may not be sufficient.
Wright (1990), p77 
'■* Dummett (1973), p57
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Presumably, part of the drive behind nominalism is an intuition that numerals do not |
function as singular terms — while the realist endorses the positive claim. Dummett and !
Hale have offered a way out of this impasse: that singular terms can be given “clear and 
exact criteria, relating to their functioning within a language”. Before moving on to what |
such criteria could be, consider the strategy here. |
The plan here is to take the central case — terms that do refer to objects — and to 
characterise the use of such terms. Then, given this characterisation, to use the analysis to i
examine areas where there is no form of check, or where intuitions are not so clear. So |
for example, the criteria should be set out as detailing terms referring to medium sized 
physical objects — and if the criteria are sufficient for this case, they may be adequate for 
the disputed case. The first subsection deals with Dummett’s attempts to give syntactic 
criteria to settle the issue; the second deals with Hale’s criticisms which motivate him to 
refine the tests which Dummett proposes.'^ As Frege never used such syntactic tests for 
singular terms — relying instead on a basic ability to recognise the logical categories to 
which expressions belong — this might imply that the use of numerals as proper names 
should be seen as straightforward, without the use of complicated machineiy which 
Dummett and Hale employ. However, presented with the claim that ‘2’ refers to 2, the 
nominalist has three alternatives: they can try to argue that, somehow, ‘2’ fails to meet the 
criteria set down, or they can reject the criteria as sufficient. Alternatively, they can accept 
that the criteria work, but then argue that mathematical statements are never presented in 
appropriate contexts to run the argument, i.e. by claiming tliat mathematical statements are 
never indicative. Linda Wetzel appears to favour the first option — the second or third 
options looks much more promising. The objections she raises, and also the second set of 
worries are discussed below; such objections cannot be met without something more 
precise than the intuitive abilities to recognise logical categories which Frege relies upon.
The third set of worries is left to the next Chapter. The fourth subsection applies this 
analysis to show that NxFx ‘the number belonging to the concept F’ is a genuine singular 
term.
i Syntactic criteria fo r  singular terms
According to Dummett, a singular term is distinguished by the way it is employed
in the language, which he takes to mean that singular terms should be able to feature in 
Hale’s criticisms are developed in various places; his (1995) is the main source used.
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certain simple inference patterns. He criticises Frege for failing to give such a 
characterisation — Frege’s reliance on an intuitive grasp of such a distinction, based on 
the use of definite articles, not only is specific to languages employing grammatical 
devices such as articles, but will also allow
a wide variety of substantival expressions of all kinds — gerundives, infinitives, abstract 
nouns — derived from other parts of speech, and these often constitute, or can be used to 
form phrases constituting, singular terms; that is, words or phrases which function like 
singular terms in respect of their immediate grammatical role.'®
He concludes that “it would seem absurd, however, to think of all of these as standing for 
objects”.
The criteria are grounded in the recognition that a simple inference pattern is 
correct, justification for which is left at the intuitive level. The term " f  has singular 
reference when the following conditions are satisfied:
(I) from any sentence containing ‘ri it shall be possible to infer the result of replacing V
by ‘it* and prefixing the whole by ‘There is something such that..."
(Q) from any two sentences ‘A(r)’ and ‘B(r)’, it shall be possible to infer ‘There is
something such that that A(it) & B(it)*
(III) a disjunction ‘A(r) or B(/)’ of two sentences may be inferred from ‘It is true of t that
A(it) or B(it)’
The motivation for Dummett’s use of these particular inference patterns rests on the 
availability of other terms, aside form singular terms, to play a role as the grammatical 
subject of an expression. For example, ‘nothing’ and ‘nobody’ can appear to function as 
singular terms. When the King asked the Messenger who he passed on the road, his 
reply:
“Nobody” said the Messenger.
“Quite right” said the King: “this young lady saw him too. So of course Nobody walks 
slower than you”
Despite what Alice and the King may say, ‘nobody’ is not a genuine singular term: it —
Dummett (1973), p70 
" ibid., p70
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and expressions like it — is ruled out by (I). Generalised existential terms such as 
‘something’, ‘someone’ or ‘some little girl’ are ruled out by (II), while (III) rules out 
cases such as ‘everything’ and ‘every little girl’.
In (I) and (II), the ‘something’ in “There is something such th a t...” has to be the 
first order something. To distinguish this usage from higher order senses of ‘something’, 
Dummett has suggested that a further test be used. Problem expressions occur in 
statements such as “Alice is a little girl” — ‘a little girl’ passes, however awkwardly, all 
three tests (I)-(III). But ‘a little girl’ is not a singular term, but rather a modified common 
noun. The test which Dummett suggests be added to augment (I) and (II) is a 
specification test; this utilises a feature of object-dependent thought, which is not shared 
by the higher order senses of ‘something’: it is always possible to ask for a further 
specification of an object, which is not so for predicates or other unsaturated expressions. 
For example:
“Alice borrowed something from the King”
If the occurrence of ‘something’ here is first order, then a request for a specification of 
the thing in question will be in good order. Suppose the answer is “A dish.” Then if this 
is indeed ‘something’ in the first order sense, then further specification can be made: 
asked “Which dish?” the reply might be “A dish for plum-cake” and then “A dish to feed 
the Lion and the Unicorn” and so on. In this case, it is clear that further specifications will 
be available indefinitely, so the ‘something’ is indeed first order.
It may be that at some stage in this indefinitely repeatable sequence of 
specifications, the speaker is unable to answer the questions: this should be sharply 
distinguished from the case when there is no further specification available. Likewise the 
speaker might think that the request has already been answered, in full or part, by some 
previous response: again, this does not detract from the availability of the further requests 
for specification.
The higher order case can be seen to be quite different. Take the statement:
“There is something that Alice is, which the King is not”
A request for specification of what it is that Alice is, might elicit the response: “A little
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girl”, in which case it is not appropriate to ask: “Which little girl?” To do so is to display a 
basic misunderstanding of the terms involved: to confuse a common noun-phrase with a 
singular term. Dummett stresses that the distinction between first and higher order cases 
depends on the availability of further specification requests, rather than the ability to 
refuse to answer the specifications — as there may well be the means in the original 
statement, or a reply to a specification question, all that is required to answer any further 
question.
However, a number of objections have been raised against the completeness of 
such a procedure. For example, consider:
‘The Queen believes someone is a thief’
In this case, the ‘someone’ in question is used in a first order sense, yet a first-round 
request for specification might receive the reply: ‘A member of the Royal Household’, 
and for this to be as precise as the Queen is able to specify. While further specification
questions may be grammatically admissible, the questions may be rejected as the Queen
may not have a specific person in mind. Hale offers the following diagnosis:
Generally, when ‘something’ occurs within the scope of another operator — not
necessarily one generating opacity — the test misclassifies it as higher level.'®
While this might cause problems for the specification test were it taken in isolation, this 
problem highlights that the specification test need not be completely general. Recall that 
the test was brought in to qualify occurrences of ‘something’ or ‘someone’ in tests (I) and 
(II), and so need only work for statements of the form given in the conclusion of these 
tests. This has led Hale to suggest that it might be more appropriate to build the 
specification requirements into the formulation of (I) and (II) directly, rather than to take it 
as an independent test applied at the end.
ii  R efin ing the criteria
There appear to be two closely related worries with the approach as Dummett 
presents it. The first is that the account suggests that all and only singular terms in
Hale (1990), pp ll f f
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English will have the logical form of singular terms. While it may be plausible that proper 
names in English will be genuine singular terms, there is no reason to suppose that there 
are no substantive expressions whose logical form is hidden by the surface grammar. 
Hale complains that:
we have no right simply to assume, in advance, that this distinction coincides with the 
division in surface grammar between substantival expressions and others. What is needed 
is, rather, a supplementary criterion which relates, in an intelligible way, to the function 
of singular terms.”
Secondly, this supplementary criterion needs to be sensitive, not only to the possibility of 
there being genuine syntactic singular terms in English which do not have the obvious 
surface grammar, but also must be sensitive to the grammar of languages other than 
English. For example, in English, generality can be expressed by way of pronouns 
“rather than pro-verbs, or pro-adjectives, for example.” Examples are difficult to find, but 
if it is persuasive that generality could be expressed in a number of ways other than that 
which English does in fact express it, then the account must leave room for there to be 
similar possible alternative ways of expressing singularity. What is required is a way of 
picking out all of the grammatical features which function in a saturated rather than an 
unsaturated fashion.
Hale suggests that a notion dating back to Aristotle should be used to formulate 
this supplementary criterion. According to Aristotle, a quality or property always has a 
contrary or opposite, while a substance does not. So for example, ‘tall’ has the opposite 
‘short’, but ‘Alice’ fails to have an opposite.
The Aristotelian test is set up in the following way: a proposition is split up into 
subject-predicate form, so that t is the putative singular term, and C( ) the rest of the 
proposition, with substitutional quantifiers ‘2 « ’ (some a) and ‘J]P’ (any p), with the 
substitution class for a  ranging over expressions that can stand for t in C(f), and with p 
ranging over those that can replace C( ). So for example, taking the statement “The White 
Knight is brave” as C(f), then t would be ‘the White Knight’.
A pair (a , p) will then always stand for a well formed sentence, and the criterion 
can be based on the notion of (a, p) pairs:
Hale (1995), p4
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(A) t functions as a singular term in C(0 then P))
So in the example just given:
(AKn) if ‘the White Knight’ functions as a singular term in "The White Knight is brave”, then
there is no substitution of a , for any substitution of p, such that (a , P) if and only if 
(the White Knight, p)
Taking some possible substitution instances for p, it becomes clear that there is no 
substitution for a which satisfies the biconditional:
(a, is intelligent) if and only if not (the White Knight, is intelligent);
(a, is tall) if and only if not (the White Knight, is tall), etc.
Therefore ‘the White Knight” has no opposite, and so is apt for further testing to qualify 
as a singular term. Running the Aristotelian test alone will not suffice to distinguish 
singular terms from other types of terms which fail to have opposites; but by running the 
Aristotelian test in tandem with Dummett’s three criteria and the specification test, a very 
fine sieve is obtained to pick out singular terms.
The reference of a singular term is leained, quite often, by ostensive definition, 
and more generally recognition statements such as “This is a kitten” are context 
dependent. Dummett comments:
A general criterion for recognising something as established concerning any object in a 
certain range cannot genuinely relate to the objects in that range, but must relate rather 
to such objects considered as identified in some particular way,'*®
Just as the recognition of the relationship of reference between name and bearer is 
context dependent, so too us the recognition of a term as a name: Hale argues that the 
tests for singular terms should also be context dependent:
Dummett’s intention is rather to provide, not whether some expression — considered in
“ Dummett (1973), p232
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itself — is or is not a singular term, but whether some given expression is to be 
regarded as (functioning as) a singular term as it figures in some given sentential 
context/'
This motivates the thought that there are no singular terms simpliciter, but rather that 
emphasis should be placed on the role an expression plays in a given context, in this case 
whether the term in question has singular reference.
As a result of these refinements, Hale has proposed following reformulations of 
Dummett’s criteria:
(I*) It is a necessary condition for T  to be functioning as a singular term in a given sentence 
‘A(ri’ that the inference therefrom to the conclusion There is something such that A(it)’ 
shall be valid.
Adding context to (II) could be done in one of two ways:
(II*) It is a necessaiy condition for to be functioning as a singular term in a sentence ‘A (0’ 
that, for some sentence ‘B(r)% the inference from ‘A(r)’ and *B(r)’ to There is something 
such that A(it) and B(it) shall be valid.
(II**) [as (II**) but with ‘some’ replaced by ‘any’]
Hale rules out (IP*) almost immediately as too strong as — unless the result is to be hold
hostage to the refutation of Quine’s claims concerning the inadmissibility of quantification
in opaque contexts — no singular tenn will pass the test. e.g. if ‘t ’ is a singular term in
some context ‘A(t)’, there will always be a further occurrence o f ‘t ’ in an opaque context
'B(t)’, such that (II**) fails.
He chooses instead to take (IP) as the appropriate context-dependent formulation
of (II), provided that this does not become too weak — and allow, crucially, expressions
of the form ‘a so and so’ through the door, thereby defeating the original puipose for (II).
Take the following example: ‘The White Knight owns a horse’ and ‘A horse is a
mammal’, letting ‘a horse’ be the candidate for singular termhood.~ These premises then
entail: ‘There is something such that the White Knight owns it and it is a mammal’. Cases
such as this trade on the equivalence in English between ‘a so and so’ and ‘any so and 
“ Hale (1995), plO
“ The example is based on Wetzel’s Example 7, see Wetzel (1990), p234.
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so’; to avoid this, all that is required is that ‘B(t)’ should also pass the third test.
A further stipulation is required: that ‘B (0’ be chosen so that it neither entails, not 
is entailed by 'A(t)’. In order to show that this is not ad hoc. Hale discussed the 
motivation for this point in some detail. Briefly: he returns to the motivation for framing 
(II) —  to eliminate phrases such as ‘something’ and ‘a such and such’ which are not 
blocked by (I). If B(t) is chosen to be identical to A(t), where A(t) aheady passes (I), then 
‘Something is such that A(t)’ does entail ‘Something is such that A(t) and A(t)’; hence his 
imposition of this further independence stipulation.
The thh'd criterion should also display this same feature of logical independence:
(m*) It is a necessary condition for T  to be functioning as a singular term in a sentence ‘A(r)’ 
that, for some sentence ‘B(r)’, the inference is valid from Tt is true of t that A(it) or 
B(it)’ to the disjunction ‘A(f) or B(r)'"
One final hole remains to be plugged. The third test (HI) was designed to exclude terms 
such as ‘everything’ and ‘everybody’; but despite all the appropriate subclauses which 
have been added, the test is still too weak — a certain kind of quantified expression will 
still slip through the net. In general, (HI) works because of the following inference 
pattern fails
Everything is such that A(it) or B(it) H a (c  very thing) or B(every thing) 
le . Vx(A(x) V B(x))M  VxA(x) v V x B ( x )
However, just because the form is invalid, does not imply that there are no sound 
instance exemplifying this scheme — especially if vacuous quantification is allowed. 
Hale concludes that such counter-examples will be, if not spurious, “at least something of 
a cheat”: what the counter-examples show is not that the tests are wrong, rather the 
phrasing of the tests needs to be a little more precise.
In order to phrase the tests in the correct way, consider a more sophisticated 
counter-example which Wetzel has put forward. It runs something like this. For some
“ Hale opts for (III*) the weaker, rather than the stronger version, for essentially the same reasons which 
prompted his choice of (II*).
“ le . where ‘x’ does not appear free in at least one of 'A(x)’ or *B(x)’.
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given A(t), there is some B(t)
A(t) Everyone who was invited to the Tea Party was invited by someone who sells hats
B(t) Everyone who was invited to the Tea Party was invited by somebody mad.
such that the required inference to the disjunction of these statements from:
It is true of everyone who was invited to the Tea Party either that she/he was invited by
someone who sells hats or that she/he was invited by somebody mad
is valid: so ‘Everyone who was invited to the Tea Party’ as it occurs in ‘A(t)’ passes 
(HI*)
The same type of move turns the trick in this case as in the case of vacuous 
quantification: Hale formalises the reasoning to make this explicit:
(V x ) [ ( V y ) (R x y -^ y = b ) -> ( (3 y ) (R x y & F y )v (3 y ) (R x y & G y ) ) ]
K V x ) [ ( V y ) ( R x y - ^ y = b ) * ^ ( 3 y ) ( R x y & F y ) ]  v ( V x ) [ ( V y ) ( R x y  ^ y = b ) - » ( 3 y  ) ( R x y & G y ) ]  
So rather than obtain valid cases of the generally invalid scheme 
Vx(A(x) V B ( x ) ) H  V x A ( x )  v V x B ( x )
by stipulating that ‘x’ not occur free in both of ‘A(x)’ and ‘B(x)’, the above example 
shows that it is possible to give valid examples where ‘x’ does occur free in both ‘A(x)’ 
and ‘B(x)’. In Wetzel’s example although x’ does occur free, its use is in some sense 
redundant, as is seen by reexpressing the premises and conclusion as:
( V x ) [ ( V y ) ( R x y ^ y  = b ) ^ ( F b v G b ) ]
l-(Vx)[(Vy ) ( R x y - » y  = b) ->Fb] v ( V x ) [ ( V y ) ( R x y - ^ y  = b)~>G b ]
Which, as Hale points out, is a special case of the following classical form:
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( Vx ) ( A X -»( P vQ  ) ) l-( Vx ) ( A X *^P ) v ( Vx ) ( A X -»Q )
which now exposes lack of free occurrence of ‘x’ in P or Q. What is required to fix this, 
is for A and B to be non-redundant, or be essential as Hale puts it, in the following 
technical sense:
(E) A (0  occurs essentially in ■& only if there is no sentence d ’ which is logically equivalent
to d  and which is further such that it contains no expression B(^) that is synonymous 
with some expression C(Q occurring in d', of which A(Ç) forms a part.
In sum, this results in the following battery of tests:
(1) A substantival expression t functions as a singular term in a sentential context
‘A(0’ if and only if:
OD the inference from ‘A(r)’ to ‘Something is such that A(it)’.
(II) for some sentence ‘B (f)\ the inference is valid from ‘A(f)% ‘B(r)’ to ‘Something
is such that A(it) and B(it)’
(HI) for some sentence ‘B (0 ’ the inference is valid from ‘It is true of t that A(it) or
B(it) to the disjunction ‘A(0 or B(f)‘
where
(i) the conclusions of the inferences displayed in (I) and (II) are neither of them 
such that a point may be reached where a well formed request for further 
specification may be rejected as not requiring an answer
(ii) the displayed occurrence of t in ‘B (0 ’ of condition (II) itself meets condition 
(III)
(iii) the displayed occurrences of ‘A (0 ’ and ‘B (0 ’ in (II) and (III) be essential, in the 
sense of the (E)-schema
(iv) ‘B(f)’ neither entails nor is entailed by ‘A(r)’
(2) Having, by these means, excluded from the category of singular terms all those 
substantival expressions that are not the genuine article, but are capable of occupying 
sentential positions where genuine singular terms can stand, we then apply the following 
further necessary condition:
(A) t functions as a singular term in C(r) then P)'®*-'(ri P))
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where the p substitution class comprises all expressions grammatically congruent with 
‘A(_)’, except any that fail our stage (1) tests
Hale qualifies these tests, as Dummett before him did:
if we are to regard an expression as standing for an object, we must be able ‘to recognise 
the object as the same again’, and that in consequence, an expression that passes the 
more formal tests is not to be classified as a genuine singular term unless there is 
associated with it, a criterion of identity, applying to objects of the sort among which is 
purports reference.-®
The issues surrounding such a criterion of identity, are raised below in §IV.
i ii  Criticisms o f  the syntactic approach
In addition to the criticisms and counter-examples which Wetzel has raised, there
is another type of worry which afflicts this general syntactic approach: the criteria used, 
both the use of inference patterns to eliminate quantifier and quantifier-like expressions, 
and the Aristotelian test, are — as Wright puts it — parochial."^ As the tests are all 
designed as an explanation of the use of singular terms in English, it seems difficult to see 
how this could generalise to a language-neutral characterisation of singular terms, nor 
give a handle the notion ‘object’. Even if there were tests developed for every natural 
language, a piecewise approach would be of little benefit, as developing the account in 
such a way would threaten the underlying thought that there is one general notion of 
object at play.
There are two lines of response — one optimistic, the other pessimistic. The 
optimistic line starts with an acknowledgement of the demise of one unified test, 
applicable in all languages — a view which has been called ‘International Platonism’."® 
Once it is realised that International Platonism is not an option, the road is open to 
consider whether certain restrictions might be put on the piecewise approach, so that 
rather than give a language specific notion of object, a thoroughly general notion is
Hale (1995), pp20-21 verbatim 
“  ibid., p22 
” Wright (1983), p62 
“ ibid. p63
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arrived at. one candidate for such a constraint would be the availability of parallel criteria 
across various languages; that grasp of singular terms across different languages will be 
achieved by resort to criteria of the same shape and form. So the optimist trades on the 
uniformity of the form of the accounts to provide a grasp of the thoroughly general 
category ‘object’.
The pessimistic option, on the other hand, would be to accept that, in addition to 
there being no language-neutral set of tests, there is no method of establishing a general 
notion of object at all, even in a single language such as English. Bad as this seems, this 
need not imply that there is no account possible: while there may be no sharp 
characterisation of all and only objects, there may be an appropriate generalisation based 
on the naming of medium sized physical objects, which by way of the name/ bearer 
model would give a characterisation of a broad class of items as objects. That Wetzel and 
Hale can tiade counter-examples at all, suggests that there is some robust intuition at least 
underwriting this much.
This pessimistic train of thought will suffice for the present purposes: while it 
might cause problems for a general account of the notion of an object, it would only do so 
because of the possibility that certain objects turned out not to be Fregean, rather than vice 
versa. So long as the notion of a Fregean object is more restrictive than the general class 
of objects, satisfying the syntactic criteria for singular termhood will yield a 
corresponding notion of Fregean object which is included in a more inclusive, but less 
sharply defined notion of object — which will be enough to show that numbers are 
objects.
iv  N xF x is a syntactic singular term
Nowhere in the literature is there an explicit exposition of the singular termhood 
of numerals. Possibly this is because it is straightforward, once the adjectival uses are 
eliminated.
Let ‘A (0’ be the statement ‘Nine is the number of the planets’ and take ‘Nine is 
the square of three’ as a suitable ‘B(O’. Then, it follows from ‘Nine is the number of the 
planets’ that ‘There is something such that it is the number of the planets’; from ‘Nine is 
the number of the planets’ and ‘Nine is the square of three’, it follows that ‘There is 
something such that it is the number of the planets and it is the square of three’. In both
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cases, specification questions ‘What?’ can be answered ‘A number’; ‘Which number?’ — 
‘Nine’, at which point, the line of questioning terminates; notice however that the line of 
questioning only terminates in a full specification, never in a refusal to respond to the 
question. From the disjunction ‘It is true of nine that it is the number of the planets or it is 
the square of three’ it is a valid deduction to conclude that ‘Nine is the number of the 
planets or nine is the square of three’. In this case, the expressions ‘A(Ç)’ and ‘B(Ç)’ are 
both essential, and ‘B(f)’ neither entails, nor is entailed by, ‘A (0’. Note that as numerals 
are grammatically substantive, there should be no problem in passing the Aristotelian test:
(A) t functions as a singular term in C(f) then -«^aflPCCa, P))
where the (3 substitution class comprises all expressions grammatically congruent with 
‘A(_)’, except any that fail our stage (1) tests.
Let C(r) be ‘Nine is the successor of eight’, then ‘(a, is the successor of eight) iff 
not-(nine, is the successor of eight)’; ‘(a ,  is the number of the planets) iff not-(nine, is 
the number of the planets)’ etc. all fail in the proper fashion, hence nine, and all numerals 
like it, are syntactic singular terms
X  Tolerant Reductionism  and Identifying Knowledge
Given a contextual definition, such as D=,'^ there are two obvious ways of 
reading the biconditional - either to follow Frege, and take the left hand side as a re­
conceptualisation of the right, so that a grasp of the truth conditions on the right hand side 
is sufficient for a grasp of the truth conditions for the left hand side, and hence for an 
understanding of the syntactic singular terms that appear on the left hand side, or to treat 
the biconditional as a reduction of reference to directions into reference about lines.
This is a standard line of objection to platonism in mathematics: to eliminate the 
notion of ontological commitment to abstract objects. Faced with N=, this sort of 
traditional nominalist position — as opposed to Field’s new style nominalism — takes 
N= as ti'ue, but interprets it as showing, not that abstract objects exist, rather that there is 
a way to eliminate all referring uses of numbers.
In Wright (1983) such a position is called austere reductionism, since it argues,
(D=) Dir(a)=Dir(è) a ll  b
i.e. the direction of a is the direction of 6, just in case a and b are parallel.
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in effect, while the left hand side may contain genuine singular terms, the remaining 
semantic structure of the left hand side is so austere that it will not support the 
introduction of objects by way re-conceptualisation of the truth conditions given by that 
side of the biconditional.
The main problem with this view is that it presupposes which way round to read 
the biconditional — it assumes that the correct way to read it is as a reduction, not a 
construction. Granted, if there are independent reasons for taking this to be the principled 
direction — such as problems with identifying knowledge — then this may be a 
legitimate move, but to begin with the eliminative claim is to move too swiftly.
In addition to this presupposition, the austere reductionist account faces a number 
of problems .The contextual definition would seem to license various moves — such as 
involved in Dummett’s first inferential test: from ‘NxFx=NxGx’ to ‘There is something 
such that it is equal to NxGx’, But if the austere reductionist is right, then such moves 
need an explanation — which is precisely what the reductionist seems unable to do. 
Either the reductionist must accommodate such facts about the inferential relations which 
the left hand side supports, deny that such an inference is valid — which seems weak — 
or deny that N= is true, at which point, the austere view collapses into Field’s position.
Dummett has argued that there is an alternative to the straightforward ‘robust’ 
reading of such biconditionals and the austere reading. This middle ground he calls 
tolerant reductionism, and is based on a particular conception of reference. In addition to 
syntactic criteria governing the recognition of singular terms, there are also epistemic 
constraints — a singular or object-dependent thought, to be intelligible, requires the 
identifiability of the object in question. The availability of this identifying knowledge is 
one factor motivating Dummett, and presumably also the standard (austere) reductionist. 
Dummett argues that all forms of identifying knowledge are essentially causal, and that 
given the standard thought that numbers are abstract, there can be no genuine identifying 
knowledge of such objects. The first subsection introduces Dummett’s ‘tolerant’ 
reductionism, while the second looks at his notion of thin reference in more detail. The 
third subsection examine’s Azzouni’s arguments for A-infallibility and the conclusion he 
draws concerning the ultrathinness of the referents of mathematical singular teims as a 
result of this. The fourth subsection returns to identifying knowledge, to see whether it 
ought to motivate Dummett and Azzouni in the way that it does. Finally, in the fifth
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subsection, some strong objections to Dummett’s strategy are raised, resulting from Haie 
and Wright’s considerations of contextual definitions.
i D u m m etfs  Tolerant Reductionism
Dummett has argued that as singular terms introduced by way of contextual 
definitions do not guarantee the availability of identifying Icnowledge, such terms may not 
genuinely refer: in short, that contextual definitions do not provide the requisite contexts 
for the application of Frege’s Thesis.
He argues that incomplete expressions — such as predicate and relation terms — 
are taken to have a role in tlie determination of the truth value of sentences in which they 
occur, yet are not taken to be directly referential, i.e, they neither pick out an object nor a 
class of objects. This leads Dummett to frame the following distinction, between the role 
reference plays in determining the truth conditions of statements in which a term occurs, 
and reference as an external end point, which he also describes as reference as the realist 
conceives it. That reference should have these two aspects seems entirely plausible — 
Dummett argues that the name/bearer model of reference that Frege’s realist conception of 
reference is based on, may be appropriate for singular terms, but that the analogy breaks 
down when dealing with incomplete expressions such as predicates — he concludes that 
the role predicates play is not to point to properties and relations in the external world, but 
merely to play a part in deteimining the truth conditions of expressions in which they 
occur.
He calls the conception of reference as semantic role thin reference; it is 
introduced in Frege: Philosophy o f Language^'^ fox singular terms that fail to have an 
external, end-point reference. There are two strands in the arguments involving thin and 
thick reference, and both attempt to show ways in which the name/bearer model not only 
breaks down when applied to incomplete expressions, such as predicates but also breaks 
down in the case of contextually defined terms.
The first strand relates to the semantic role of terms in an expression. Normally, 
we think that in an expression that is open to being true or false, the singular terms refer 
to objects — that is the role they play, to stand for objects, and in doing so contribute to 
determining the truth conditions of the expressions in which they figure. So to understand
Dummett (1973)
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the expression, that is, to know the truth conditions, it has to be understood what 
contribution each part makes in the determination of the truth conditions. Dummett argues 
that there are two ways in which contextually defined terms differ from their mundane 
counterparts, relating to the explanation of meaning and description of language mastery.
He points out that the part played by a contextually defined term in the explanation 
of the meaning of a statement, in which the term occurs, differs from the part played by a 
similar term introduced by ostension or other such mundane means. Understanding the 
meaning of an expression will normally go through the singular terms in that expression, 
making use of their reference. However, when it comes to contextually defined singular 
terms, things might not be so simple. The whole point of contextual definitions is to 
obviate the need to give the referent through ostension; understanding of the expression 
need not go through the singular terms — these singular terms can be bypassed, and the 
sense of the expression reached only by using the right hand side. It should therefore not 
be too surprising that there is this disanalogy.
Contextually defined terms and terms referring to concrete objects also differ in 
the following respect: there is a difference in the way in which reference features in the 
description of the abilities which are constitutive of mastery of the two sorts of term. In 
the one case, this is described as a response to the referent — but this cannot be the case 
where contextual definitions are concerned. Dummett concludes that although the left 
hand side may contain genuine singular terms — meeting the syntactic criteria for singular 
termhood — it otherwise lacks significant syntactic structure, and so he accords these 
terms only a thin sense of reference.
The second part of Dummett’s argument concerning thin reference involves 
identifying knowledge, and is tied to his thoughts about ostensive definition. If the 
identifying knowledge of the referent of a term is causal, then the object in question must 
exist in some way independently of reference to it; if such causal identifying knowledge is 
not available, then the objects in questions will be shadows cast by linguistic practice, and 
reference will not pick out genuine mind-independent objects.^*
ii  Thin reference and semantic role
As mentioned above, Dummett is motivated in his theory of thin reference by
This is Wright’s metaphor, see Wright (1992), ppI81-2
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considerations based on a causai conception of identifying knowledge; crucially the 
thought that mastery of a singular terms involves the ability to determine the truth of a 
recognition statement such as “This is Alice”.
Reference, as Dummett’s realist conceives it, is a relationship between a singular 
term and an object. As Dummett is convinced that there is no way to acquire knowledge 
of such a relationship when the term in question is introduced — and can only be 
introduced — via a contextual definition and not by ostension, he concludes that genuine 
(thick) reference must fail in such cases. The primary reason for the breakdown of this 
model of reference to involve the explanation of the meaning of singular terms, and like 
his thoughts on identifying knowledge, it hinges on the lack of causal input in the 
reference relation for abstract objects. With singular terms which refer to concrete objects, 
the abilities which constitute masteiy of this sort of expression involve more than merely 
being
‘plugged’ into a linguistic practice which involves the use of recognition statements 
consisting of the identity sign flanked, on one hand, by a demonstrative phrase and on 
the other, by a descriptive ... singular term.®^
Dummett argues that such linguistic competence is not enough, a speaker will have to be 
able to use such competence, that is, when presented or confronted with the referents of 
such singular terms. He contends that for concrete singular terms, mastery of the singular 
expression involves not only linguistic competence, but also the ability to respond to such 
cases of perceptual confrontation; as such contact is not possible with inert objects, he 
takes it that the part played by reference in the explanation of the meaning of singular 
terms will differ for concrete and abstract objects. His conclusion is that while concrete 
singular terms enjoy a relationship with an independently existing object, in the abstract 
case reference is ‘a matter wholly internal to the language.’®^
But the standard Fregean line is that while reference failure need not lead to a 
lapse in meaningfulness, statements which fail to refer cannot be true. As mathematical 
statements are often true, Dummett is forced to conclude that the tenns must have some 
sort of reference — thin reference.
This strategy bears some resemblance to that adopted by Blackburn, which he
Miller (1991), p260 
" Dummett (1973), p499
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calls quasi-realism. In his discussion of various anti-realist strategies in the philosophy of 
science, Arthur Fine suggests that a variety of instrumentalist position could be 
developed, based on Blackburn’s notion of quasi-realism. His gloss is worth quoting in 
full:
The basic strategy of quasi-realism involves connecting an area of discourse and a 
practice that is puzzling in certain respects with a more homely and less puzzling area. If 
we call the former thick and the latter thin, then the idea is to try to explain the thicker 
and puzzling practice in terms of the thinner reality, ‘a world which contains only some 
lesser states of affairs to which we respond and in which we have to conduct our lives’®"*
... Thus, we might try to explain why we think about things in the terms of the thicker 
discourse, and such an explanation would ground and justify our use of the thicker 
framework, our behaving as if the thicker commitments were true®® ... So quasi-realism 
tries to earn us the right, on the thinner basis, to just those features of the thicker 
domain that tempt people to realism about it.®®
Blackburn has most successfully applied this strategy in metaethics, based on quasi- 
modal operations of endorsement and disapproval (Hurray! and Boo! operators); yet his 
account is not fully reductive. He argues that acknowledging the underlying thin 
discourse discharges the ontological obligations which otherwise result from taking the 
surface grammar seriously, but leaves open the option to accept the surface grammar on 
grounds of usefulness and pragmatism. Dummett’s suggestion that terms refer, but fail to 
pick out referents, seems entirely similar.
Both Dummett and Blackburn’s attempts to give a detailed analysis of the 
difference between thin reference and genuine reference, or between assertoric content 
and ‘deep’ assertoric content, run afoul of some serious difficulties.^^ Azzouni has also 
offered an account of reference without referents for mathematical singular terms, again
based in linguistic considerations.
®* Blackburn (1984), p i69 
®® See ibid., pplSO, 216 and 257 
®® Fine (1986a), p215
®^ The problems which Dummett’s account faces are outlined here, in this Chapter; the parallel problem 
— keeping the notions of thin and thick content separate — is discussed in Wright (1993), pp239-61. 
e.g. see pp242-3:
a response which conserved the Spreading the Word conception of the quasi-realist 
programme would have to establish a robust distinction between the overt assertoric 
syntax of a class of sentences — their susceptibility to embedding within negation, the 
conditional construction, and operations of prepositional attitude etc., — and genuine 
assertoric content. What reason is there to think that any such distinction can be drawn 
which is suitable for Blackburn’s purpose?
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Hi Reference and AHnfallibiîîîy
Azzouni’s work as already been mentioned in Chapter 1 in connection with 
Quine’s Platonism and his theory of posits (§111) and in connection with referential 
mishaps (§V). He has argued that as mathematical objects are not appealed to in order to 
explain experience, nor to organise it, such items can neither be tliick nor thin posits, and 
therefore must be ultrathin posits. This is supported by his thought that there are 
disanalogies between mathematical items and thin posits (unobservable entities) based on 
differences of epistemological strategy in mathematics and in science, and also 
disanalogies between mathematical items and both thick and thin posits based on an 
analysis of referential mishaps. Azzouni’s discussion of these mishaps is worth 
considering in detail, as is its possible connection with Dummett’s conception of 
reference which is purely semantic.
As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, there are two obvious ways for an 
object-dependent thought to fail: the thought might focus on an object, but on the ‘wrong’ 
object, or it may fail to pick out any object at all. Azzouni further distinguishes the first 
kind of error — he suggests that not only is it possible to pick out the wrong object — to 
get the reference wrong — which he calls an A-mishap, but that it is also possible to pick 
out the correct object, but to misname that referent, which he calls an ‘A ’-mishap.
Some examples are required: suppose that Tweedledum and Tweedledee are 
identical twins; were Alice to call Tweedledum ‘Tweedledee’, she need not be mistaken 
about what she thinks ‘Tweedledee’ refers to, but rather her mistake is to call 
Tweedledum by the name ‘Tweedledee’. this is a primary A-mishap; the referent of one 
term (Tweedledee) is confused with that of another.
Now suppose at some point in a journey through Wonderland, Alice and the Red 
Queen were to come across the twins. If the Red Queen is good at discriminating twins 
(unlike Alice), on being introduced (wrongly) by Alice to the twins, the Queen will think 
that ‘Tweedledee’ refers to Tweedledum; this is a primary ‘A’-mishap: the Queen is not 
confused as to what ‘Tweedledee’ refers to, rather the confusion is over the name and 
whom it refers to.
When definite descriptions are used rather than proper names, such mishaps are 
said to be secondary. Primary A- and ‘A ’-mishaps in the description can cause mishaps
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with respect to the term the description is associated with, or they can arise out of primary 
A-mishaps with collateral information, primary ‘A’-mishaps with other terms, and so on.
The analysis of referential mishaps has led Azzouni to conclude that unlike the 
empirical case, primary A-mishaps are not possible with mathematical singular terms; he 
calls this A-infallibility.
An example: in this case, the mishap occurs between 2 and 4; suppose someone 
thought that the following integral had the value of 2:
2 sin(— = 2\ 2J
Notice that it is not a case of confusing 4 with 2 — it is not a primaiy A-mishap; therefore 
it must be either a primary ‘A ’- or a secondary mishap. By thinking about the ways in 
which such an error can come about, the most obvious cause is a miscopying of a symbol 
from one line of working to the next — so it is a secondaiy ‘A’-mishap,
Simpler examples — such as 7x8=49, or 3104-5=61, might arise by following
some simple algorithm to work the answers out. Suppose in the first case it is just a 
matter of adding 7 eight times, and by miscounting how many times 7 is added. Again, 
these are cases of secondary ‘A ’-mishaps.
In the empirical case, singular terms are linked to their referents by what is 
sometimes described as a non-conceptual connection; however, the name/bearer model of 
reference seems to collapse in the mathematical case, as there appears to be no gap 
between the name and the bearer, as there is no way to misrefer to the bearer of the name.
This leads Azzouni to promote a variant of formalism, which might roughly be 
summarised by the thought that: there is no more contact between the term and its 
referent, than the notation used to refer to it.
For Azzouni’s arguments to have any force, and any originality, these types of 
mistake have to be distinguished from simple use/mention errors. He claims that 
“Something a little more systematic and interesting is afoot.” ®^ Whether a formalist 
identification is made between numbers and numerals — which he feels would be a 
justified conclusion based on this evidence — or if it is not, there is a difference between 
mistakes with small numbers and large ones. Errors with small numbers are usually taken 
Azzouni (1994), p43
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to betray linguistic incompetence, while for larger numbers, the mistakes are to be 
explained as a result of ‘A’-mishaps:
Mastering the manipulation of small numerals takes (relatively speaking) very little.
And possession of that capacity is definitive of referential success. So when errors are
made, they are seen as so crude that either they are (barely) ‘A ’-mishaps or (more likely)
examples of linguistic incompetence.®®
As this suggests that there is no mechanism underlying reference to mathematical 
items — because the reference is immediate — Azzouni takes this to undermine the 
popular interpretation of Benacerraf’s Puzzle: if the woriy is to account for the reference 
of mathematical items despite their causal inertness, then this is a challenge to give an 
account of the mechanism by which reference to such objects works. If there is no 
mechanism of reference, then there will be no puzzle.
Although Azzouni’s arguments do not engage with the puzzle as Benacerraf 
himself presented it, it does reply to the popular interpretation of the puzzle. More 
importantly, his study of referential mishaps sheds some light on what it might be for 
reference to have no more than a semantic role, as Dummett has suggested. However, 
despite the illumination which Azzouni gives to the underlying notion, his analysis will 
not be helpful in interpreting Dummett’s expression of that intuition: Azzouni’s distinction 
is based on differing categories of object or posit, while Dummett concentrates on 
differing notions of reference.
iv  Problems with thin reference.
There are two questions to consider in relation to Dummett’s Tolerant
Reductionism:
i) whether there is indeed a coherent notion of thin reference; and
ii) does it have the anti-platonist significance which Dummett takes it to have.
Recall Dummett introduced thin reference by appeal to the contribution a term 
makes to the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs. In the case of terms which are 
introduced by way of contextual definitions, he argued that the part such singular terms
Azzouni (1994), p43
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play would not involve 'going through’ their referents — so the reference of such 
singular terms is thin. The model for contextual definitions which Dummett uses in his 
discussion of thin reference is D=, which concerns directions:
(D=) Dir(a)=Dir(6) ^  a lib
Wright has objected to the narrowness of Dummett’s considerations; while he — 
Wright — admits that some terms may be semantically idle in the sense outlined just 
above, Dummett’s paradigm cases involve statements where the singular terms in 
question do not actually occur. For example: the truth values of direction statements can 
be known without any reference to direction terms; e.g. by taking D= as introducing 
‘notational variants’ in terms of lines and parallelism. What would be required to show 
that direction terms are suitably idle ought not to depend upon statements where the terms 
do not occur, but rather that issue should turn on the contribution they make to the 
determination of the truth value of propositions in which they do in fact occur. But 
arguably, this is precisely what the introduction by way of a Fregean contextual definition 
delivers:
you have in addition to follow through the Fregean abstraction — to read the left-hand- 
sides of the appropriate principles not merely as notational variants of the right-hand- 
sides, but in a way which is constrained by their surface syntax and the familiar 
vocabulary that they contain.’**
A further complication suggests that Dummett’s analysis must misfire: by concentrating 
on D=, Dummett has singled out a case which is a genuine definition: however, N= does 
not provide a means of eliminating all occurrences of NxFx, e.g. it fails to eliminate it 
from ‘mixed’ expressions, such as NxFx=^: it is this feature which leads to the Caesar 
Problem. However, as these occurrences cannot always be eliminated using N= alone, 
the appropriate circumstances fail to materialise for Dummett’s argument to run 
concerning the ‘semantically idle’ nature of such terms.
There is another problem which crops up in connection with contextual 
definitions. Wright’s syntactic priority thesis is that while there is a right over left priority
in the introduction and explanation of the meaning of the terms involved, the ontological
■'“Frege (1884) §65
■*' Wright (forthcoming), pl7
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priority is in the other direction, from left to right. Dummett contends that there is not an 
appropriate response to reductionist pressures. Consider the case of a contextual 
definition such as D=. The thought behind Wright’s priority thesis, is that the left hand 
side of the biconditional has ontological priority, so that as it contains reference to 
directions, so too must the right hand side include such reference, however well hidden 
that reference may be. Hale calls this the Hidden Reference Claim; he takes Dummett to 
be arguing that it cannot be correct, as it is possible to grasp the sense of the right hand 
side without fulfilling the possession conditions for ‘direction’; as the right hand side and 
the left hand side are to possess the same sense, it follows that because of the connection 
between sense and reference, if the left hand side genuinely features a reference to 
directions, so too must the right. As it is possible to understand the right hand side 
without being aware of any reference to direction, it follows that if the right hand side 
lacks this feature, so according to Dummett, must the left.
Following Frege, both sides of the biconditional express the same thought, and 
therefore share the same sense. Further, if the two statements share the same sense, then 
according to Frege, as the sense of a complex expression is composed of the senses of its 
parts, grasp of a sentence involves grasping the sense of each of the components. In this 
case of the biconditionals, this poses problems. However, there is good reason to reject 
this Fregean criterion for sameness of thoughts. His criterion was designed to allow for 
there to be statements with the same sense, without further demanding that anyone who 
understands one would understand the other. While the criterion does succeed in this 
general task, it lumps together two quite distinct cases:
where a thinker possesses a certain concept, but does not understand a particular
expression for it, and cases where she simply lacks that concept altogether
There is room then, due to the difference between these cases, for statements to have the 
same sense, but to be composed of different ingredient senses, contra compositionality. 
Hale argues that, as in the numerical case, there are genuinely different ingredient senses 
in some biconditionals, the two halves need not be taken to express the sameness of 
sense, but rather a sameness of truth conditions. Take the following example:
Hale (1994), pl28
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There are wives’ and There are husbands’ share their truth condition (both being true 
just in case 3x3y(j: is female and y  is male and x is married to y)) but they surely differ
in sense — if they did not, then the thought that There are wives if and only if there are 
husbands would be the same thought as There are wives if and only if there are wives, 
which it plainly is not/^
All of the above distinctions are more easily understood if the discussion is focussed on 
existence, rather than reference. Hale has argued that the tolerant reductionist is faced 
with a dilemma:
Either he maintains that there is, corresponding to his distinction between thin and 
realistic conceptions of ‘reference’, a parallel distinction between thin and thick (realistic) 
senses of ‘existence’, or he maintains that there is one notion of existence.’**
Azzouni opts for the first horn of the dilemma; Dummett takes the second. Given that 
Dummett admits only one sense of ‘existence’, Hale finds it hard to see why thin 
reference need pose any threat to the platonist. He comments that if this strategy is to do 
any damage to the platonist account, objects of real reference need to be held to exist in 
some sense not available to the objects of thin reference. He comments:
Once it is allowed that a syntactic singular term has semantic content, it is unclear (at 
best) whether, or what, more could be demanded for it to count as possessing reference, 
understood as a relation to something external.’*^
V Id en tify in g  Knowledge
The semantic approach to a differential conception of reference is a dead end: 
whether the approach be that of Dummett’s ‘tolerant reductionism’, Blackburn’s quasi­
realism or Azzouni’s ultrathin posits. There are unsurmountable problems, as thin and 
thick reference inevitably collapse. However, the demise of the semantic conception of 
thin reference points to a review of the thoughts which motivated the endeavour — 
Dummett’s account of identifying knowledge.
Russell (1912) divides knowledge into two classes: knowledge of things and
knowledge of truths. Knowledge of things he further divides into knowledge by
""iW.,pl28
•** Hale (1994), pl38 
■** Hale (1987), p i36
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acquaintance and knowledge by description. Evans draws the following principle from 
Russell’s analysis:
A subject cannot make a judgment about something unless he knows what object his
judgment is about.*®
Unlike Russell’s treatment, Evans' discussion of the subject is not tied to a 
foundationalist epistemology, and is not essentially bound up with any epistemological 
strategy. On grounds of sheer generality, Evans' approach to singular thoughts will be 
followed, rather than that of Russell.
For Frege, grasp of the sense of a statement involves grasp of the parts of that 
statement — and the grasp of the sense of a singular term is precisely that knowledge of 
which object it refers to. As Evans points out “the real dispute concerns what it is to have 
such know ledge.D um m ett argues that the best defence of names for abstract objects is 
to see the use as an extension of the legitimate practice of naming concrete objects. The 
justification behind such a move is to come through the analogy — abstract objects are the 
bearers of their names in just the same way that concrete objects are the bearers of their 
names. This is what he calls the name/bearer model of reference; his arguments against 
the robust reading of N= are that this name/bearer model breaks down in the case of 
abstract objects.
The aim of Dummett’s tolerant reductionist strategy is again to drive a wedge 
between the two halves of the name/bearer model; he argues that the sense of a proper 
name involves (roughly) a criterion for recognising — given any object — whether it is 
the bearer of that name or not. Consideration of certain problems concerning the 
formulation of such a criterion — for example, so that it does not require a completely 
recursively effective method, nor that it violate Dummett’s own intuition that identification 
is context dependent'^ — leads Dummett to suggest: grasp of the sense of a proper name 
is the ability to recognise, when one is presented with it, whatever counts as establishing 
conclusively that a given object is the bearer of that name.''^ He equates with such 
knowledge that which is required to determine the truth value of what he calls.
Evans(1982), p89 
ibid., p89
Objects must be singled out in a particular way — see §X 
Dummett (1973), p230
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‘recognition statements’, such as ‘This is a \
Dummett’s analysis of recognition statements has as its basis, the notion of 
ostension, which leads to an account of identifying knowledge as essentially causally 
constrained. He picks out the following as sources of identifying knowledge:
i) demonstrative identification of the object in one’s immediate environment
ii) recognition, that is, picking out the same object again
iii) descriptive identification
Dummett argues that of these three types of identifying knowledge, only the first 
is basic; the other two — recognising the same object again, and descriptive identification 
— are derived. From this, he argues that such knowledge is only available for concrete 
objects: as abstracta are introduced by contextual rather than ostensive definition, there is 
no causal link between the name and the bearer of that name for abstract objects, and 
therefore tlie name/bearer model must break down, just at the point where it would have 
to carry the greatest load. The question becomes one of how the senses of names of 
abstract objects are to be given, if not by one of these three modes. If Dummett is correct, 
and demonstrative identification is the primary form of identifying knowledge, and the 
other two cases are derivative, then as Hale puts it:
[Dummett] is clearly right to deny that we can make anything of the suggestion that 
coming to appreciate the truth of an equation involves identifying some external object 
as the referent of ( one of) the terms flanking the sign of identity. ... And there is 
simply nothing which would count as identifying something, in that sense, as the 
referent of the standard numeral ‘5’.®“
If this is the case, then there will never be reference (as the realist conceives it) to
abstract objects such as numbers. The conclusion that the reductionist draws from this is
that this breakdown of the name/bearer analogy, through failure of these forms of
identifying knowledge, shows that the original move — to extend the use of singular
terms from the physical — is illicit, because there are no such objects to be named. The
austere nominalist’s explanation will be that despite meeting all of the syntactic criteria for
singular termhood, the failure of identifying knowledge shows that there is only surface
commitment to numbers, and that by scraping the surface a little, it is clear that there are 
^ Hale (1987), pl65
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no such things.
Dummett, on the other hand, argues that by concentrating on the notion of 
reference, two components can be separated — reference as semantic role, and reference 
as the realist conceives of it, as pointing to something external. Abstract objects, by 
meeting all of the syntactic criteria, are granted reference in this thin sense, which is why 
Dummett calls this ‘tolerant reductionism’.
While Hale admits that this shows one sort of disanalogy, it does no harm to the 
logicist approach to these issues. He separates two strands in the platonist’s position: the 
claim that the singular terms refer to objects, and secondly, that such statements concern a 
mind-independent reality. He argues that the second of these issues is bound up with the 
notion of truth, and the status of truths of statements of the appropriate kind. Dummett’s 
attack is focused on the objects side of this divide — he accepts that the statements are 
true, and holds that the singular terms refer, in some sense, to objects.
Hale writes:
It is only the combination of the mind-independence of those traths with the claim that 
the statements of them contain genuine singular terms which yields the conclusion that 
they deal in mind-independent objects. If this is right, then it is, quite simply, 
misguided to regard the possibility, or lack of it, of demonstrative identification of 
objects of a certain kind as decisive for their status as elements of the external world,®'
He suggests that demonstrative identification be rejected as the primary form of 
identifying knowledge, and that an account be given of what it is that these cases, 
demonstrative identification, recognition and descriptive identification, have in common, 
that is, the aim should be to give an account of what unifies them, and that such a general 
account would no longer have as its primary focus demonstrative identification, and 
hence, would permit an account granting reference to abstract objects. If such a line can 
be sustained, then not only does this undercut all of the austere reductionist’s claims, it 
also does a certain amount of damage to Dummett’s ‘tolerant reductionism’, as this 
draws, among other things, on the ‘ostension’ model of identifying knowledge.
A first stab would be that having identifying knowledge of an object consists in 
being equipped to verify some identity statements about it, and that having any of these 
three kinds of knowledge is to be so equipped. However, this first attempt at an analysis
®' Hale (1987), pl66
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does not go deep enough — for there are essentially two kinds of identification that are 
required here: firstly, identification of an object as an object of a particular kind, or falling 
under a concept, and secondly, identifying or distinguishing between objects falling 
under the same concept. The formulation just given will deal with the second of these — 
but will do nothing for the first.
What will be required then is simply a pair of criteria:
i) a criterion which suffices to identify or distinguish objects falling under a concept
— call this an internal criterion, or just a criterion of identity;
ii) a criterion to pick out which objects fall under a concept, and those which do not
— call this an external criterion, or an criterion of application.
Possession of identifying knowledge of an object involves satisfying the criteria of 
identity and application for that object, i.e. the ability to distinguish the object from others 
of the same kind, and from those of different kinds. Seen in this light, the three cases 
which Dummett considers — demonstrative identification, recognition and descriptive 
identification — are special cases of a more general (and not necessarily causal) case.
The important case to concentrate upon is when the object falls under a soital 
concept, that is, when the concept picks out or individuates a kind of th ing .T hen  these 
criteria characterise the ability to pick out an object of a given type, and the ability, given a 
token of that type, to recognise that token again.
So not only are the semantic theories of thin reference unworkable, by 
establishing an entirely general theory of identifying knowledge, Wright and Hale have 
shown such approaches to be unmotivated.
X I  Hume^s Principle
A number of objections have been raised against N= and the use to which Wright 
puts it; the two most important objections concern its impredicative character and what
Strawson (1959), pl68 draws on the distinction between two types of concept which apply to objects. 
This is the distinction between sortai and characterising concepts. A sortal concept supplies a principle for 
distinguishing and counting particulars which it collects, and thereby provides its own principle for 
individuating the objects it so collects. Characterising concepts also supply principles for collecting and 
counting items, but do not provide a means for individuating the objects which fall under it. For example, 
‘butter’ is not a sortal concept — we cannot count butters, for example. But it is a characterising concept, 
and there are no problems associated with counting lumps, packets or churns of butter.
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Wright has called the Bad Company objection.^
Wright has argued for the legitimacy of abstraction principles in general and N= in 
particular. The Bad Company argument does not contest the truth of N=, nor the role it 
plays in introducing the concept Number, but rather its status as an analytic truth. The 
obvious ‘bad company’ which N= keeps includes the inconsistent abstraction principle 
which Frege took as his Basic Law (V): comparing the two might lead to the following 
objection: must there not be some error in the neo-Fregean conception of abstraction if it 
both accepts N= and rejects (V), a very similar abstraction of “essentially the same kind 
as N=”.^
However, Boolos — who has argued forcefully against the analyticity of N= on 
the basis of the Bad Company objection — does not concentrate on this obvious case; 
after all, N= and (V) are explanations of the concepts Number and Extension, and it 
would seem only prohibitive to suggest that all examples of a type of explanation have to 
be successful in order for that type to count as genuinely explanatory. Instead, he offers 
the following abstraction principle as the sort of chap whose company N= ought to avoid:
(P=) (VF)(VG)(ParF=:ParG<^Syra(F, G)I2)"
Rather than concentrate on Boolos’ P=, Wright has given a simpler example of 
exactly this point in his discussion of Boolos objection: Wright calls this the Nuisance 
Principle.
(v=) ( V F ) (V G )( v F =v G ^ A (F ,  G))®®
As with the Parity Principle, the Nuisance Principle will hold for any finite domain, but 
will fail to be satisfied if the domain is infinite. It holds the same claim to analyticity as
N= does: if N= is to be classed as analytic of the concept Number, then v= is plausibly
®® See Wright (1997), p213 
®* Wright (1997), p213
Unpacking the rhs: Sym(F, G)I2 is shorthand for; the number of things which are F or G, but not both 
(the Symmetric difference of F and G) is even. Boolos calls the objects Introduced by this abstraction 
Parities.
®® Unpacking the rhs: A(F, G) is shorthand for: only finitely many objects be either (F&'~G)v(G&~F).
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analytic of the concept Nuisance. Yet N= is satisfied only on transfinite domains, v= on
finite ones, and so it would seem that these two principles are mutually inconsistent.
One way out of this bind would be to take the abstraction principles in question as 
“formative of the concepts they introduce”,^ by taking N= as analytically true would
simply force the organisation of our concepts so that v= were analytically false. A better
solution — one that does not relegate the discovery of the infinitude of numbers to mere 
projection or stipulation — would involve preserving the character of N= as laying down 
only the truth conditions for the concept Number, rather than also stipulating that those 
conditions are met. But stating the above preconditions gives a clear insight into what a 
solution could consist in, as N= can be given in such a way that it fixes the truth-
conditions and no more; v= cannot.
[T]he reason it is so is because it carries implications for the extensions of concepts, 
especially: concrete sortal concepts, quite unconnected with the concept it aims to 
introduce. The Nuisance Principle cannot be viewed merely as introducing the concept 
by fixing the truth-conditions for statements concerning instances of it, and then leaving 
it to the world to settle which if any of those truth-conditions are satisfied; if that were 
all it served to do it would not possibly carry any import for the cardinality of the 
extensions of concepts which are quite unconnected to the concept of Number ... and 
whose explanation proceeds quite independently.®®
It is important to consider the role N= plays in simply fixing the truth-conditions. 
In the third and fourth Chapters, structures will be considered, which arise not out of 
principles such as N=, but from axioms which characterise those structures. These 
axioms also fix the truth conditions, but not in the principled way that N= does. There is 
sufficient difference between the two methods of fixing truth conditions that little is 
profited by dwelling overlong upon N=; that said, it is important that the tenability of the 
semantic approach be demonstrated, and as such, at least a sketch of a reply to each of the 
objections is required.
If N= is laid down — stipulated — as a definition, such a move would not license 
the natural inference from ‘NxFx=NxGx’ to ‘(3y)NxFx=y’, which intuitively, we may
®^ Wright (1997), p226 
®® Wright (1997), p231
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wish to allow. Interpreting N= in a suitably robust fashion to allow such conclusions 
requires some justification. In reply to such a demand, Wright looks to Frege, and his 
introduction of the direction equivalence. He claims there that:
We carve up the content in a different way from the original way, and this yields us a 
new concept.®’
Briefly, “Numbers are rather the output of a distinctive Idnd of re-conceptualisation of an 
epistemologically prior species of truth.”® The adoption of the principle, although taken 
to be substantial, ought not be problematic, as it relies on the prior truth of the right hand 
side and more importantly, grasp of the truth conditions for the right hand side.
Field’s objection to N= is that it appears to magic numbers into existence, much 
as Anselm’s Ontological Proof does the existence of God. Field’s peculiar brand of 
arithmetical atheism relies on this and on other standard objections to abstracta. He 
therefore takes N= to be false. Yet, as stated above, number ought to be thought of as a 
re-conceptualisation, not as
generated purely out of the concept number, as the existence of God Is supposed, 
according to the Anselm’s Ontological Argument, to be generated by His Concept.®'
Field’s objections rely on interpreting N= as doing more than simply fixing truth 
conditions — he is, as it were, taking the first route, gestured at above, out of the 
problem, and assuming that N= guarantees that the truth-conditions are satisfied.
Returning to the Bad Company argument, Wright concludes that the distinctive
difference between the two cases is that N=, unlike v=, is conservative.® Adding N= to a
conceptual scheme will not affect, for example, the cardinality of the extensions of the
concepts already contained in the conceptual scheme; adding v= however, does allow us
to prove more about tliose concepts than was possible without the introduction of v=.
It therefore appears that it is possible to establish a principled ‘dress code’ by
Frege (1884) §64 
® Wright (1997), p208 
®‘ ibid., p208
Conservativeness is used by Field to account for the utility of mathematics, as he claims that 
mathematics is not literally true. See §5, Field (1980), Chi and Field (1989) Ch4.
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which to distinguish N= from a crowd of less appealing principles: consistency (to 
distinguish N= from, say, Basic Law (V)) and conservativeness (to distinguish N= from
v= and P=) and so no way of sustaining the bad company objection.
The argument from impredicativity is potentially more damaging. N= and similar 
second order abstractions require quantification over a domain which need to contain 
those objects is supposed to introduce. Dummett claims this is the root of the failure of 
Frege’s project. Whilst the impredicativity may not lead to the inconsistency which 
certainly did lead to the demise of Frege’s own logicism, it does lead to several other 
problems.
Dummett claims that three problems face impredicative contextual definitions:
i) impredicativity is a bar to the possession, by every statement of the theory, of a 
determinate tiuth value;
ii) the domain of quantification requires a characterisation priori to the application of 
such principles; and
iii) the impredicative character of N= makes it unsuitable as an explanation of the 
notion of cardinality.
In order to reply to the first objection, it is worth clearly distinguishing Frege’s 
actual project from the neo-Fregean revival pioneered by Wright et al. Certainly Frege 
held that every statement genuinely expressible in the Begriffsschrift has a determinate 
truth value: however those following his work need not hold such restrictive views, as 
Hale comments:
whilst they are firmly historically linked, logicism and a commitment to bivalence are 
not obviously inseparable.®®
While there may indeed be no general connection between determinate truth values and
logicism, Dummett has argued that in the case of contextual definitions, only if fully
determinate truth values are guaranteed will the items introduced by such means possess
realistic reference. However, the criticisms already raised of Dummett’s conception of
thin reference should make it clear that it suffices for a term to have reference that there be
true statements in which it occurs; for the term to be genuinely singular — i.e. meeting
the syntactic criteria and supported by identifying knowledge — and so long as those 
“ Hale (1994), pI40
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cases which lack a determinate value do not ‘reflect a defect in their contextual 
definition’.® For example, cases such as the Caesar problem would reflect such a defect; 
lack of determinate truth value for the statement ‘Nx(x is a natural number)=Nx(x=x)’ 
would not.®
Dummett’s second point — that the domain of quantification requires a prior 
characterisation — is puzzling. It is difficult to see in what way such a prior 
characterisation could be given — or indeed, what motivates Dummett in claiming that so 
strong a restriction must be placed on quantification for it to be licit. It may be that this 
criticism follows from Dummett’s thoughts on intuitionism; if so, it cannot lead to a real 
objection without the ransom being paid on a whole host of other contentious issues. The 
best case for such would seem to be by maintaining Dummett’s semantic anti-realist 
revisionist approach, then and only then does this become a genuine objection to 
impredicative definitions. However, for Dummett to hold to his line on revisionism, he 
needs to hold that impredicativity is no bar to explanation. As Hale has pointed out, 
Dummett himself has argued for the harmless impredicativity of several definitions, 
notably those of the logical constants for intuitionistic logic®. But, this is precisely the 
content of Dummett’s third objection to N=: that its impredicative character makes it 
unsuitable as an explanation of the notion of cardinality.
Therefore, as the first objection can be sidestepped by the neo-Fregean, and as 
Dummett is unable to assert even the disjunction of his second and third objections, it 
would appear that the impredicativity is really quite harmless.®
The final objection to consider is Boolos’ bad company argument: given that
similar abstraction principles, such as Basic Law (V), are illegitimate, how can N= be
considered as a legitimate way to found arithmetic? One line of reply to this is to argue
that the inconsistency of Basic Law (V) need not make all contextual definitions
illegitimate. Although Dummett has taken the impredicativity of contextual definitions to
be problematic, it cannot be impredicativity which leads to the inconsistency — for N= is
known to be consistent. Wright has argued that it is enough to point out the disanalogy
between N= and Basic Law (V); one is consistent, the other is not. It seems that N= need
not be blamed for keeping bad company after all.
“ Hale (1994), pp 140-1 
“ The example Is from ibid., pl41 
“ Dummett (1977)
For a fuller discussion of the ‘Harmless Impredicativity of N=’, see Wright (1998)
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X Î I  To bury Caesarj or to praise him?
The Caesar problem is bizarre, notorious and decidedly hard: it is at the root of 
Frege’s dismissal of the contextual definition of number, and its subsequent replacement 
by the explicit definition in the Grundlagen, which in turn led to the adoption of Basic 
Law (V) and the use of value ranges. The complaint, which has already been mentioned, 
is that the use of N= alone will not suffice to settle the truth conditions of questions as 
obvious as “Is Julius Caesar the number of the planets”. In fact, N= fails to give a 
satisfactory account of itself in all such ‘mixed’ contexts, in which one or both of the 
singular terms is not in the form NxFx.
Some have argued that as N= works well in the contexts where numbers clearly 
are being dealt with — which would include all uses in arithmetic — the failure of these 
fringe cases is irrelevant. However, Frege seems right to give the problem the 
prominence that he does — Hale has argued that it is the ability to resolve issues such as 
the Caesar problem, that will determine whether reference in a discourse is genuine, or 
whether it merely supplies a singular term with reference in the guise of semantic value, 
that is, in only a tliin fashion.
According to Hale, solving the Caesar problem, requires demonstration that 
numerals are supported by identifying knowledge of their referents. Recall from the 
discussion above, the requisites for identifying knowledge: satisfaction of a pair of 
criteria: a criterion of identity and distinctness, to discriminate between objects of a given 
Idnd; and a criterion of application, to distinguish between those objects belonging to a 
certain kind, ad those not belonging. It is easy enough to see that N= suffices if it is 
known that numbers are being dealt with, in other words, it supplies a criterion of identity 
and distinctness, performing admirably so long as expressions are of the form 
*NxFx=NxGx’. Where this breaks down is in mixed statements, where no guarantee is 
given that the singular term is question refers to a number.
On the face of it, N= does not supply an answer to these questions, and such an 
omission goes against our intuitions. We know that Caesar is not a number; it is not as if 
we are in any doubt on this issue. What is at stake is the sufficiency of N=. The response 
which claims that such mixed cases are unimportant, or that these expressions occur only 
rarely, does not explain the force with which this question demands an answer. To
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understand it is to be compelled to answer the question. Either an answer needs to be 
given which matches our intuitions on the subject, or an explanation given of the mistakes 
that have been made by us and our intuitions. Nothing less will suffice: the problem 
cannot be discounted, else the status of numerals as genuine singular terms will be at 
stake, for without identifying knowledge, syntax alone will not turn the trick.
According to Wright and Hale, not only does the Caesar problem force itself upon I
us, requiring — even demanding — an answer, but also that the resources are available to !
Iresolve the issue. First, the strategy to answer the difficulty, then some criticisms of the !
line that Hale and Wright have taken. :
I and the Sortal Inclusion Principle
Wright’s analysis of the Caesar Problem for arithmetic is based on his conception 
of identifying Icnowledge.® Grasp of numerical singular terms involves the ability to 
distinguish one number from another, and to discriminate between numbers and objects 
of different kinds. The Caesar question is damaging because it highlights the difficulty of 
meeting this second requirement.
This general approach presupposes that there is some natural divide of objects into 
sorts or kinds, in accordance with the concepts which pick out those sorts. This need not 
be restricted to cases such as natural kinds, such as lions, tigers and bears (Oh my!) but 
may include many non-natural kinds too, such as chairs, tables and beer mugs. Wright’s 
thought is that the resources which are used to identify and distinguish between objects of 
a particular kind, may be unique to that kind, or to a restricted class of suitably similar 
types. For example, numbers are identified and distinguished by appeal to 1-1 
correspondence between concepts. To discriminate numbers from other objects requires 
only that appeal to resources such as 1-1 correspondence between concepts rule out or 
exclude a sufficiently broad class of objects. Rather than concentrate on what the 
exclusion conditions amount to, Wright has concentrated on the inclusion of one sort 
within another.
(SIP) where Fx is such a putative sortal concept, Gx is a sortal concept under which instances 
of Fx fall if and oniy if there are — or could be — terms a, b which recognisably 
purport to denote instances of Gx, such that the sense of a -b ,  can adequately be 
“ Wright (1983), ppI20//
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explained by fixing its truth conditions to be the same as those of a statement which 
asserts that the given equivalence relation holds between a pair of objects in terms of 
which identity and distinctness under the concept Fx is explained.®’
The strategy that is employed in solving the Caesar problem is that by taking the criterion 
of identity and distinctness which is supplied by N=, it is possible to generate a criterion 
of application for number, by using a very general sortal inclusion principle. Hale 
reformulates such as principle as
(SI) Singular terms from a given range stand for instances of a sortai concept F iff there is 
some sortal G, whose extension is included in that of F, such that, where a and b are 
any terms from that range, understanding ‘a= è’ involves exercising a grasp of the 
criterion of identity for G’s.™
Combining N= and SI results in a principle which will give the means to distinguish 
numbers form objects of other Idnds. Wright calls this principle N :^
(N") GvT is a sortal concept under which numbers fall, (if? and) only if there are singular terms 
a, b purporting to denote instances of G.t, such that the truth conditions of a=h could 
adequately be explained as those of some statement to the effect that a 1 — 1 correlation 
obtains between a pair of concepts.’*
Using this, the Caesar problem can be resolved; as Wright puts it;
Caesar is not a (natural) number, because Caesar is a person; and the sense of statements 
of personal identity cannot be explained by reference to the notion of 1 - 1  correspondence 
between concepts.”
ii  Criticisms o f this approach
^ibid., pi 14
” Hale has recently (Hale & Wright (1996)) rephrased this to give the following
(ST) Some C’s are D’s only if, there exists D’ CD, such that for any d, d’ with reference in D’, where
there is an identity holding between C terms c ’=c, the corresponding identity d=d' shares the 
same truth conditions.
which he claims is now clearly too strong, because of the unrestricted universal quantification that it 
includes. He suggests that this should be weakened by adding the notion of D-canonicity:
A term is a canonical D-term just in case its sense makes it clear that it purports to refer to a D-term. The 
resulting sortal inclusion principle SI* is used to deal with some of Dummett’s objections to N=.
’* Wright (1983), pi 17 
ibid., pl44
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Dummett’s main criticism of this approach is based on a misunderstanding: he 
takes Nd (Wright’s principle for numbers arising from N= and SI) as a stipulation, in 
effect, equivalent to a solution Frege himself considered and rejected.^ If Nd is seen as 
the consequence of two well-motivated principles — N= being one, SI the other — then 
Dummett’s criticism is clearly wide of the mark. He does offer two further objections, by 
way of counter-examples, to the use of the sortal inclusion principle; these are worth 
considering, before briefly moving onto some thoughts about the sufficiency of Wright’s 
proposal.
What would be the consequences if questions of personal identity did resolve 
around questions of 1-1 correspondence? We are invited to imagine the following 
‘whodunit’ scenario: the murderer has six fingers on his left hand, and the butler has six 
fingers on his left hand; therefore the identity of the murderer as the butler is purely a 
matter of 1-1 correspondence between numbers of fingers. While it may be that such 
questions can be settled by means which might indicate that there is some degree of sortal 
overlap, Hale and Wright have both stressed the need to distinguish such factors which 
lead to the contingent resolution of problems of this sort, and those factors which 
contiibute to the content of the identity statements.
Another supposed counter-example — due to Michael Potter — deals with 
Members of Parliament. Suppose we are presented with the following abstraction 
principle:
(MP=) %'s MP=y’s MP ** X lives in the same constituency as y.
The objection is that Smith cannot be Jones’ MP, as Smith is not the sort of object 
‘whose identity consists in holding co-constituency relations between Jones and others.’’'* 
However, while this looks like a damaging objection, it fails for a very simple reason: 
this concept of MP — introduced by the notion of co-constituency — is an abstract 
object, unable as Hale points out, to have a wife or a mortgage. The counter example 
lapses, because the concept so introduced fails to remain faithful to the intuitive concept 
of MP which we already have; instead it fixes the meaning of a term referring to abstracta
which are more like the office of MP, a type rather than a token. N= on the other hand, is
” Frege (1884), §67 
” Hale (1994)
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faithful to the concept of number we already have.
Lastly, the sufficiency of Wright’s response needs consideration. Recently Wright 
and Hale have plugged a number of small holes in the account, but these basically only 
add finesse to the general method. The question to consider here is whether the method of I
sortal exclusion rules out enough objects. It looks fairly conclusive that N= plus SI rule i
out all concrete objects from the domain of numbers; it is not so clear as to what the |
verdict is when they are focused on certain mathematical objects — sets and classes in i
particular. Dummett suggests that no class will be up for inclusion in the numbers, as 
they can be given in ways other than by the appropriate equivalence relation. However,
Hale notes that: '
The membership condition for certain classes, for example, may essentially involve the 
notion of 1-1 correlation. Classes so specified would seem, so far as the proposal goes, 
to be perfectly good candidates to be numbers. The classes with which Frege’s eventual 
explicit definition identified the cardinal numbers provides one obvious example, and 
there are others.”
It is these ‘others’ that may cause the problems — largely the problems raised in 
Benacerraf (1965); if some classes or sets are numbers, then the von Neumann ordinals 
and the Zermelo ordinals look like good candidates: the question then becomes whether 
2~{{0}} or 2={0, {0}}. These issues are dealt with in a general fashion, throughout 
the next chapter.
X I I I  C onclusion
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the aim has been to demonstrate the 
tenability of a semantic approach to at least one area of mathematics, namely arithmetic.
Given that the inconsistencies can be removed from the Fregean project, it is worth while 
considering tliis, as it is a well developed account.
There are three main sources of contention concerning tlie viability of this method; 
as the Fregean argument relies on the notion that: singular terms in a truth apt statements 
refer to objects, it is unsurprising that the objections focus on components of this 
argument.
 The first set of problems relates to the use of syntactic structure to give insight
Hale (1994), pl32
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into questions of ontology; to characterise syntactic singular terms and to show that 
numerals are such terms; to show that the use of such terms is supported by adequate 
identifying knowledge of the referents of the terms, and the challenge from Dummett’s 
tolerant reductionism. The second set of problems relates to the status of contextual 
definitions: objections that it is false, not a truth of logic, not that it is indistinguishable 
from other, less desirable abstraction principles.
The third objection to the neo-Fregean revival is Frege’s own: that N= does not 
properly act as a definition, as it cannot resolve questions such as “Is Julius Caesar the 
number of the planets?”
All these objections can be overcome; in most cases, a sketch of the solution to 
each of these problems is presented, establishing philosophical machinery which ought to 
be applicable in extending the account beyond arithmetic into the broader discourse of 
mathematics in general.
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X Ï V  In troduction
In the first Chapter, I hinted that the major problem motivating this dissertation, 
was finding the point of contact between logicism and structuralism, and finding the exact 
shape of the disagreement. Hopefully, the development of Frege’s theory of arithmetic — 
one of the threads in this knotty tangle — in the previous Chapter was persuasive. The 
aim of this and the next Chapter is to consider a quite distinct aspect of the tangle: the 
notion of structure. For the past century, mathematical activity has concentrated largely 
upon the notion of structure and mappings which preserve structure. Therefore, any 
philosophy of mathematics which takes mathematical practices seriously will need to give 
some account of structure.
What is meant in mathematics by structure will be explained in more detail 
shortly, but the following is a helpful first stab at capturing the notion:
A system is a particular, a structure repeatable. The set-theoretic hierarchy, the real 
numbers and the natural numbers are all mathematical systems. However, many systems 
share the same structure — for instance the natural numbers, the finite von Neumann 
ordinals and the Zermelo ordinals all share a particular structure.*
i The Structuralist Strategy
Very few philosophers take the explanation of structure to be a additional burden 
to the task of giving a philosophical account of arithmetic or set theory;" either structural 
concepts are disregarded, as they are taken to be only of marginal philosophical 
importance; or structure is taken to be the predominant notion, and used to give an 
account of arithmetic as well as of algebraic structures. Non-foundationalist writers, 
drawing their inspiration from current mathematical practice, have tended to concentrate 
on the notion of structure, opting for the second horn of this ‘dilemma’; traditional 
philosophies of mathematics opt for the first.
In an interesting article, Awodey has proposed a further distinction — between 
mathematical and philosophical structuralism:
[Mathematical structuralism] has already met with considerable success through a 
century of work by mathematicians pursuing a structural approach to their subject.
* Melia (1995), pl27, Melia attributes this distinction to Corcoran; see Corcoran (1980)
’ One who does accept the additional burden is Charles Parsons; see for example. Parsons (1990).
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Indeed this success is reflected in the current prominence of the notion of structure in 
mathematics.®
Philosophical structuralism, on the other hand, is a position which claims that 
philosophical mileage can be made by adopting the approach of (mathematical) 
structuralism and applying it, as it were, to problems in philosophy. Such an approach is 
an obvious way to take the methodology and practice of professional mathematicians 
seriously, by concentrating on the types of item which they study, rather than by 
concenti'ating on more familiar ‘High School’ disciplines such as geometry or arithmetic. 
This thought will often be summed up by the slogan ‘taking mathematical practice 
seriously’; it does not imply that the traditional positions ignore mathematical practice, but 
rather that the structuralist places a paiticularly strong emphasis on mathematical research 
and the methods of mathematical structuralism. A typical expression of structuralism 
might be this:
Reference to mathematical objects is always in the context of some background 
structure, and that the objects involved have no more to them than can be expressed in 
terms of the basic relations of the structure.*
or like this:
structuralism is the doctrine that mathematics in générai is solely concerned with 
structures in the abstract sense, that is, with systems left no further specified than as 
exemplifying the structure in question.®
i i  Structures and Systems
The distinction between structures and systems will appear at various times 
thought the rest of this and the following Chapters. Although the distinction will be 
examined in closer detail later on, a fuller explanation than that offered briefly above will 
be helpful at this stage.
Mathematical systems — such as the natural number system N, the rational 
number system Q or the real number system R — have underlying structure: for example,
® Awodey (1996), p209
* Parsons (1990), p272 
® Dummett (1991), p295
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R has the same structure as any open interval of itself, e.g. (0, 1). This structure is the 
complete Archimedean field, also known as the real closed field (RCF). It can be 
described — by way of an axiom scheme — independently of the objects which can form 
such fields. Any collection, such as R or (0,1), which satisfies these axioms defining the 
structure, will be an example of a real closed field. The structure can be studied 
independently of any of the instances or examples of the systems with that structure, and 
the results will hold for any of the systems with that structure; investigating structures is 
therefore a powerful methodological technique.
To the extent that every system has an underlying structure, there have been 
attempts to reduce all mathematics to the study of structure; for example, as was attempted 
by Bourbaki,® who took it that structure was the only mathematically salient feature of a 
system. Bourbald set about expressing every area of mathematics in explicitly structural 
terms, by concentrating on the first order models of mathematical systems. The power 
and elegance of these techniques influenced other academics, especially in France, such 
as those working in fields such as theoretical linguistics {e.g. Saussure) and anthropology 
{e.g. Lévi-Strauss). The rise — and fall — of structuralism as a literary theory, despite 
the early connection with mathematics, is entirely separate from the recent growth of 
stiucturalism in mathematics
The Bourbaki project constitutes an incredible mathematical achievement; 
however, it was not an unmitigated success — largely due to the expressive inadequacy 
of the first order logic that Bourbald relied upon.
More recently, category theory has been developed; this considers structures and 
structure preserving mappings in order to characterise ‘the structure of structures’; i.e. 
categories seem to be to structures, what structures are to systems. Some have suggested 
that category theoiy be used to provide a foundation of mathematics, while others have 
taken it as a pure distillation of the best methods of mathematical structuralism.
This Chapter explores the notion of structure and various positions which are 
forms of philosophical structuralism — on the whole, the account is critical, leading to 
the conclusions that the various forms of philosophical structuralism not only fail to give
Nikolas Bourbaki was the name adopted by a group of young French mathematicians, originally from 
Nancy. The original Bourbaki was one of Napolean’s generals — there is an old statue of him in the 
garden next to the Mathematics Institute in Nancy.
^  85 -
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALISM 
solutions to familiar philosophy puzzles, but that it also does not capture the nature of 
mathematical structuralism. In the next Chapter various modest accounts of structure are 
developed, in order not only to give a philosophy of structure but also to expose the false 
dichotomy between the objects-only perspective of traditional philosophy of mathematics 
and the structures-only view espoused by modem structuralists.
The first section of this Chapter (§XV) introduces philosophical structuralism in 
more detail, and is followed by a section which looks at one of the main forms of 
structuralism, abstract-structuralism. The third section looks at pure-structuralism, while 
the fourth is more critical, dealing with some of the problems with the structuralist 
strategy. The fifth section leads on from these considerations, to offer an amended 
argument for structuralism about mathematics. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
review of some of the arguments between logicists and structuralists.
X  V  Philosophical Structuralism
The structuralist hopes to make headway on the platonist on three important 
counts: she claims to have solutions to the platonist’s problems with epistemology, 
ontology and with reference.
It is usually thought that the objects-platonist is committed to a realm of abstract 
objects, and Benacerraf, as mentioned in the first Chapter, is usually thought to have 
caused trouble for any view of mathematical objects as acausal. The structuralist claims 
that it is possible to have knowledge of a structure from instances of the patterns which 
exemplify that structure; moving from the concrete to the abstract in one step, thus giving 
a cleaner account not only of the epistemology of mathematics, but giving rise to a 
simpler ontology too.
Michael Resnik presents his form of structuralism as a response to the platonist’s 
plight when confronted with this sort of epistemological problem. By arguing that the 
entities of mathematics are being misdescribed — by mistakenly thinking of them as 
objects, rather than as structures — he contends that the problem of knowledge of 
abstract entities can be resolved. The objects of mathematics are for him, not items such 
as numbers or sets, but patterns. He takes patterns to have a fairly obvious, non-technical 
meaning. As there is causal contact with patterns, Resnik is able to conclude that a 
reliabilist account can be given of mathematical knowledge, relying on this notion of
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pattern recognition.’
Resnik’s argument needs some preliminaries to get it going. He argues that 
mathematical knowledge is not sui generis, but that it is of a kind with music and 
language.
Of course, no one fully understands the mechanism behind any of these skills, but by 
putting mathematics in the same epistemological context as music or language, we 
remove some of the mystery enveloping standard platonism. The standard platonist has 
no way of convincing a skeptic that knowledge and experience of this type exists. The 
structuralist by contrast, can point outside of mathematics in order to demonstrate the 
possibility of mathematical experience and knowledge. He can even indicate the place to 
look for the mechanism involved*
Several steps are involved: first, recognition of patterns, then abstraction from those 
patterns. Resnik claims that:
At the last stage we leave experience far enough behind that our theories are best 
construed as theories of abstract entities.’
He is sensitive to the question of whether beliefs about patterns formed in this way are the 
source of genuine mathematical knowledge, but while he shows some sensitivity in his 
discussion of this question, his final response is dogmatic: he takes it as given that there 
are mathematical truths, and that we have mathematical knowledge, and that beliefs about 
patterns will be involved in this loiowledge.
This sounds very like Mill’s empirical epistemology for mathematics, where the 
mathematical is taken to be constituted of high level explanations of empirical regularities 
of a very general kind.*° From the various instances of patterns, the more general form is 
adduced. Although Resnik claims to be a realist about mathematics — possibly he is even 
a platonist — he solves Benacerraf’s dilemma by opting for a causal epistemology. (To a 
certain extent Shapiro also plumps for this option.) Although abstract, there is contact 
between mathematical items and the subjects of knowledge, by way of various 
intermediary patterns. While this at first sounds plausible, no mechanism is given to
’ The account of pattern recognition is developed in Resnik (1981) and (1982)
* Resnik (1981), p35 
’ ibid., p35
See Frege (1879), §16 for a concise treatment of Mill’s philosophy of arithmetic.
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account for the way in which the knowing subject is to abstract the mathematical content 
from the patterns she sees. So even though this attempts to be a causal account, the 
crucial step still remains a mystery.
The second advantage the structuralist claims over the objects-platonist relates to 
the problem of reference: if mathematical objects are abstract and acausal, how can there 
be determinate reference to them? By showing that if the natural numbers are a 
progression of different sets, there is no way to determine which sets they are, for there 
are numerous different set-theoretic progressions which fit the bill. Although the moral 
that Benacerraf draws is that there is no determinate singular reference because there is no 
singular reference, he is usually taken to have shown that there is no determinate 
reference because reference to such items is indeterminate; moreover, it is usually taken 
this this indeterminacy is not damaging. This line of argument depends on a particular 
interpretation of Benacerraf s arguments; I shall return later in this Chapter to the 
arguments as Benacerraf himself states them. In this subsection, I shall concentrate on the 
popular (but perhaps misleading) interpretation of his arguments.
Popularly, Benacerraf is taken to have posed the following question: given the 
abstract nature of mathematical objects, how is it possible that we are able to refer to such 
objects? Azzouni calls this Benacerraf s Puzzle of Referential Access.” In Benacerraf 
(1965) a tale is told of two brothers who are brought up in isolation to each other, each 
receiving a different mathematical education: they receive different set-theoretic 
approaches to arithmetic as part of that education. One learns that the Zermelo sets form 
an co-sequence: 0 , {0}, {{0}}, {{{0}}}, ..; the other learns that the von Neumann 
ordinals perform just this task: 0 ,  {0}, {0 , {0}}, {0 , {0}, { 0 , {0}}}, . . . .  The 
result is that although they can understand each other as long as they only talk about 
arithmetic, as soon as they talk about set-theoretic properties, such as whether 2e3, they 
run into problems.
This worry generalises: there is no way to differentiate between the many
instantiations of an co-sequence: none of the progressions has priority over the others.
Consequently, it is argued that there is no way to determine which set is referred to, when
reference is made to say, the second place in the sequence: numbers cannot be sets,
because there is no way of telling which sets they are. Moreover, numbers cannot be
objects, because if there is no way of telling which sets they are, there will be even less 
“ Azzouni (1994), pp6-7
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chance of determinate reference in a wider class of objects.
This is taken to have shown that reference to numbers is beset with a particular 
kind of indeterminacy — and it is how, for example, Azzouni and Shapiro interpret 
Benacerraf s arguments.” So while there are ways to distinguish the second from the 
third place of an oa-sequence, there is no way to distinguish these places from any other 
objects, e.g. any particular objects instantiating the structure.
There are two main responses to this way of looking at the problem — either, as 
Putnam does, to recognise that this may generalise into a peimutation argument which 
will show that there is something wrong with the notion of determinate reference, or to 
take it as a sort of sceptical conclusion: that there is no fact of the matter as to whether 1 e3 
or not.
Putnam’s various arguments” about meaning and reference are not designed to 
show that there are deep problems attached to these notions, but that determinate reference 
can be claimed without lengthy philosophical justification. Shapiro’s treatment of the 
Benacerraf Puzzle develops in a similar way,*'* as does his treatment of the Caesar 
Problem. To him, such questions are misleading: the key is not to answer them, but to 
show why they do not require a solution.
He explain the apparent indeterminacy of questions such as Ts U 3 ?’ in two
ways. Such questions are sometimes solved by fiat: for example, modern mathematics 
takes the standard interpretation of arithmetic in set theory to be that of the von Neumann 
ordinals: therefore it can be stipulated that the m-sequence just is the von Neumann 
ordinals, and so le3. Another source of indetenninacy is due to a certain type of relativity
in mathematics. Shapiro claims that places in a structure can be considered variously as 
objects and as offices. When viewed as objects, particular interpretations are envisioned; 
when viewed as offices — the term comes from an analogy with the ‘office’ of President 
— no such instantiation is intended. Shapiro explains what he means when he talks of 
offices:
Individual numbers are analogous to particular offices within an organisation. We
for example, Azzouni (1994), pp55-60, Shapiro (1997), Ch3, p81 
‘® e.g. Putnam (1975) and (1980); see also Hale & Wright (1997), Chl7.
'* Shapiro comments in the final Chapter of Shapiro (1997) that this attitude is similar to Putnam’s, but 
makes no detailed comparison of the two positions.
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distinguish the office of Vice-President, for example, from the person who happens to 
hold that office in a particular year, and we distinguish the white king’s bishop from the 
piece of marble that happens to play that role on a given chess board. ... we can 
distinguish an object that plays the role of 2  in an exemplification of the natural number 
structure from the number itself. The number is the office, the place in the stmcture.'^
The second response to the referential worries follows along reasonably 
traditional nominalist lines: Benacerraf and Heilman have each offered different 
reductionist accounts of mathematics, based on what they take to be the failure of 
determinate reference for mathematical singular terms. In each case they accept the 
legitimacy of the surface grammar, and use their reductions largely to avoid ontological 
commitments: in this sense their reductions differ from strict nominalist reductions, and 
so might be said to be ‘tolerant’ in Dummett’s sense, with the overall strategy also 
comparable to Blackburn’s quasi-realism.'®
There are numerous labels for these different approaches to the Puzzle of 
Referential Access; the first position is variously called abstract-structuralism, ante rem or 
mystical structuralism; the second pure-structuralism, in re or hardheaded structuralism.'^ 
The distinctions are roughly equivalent, but each writer picks up on a different nuance in 
their inteipretation of the distinction, so these positions may not be exactly equivalent.
X V I  A bstract-structura lism
The two main proponents of ante rem or abstract-structuralism are Shapiro and 
Resnik. Both claim to be realists, in fact, they contend that in many respects, their 
positions differ little from the standaid platonist line.
Ontologically speaking, the abstract-structuralist is very similar to the platonist: 
both admit abstract objects — the difference lies in which objects they are committed to. 
The platonist takes the basic objects of mathematics to be numbers, sets, etc., while for 
the abstract-structuralist, there are no stand-alone objects — each object occurs within a 
structure which is itself an object. Anyone worried by sceptical doubts about the existence 
of abstract objects will not find abstract-structuralism a convincing alternative to Fregean 
platonism.
Shapiro (1997), Ch3, pp76-I06
Quasi-realism: see §X, ii
These pairs of contrasts are due to Hale, Shapiro and Dummett, respectively. See Hale (1996), pl25; 
Shapiro (1997), p85, and Dummett (1991), p295.
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Although part of the motivation for structuralism comes from wanting to take 
matliematical practice seriously, much of its attractiveness comes from the way in which it 
looks when philosophical questions are recast in structural terms. The main benefits are 
supposed to be solutions to Benacerraf’s twin puzzles of reference and epistemology — 
that is, if mathematical objects are inert, how can there be any reference to them; 
moreover, given that they are acausal, how can there be knowledge of such objects.
The aim, as outlined above, is to replace this picture of the truth conferring states 
of affairs with another picture — to claim, almost in a Tractarian fashion, that the 
mathematical world is the totality of structures, not of things. Even if the criticisms 
levelled quite generally against the philosophical structuralist are not conclusive, further 
problems face abstract-structuralism.
i Offices and Objects
What is perhaps the most important feature of structures, is the way that they can 
be considered in terms of systems which instantiate a pattern, or purely in terms of the 
places in the structure, without reference to the objects of any system exemplifying the 
structure.
Shapiro takes this feature of structures veiy seriously, and develops an account of 
these ‘places in a structure’. He argues that there are two main perspectives from which to 
view such places: they can be seen as objects, or as offices. If they are taken to be 
objects, then this is to take the places in a stnicture as instantiated; othei*wise the place in a 
structure can be thought of as an office. The Office of the President has certain properties 
and relationships, for example, with Senate and with foreign Heads of State; the Office is 
occupied at any one time by a person playing the role of President. Similarly, in a 
mathematical structure, it is possible to talk of the places in a structure as objects or as 
offices.
To explain how this shift in perspective works, Shapiro embraces a form of 
relativism: whether a place in a structure is an object or office will depend upon the 
linguistic resources available. He contends that:
In mathematics, at least, the notions of “object” and “identity” are unequivocal but 
thoroughly relative. Objects are tied to the structures that contain them.'®
" Shapiro (1997), Ch3 pp71-106
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Yet, contra Shapiro, offices are Fregean objects: they are the referents of genuine 
syntactic singular terms. This can be shown by running the tests outlined in Chapter 2. 
Recall that the Aristotelian test was introduced to deal with terms which did not have the 
grammatical form of proper names; as all of the terms in question here all feature 
grammatically as substantive expressions, there will be no need to run the Aristotelian 
test. Therefore, only Dummett’s three inference tests (or rather, Hale’s amended tests) 
need to be run to determine the singular termhood of such terms.
However, all such terms should pass the Aristotelian test: one worry that might 
occur in such a process could come from the existence of unique inverses in most 
structures. Take groups for example; each term naming a place in a group will have an 
inverse associated with it, which is not an inverse simpliciter, but an inverse under a 
particular operation. This would not compromise the Aristotelian test, were we to run it.
Rather than try to give a knock down argument for the singular termhood of all 
such structural terms, a few examples will be considered, which hopefully, will be 
suitably representative to show that the general case follows this trend.
First, an example from real analysis. Analysis is structural in the sense already 
mentioned — that grasp of individual real numbers requires grasp of properties of the real 
line. A good case to consider is the Intermediate Value Theorem:
THEOREM If for a function f(x )  continuous in an interval [a, b ] ,y  is any value 
between f(a) and f(b), then /(t)= y  for some suitable zE (a ,b ) .
PROOF Let a<b, f(a)=a, f ( b ) - f ,  and cc<y</3. Let S be the set of points x  of the 
interval [a, 6 / for which f(x)^y. S is bounded and has a least upper bound
also belonging to [a, b]. Then f(x )^ y  for ^<x^b. The point Ç either 
belongs to S or is the limit of a sequence of points x,i of S. In the first case 
f(D<Ty hence ^<b, since f(b)>y, and there are points x  between Ç and b, 
arbitrarily close to Ç for which /(x jsy . This is impossible if f  is
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continuous at Ç and f(0< y. In the second case, f(^)^y, we find from
f(xn)<y and ^ that f ( 0 ^ y  ; since f(0< Y is  impossible, f(0=Y^
What is required is to show that the substantive expression ^ is a singular term, referring
to a real number — the infimum of S. If ^ is a genuine singular teim, three inference 
patterns must be supported (see §IX). The first two of these inference patterns are:
(I) is in the interval [a, b f  entails ‘There is something such that it is in the interval
(II) 'f(C)=y, or rather, ‘ Ç has the image y under the function f  entails ‘There is something 
such that it has the image y under the function / ,  hence from this and the statement in
(I), it follows that ‘There is something such that it is in the interval fa, b J and it has the 
image y under the function
In each case, it looks as if there will be no way to reject a well formed stipulation request, 
although it may quickly reach the point where an answer will be refused on the grounds 
that sufficient information has already been supplied. For the third inference pattern,
some statement is required; let this be ~A (Çj, that is, that t  is not in the interval. 
This gives the inference:
(HI) ‘It is true of Ç that it is in the interval [a, b] or ii is not in the interval [a, b]' io % is  in 
the interval [a, or Çis not in the interval [a, b]' is valid.
Note that the appropriate cases of A(^j and B(Çj are essential, and that A(Ç) neither entails
nor is entailed by BfÇ), so Ç functions — contrary to today’s standard philosophical line
on variables — as a singular term in this context, naming a real number.
A second example is taken from group theory:
THEOREM Any abelian simple group is cyclic of prime order.
PROOF Let g  be an abelian simple group and take g, such that <3?^ /.
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Consider the subgroup which a generates; call this < a> . As g  is simple, 
it has no normal subgroups, and so Vg and for any  ^ < a >, then
g'lang f < a >. Hence g= < a > and so g  is cyclic.
Now, suppose that g  is not of prime order; so the order of g  is 
composite, that is, o{g)~nXm, for some m  ^ N.
By Lagrange’s theorem,*^ there are subgroups of these orders, which 
would imply that the group is not simple — so by reductio, g  is of prime 
order.
Again it needs to be shown that the three inference patterns are supported. Take a 
to be the appropriate substantive expression.
(I) '<a > ~ g '  i.e. 'a is a generator of g '  entails ‘There is something which is a generator
o f g . ’
The obvious choice for B(a) would be g \  i,e. ‘a is an element o^’ giving ‘There is
something which is an element of g  Y Unfortunately, this is entailed by the statement in
(I), so cannot be used. Instead, use the statement that is, ‘a is not the identity 
element of gY
(II) ‘There is something such that it is a generator of g  and it is not the identity element of
For the third part, take ‘< a > = g ’ and for B(a), take ‘a = i’; then
(HI) ‘It is true of a that it is a generator of g  or it is the identity element of g ’ to ‘a is a
generator of g  or a is the identity element of g '  is valid.
A third and final example: take the following definition from ring theory:
DEFINITION Let be a ring, a non-zero elem ent a  o f  ^  is said to be a left divisor o f
‘® Lagrange’s Theorem: the order of a subgroup «  of a group g  will divide the order of the group, i.e. 
o(g)=o(H).o(g: H)
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zero if 36 6^0 such that <3.6=0.
Left divisors are used for various purposes — consider the following lemma:
LEMMA An invertible element of a ring cannot be a divisor of zero
An example of a ring with a left divisor of zero is M2(Z), the ring of 2^2 matrices with 
entries taken from the integers:
X  3-»
0
 ^ is a left divisor of zero.
Take 6 to be the substantive expression under scrutiny:
(I) ‘bviO\ i.e. ‘6  is non-zero’ entails ‘there is something non-zero’
(II) ‘a.6=0’entails ‘There is something which when left multiplied by a equals zero’ and 
therefore, together with A(6 ) from (I) this gives ‘There is something such that it is non­
zero and when it is left multiplied by a equals zero’
(III) ‘It is true of b that it is non-zero or when it is left multiplied by a equals zero’ entails ‘6  
is non-zero or when b is left multiplied by a equals zero.’
. In the second and third examples, stipulation requirements are solved in the same 
simple way as in the first example; the various statements used are essential and 
independent. The examples do two things. They show the pedigree of the terms in 
question, as structured terms; the tests then show that they are genuine syntactic singular 
terms
Moreover, there is the requisite identifying knowledge of offices as objects; using 
only the axioms which characterise a structure, it is possible to distinguish one office in a
structure from any other office in that structure; the axioms then give an implicit criterion
^ It is worth remarking that such singular terms occur at best only infrequently in structural mathematics 
— more often, structures or substructures are the focus of theorems, not the elements of the structure.
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of identity and distinctness. It is also possible to show, using the same axioms, that an 
office which is given by those and only those axioms will be distinguishable from offices 
which are given by other structural definitions, whether these be mathematical or not. As 
concrete objects are not offices, this then entails that offices are supplied with a criterion 
of application, so full identifying knowledge is available for them. Therefore offices are 
Fregean objects. Structures themselves will be objects, and as all objects occur within the 
scope of structures, any structure is up for being an office in a larger structure,
i i  Structural relativity: O ffices and Objects
A central part of Shapiro’s account of structure focuses on the distinction 
between, as he himself puts it,
an object and a place in a structure, between an office-holder and an office.
So how we accommodate the role of structural instantiation is central to his account. He 
suggests that this distinction is only relative, and that there is no hard and fast boundary 
between a places in a structure and an object. It all depends, according to Shapiro’s form 
of abstract-structuralism, on the linguistic resources available from the perspective 
adopted: if there are more resources available, certain indeterminacies will be resolved, 
and places in a structure will coalesce into genuine objects.
Shapiro talks of places in a structure as being offices (for example, in a 
government structure) or positions (in a football team); the objects filling those places the 
office-occupiers or office-holders. Rather than think of there being two ontologically 
distinct categories, Shapiro argues that the only differences in this area are due to the 
perspective — i.e, the resources of the background theory — from which the items are 
approached:
A mathematical object is to be understood as relative to a theory, or loosely, to a
background framework.
But Shapiro does not confine his attention to the distinction between objects and 
places in a structure; naturally enough, he also thinks that this same distinction marks the 
boundary between systems and structures:
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What is structure from one perspective is system from another. What is office from one
point of view is office-holder from another. '^
As long as this analysis is restricted to objects and places in a structure, or the parallel 
distinction between structures and systems, then this looks like a plausible enough 
interpretation of the role of instantiation. But the worrying thought is that once Shapiro 
opens the door to this sort of relativity, he will not be able to stop this from spreading.
Any structure can be an office-occupier in a larger or dissimilar structure: an 
example of this might be to consider a family of structures such as groups. If the 
subgroups of a finite group are considered, it is worth asking whether these subgroups 
have any structure. Well, there is additional structure where the subgroups are normal. A 
subgroup N  is normal, just in case, for any element g of the group, and any element of 
the subgroup N, g+ N -N + g, i.e. the operation commutes on the subgroup. Normal 
subgroups form a lattice, that is, a partially ordered set such that any two members of the 
set have a union and an intersection in the set. So, when the subgroups are taken not as 
structures (Le. as groups) but as objects (Le. elements of a partial ordering) they form a 
lattice.
Call this feature of structures the ‘Russian Doll effect’; that structures can be 
instantiated as the places of other structures; and consequently, as the object in other 
systems (by the original notions of relativity). So not only will there be perspectives from 
which objects are places in a structure, and structure are systems, there will also be 
perspectives from which structures are objects or places in other structures. So not only is 
the notion of ‘mathematical object’ relative, so too is the notion of ‘mathematical 
structure’.
This seems to imply the unhappy thought that given a mathematical object, there 
will not only be a perspective from which this object functions as a place in a structure, 
but also one from which it functions as a structure. Once this stage is reached, the 
following worry arises: rather than explain the notion of instantiation of a structure, 
Shapiro’s discussion of structural relativity simply makes the distinction one without a 
difference.
In response to this worry, it becomes necessary to appraise Shapiro’s notion of
" Shapiro (1997), Ch4, pl22
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linguistic resources. He argues that from one theory, an item may appear as an object, 
that is, relative to a certain set of linguistic resources, an item is an object; relative to a 
different set of resources, it is seen as a structure. Similarly, from a depleted set of 
resources, what might normally be an object becomes a place in a structure. Separating 
the different notions of resource at play here is required, as while Shapiro may want to 
distinguish two notions, he would not want them to be drawn so that the relativity be 
transitive, and places in a structure turn out to be structures, due to the relativity of 
objects.
So, what is a structure. A, according to one theory,Ti, may be used to instantiate 
a place in a structure given by a theory T2, so that relative to T2, is an object 
instantiating or exemplifying some part of the structure described by T 2. A Fregean ought
to be happy to agree to this much, as it commits her to nothing new.
The second notion of linguistic resources which Shapiro accepts, however, is
new, and may cause the Fregean to hesitate. It states that where T 1 describes an item a ,
such that a  is a place in a structure A, then under T i+2 ot can be seen to be an object.
(Where 2  contains additional individuating information e.g. additional axioms, or more 
commonly, an interpretation or instantiation.)
Instead of thinking that these two types of variation of linguistic resources can be 
conflated to form one general theory, we separate the two types of resources: the first 
deals with the interplay between one theory and another — it is inter-structural; the 
second deals with a theory and its extensions — so is intra-structural. Given that the 
Fregean has a means of accommodating change in inter-structural resources, it is 
worthwhile considering what a Fregean’s response would be to Shapiro’s thoughts about 
intra-structural resources.
The full Fregean thesis about objects states that: singular terms in true indicative 
statements, supported by identifying knowledge, refer to objects. The abstract- 
structuralist’s claim, which ought to be equivalent, is that a singular term in a theory 
T +2, refers to an object. If these are taken to be equivalent, then what is it that the 
structuralist is claiming when the resources are depleted, i.e. when T is used alone, rather 
than in conjunction with %? The theory T only deals with items already in the structure, 
and their structural properties. Grasp of the statements constituting T will suffice to
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identify and discriminate any two places in the structure, but will say nothing about the 
places in the structure compared with items of any other sort. So by depleting the 
linguistic resources — by varying the quantity of such resources — any criterion of 
application will fail, despite the successful satisfaction by T of a criterion of identity.
This would seem to give rise to a thinner (or perhaps more accurately — but less 
suggestively, a narrower) conception of reference than the Fregean admits, based on 
epistemic rather than semantic considerations." This will be considered in more detail in 
§XXIV. Interpreting Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism in this way will result in the 
following view; that offices are a certain kind of object — ones which cannot be fully 
identified, and can only be distinguished with respect to the other elements of the 
structure in which they occur. Once more information is available — once the quantity of 
the linguistic resources is increased — these offices can be distinguished and 
discriminated from ordinary objects.
X V I I  P ure-structuralism
So far, in the discussion of the problems facing structuralism, comments have
been taken mostly from the writings of Resnik and Shapiro, with little from Heilman’s
writings. Although his solutions to the three main problems of indeterminacy of
reference, ontological inflation and epistemological bankruptcy^ are different from theirs,
Heilman shares their overall strategy. Like them, he thinks that objects-platonism is
untenable, because it cannot account for the problems in these three areas. Unlike ante
rem structuralists such as Resnik and Shapiro, Heilman does not think that there are
numbers, even numbers as places in an co-structure. To him, talk of number is all talk of
what might be — possible combinations of objects in a certain structure. Reference to the
objects of arithmetic is problematic simply because there are no numbers.
This strategy is what might be called a quasi-realist one.’'* Heilman attempts to
show that the statements of a particular discourse — mathematics — can have the truth
values that they have, without endorsing a commitment to a particular range of objects or
of facts. Although the surface syntax of mathematical discourse suggests that there might 
Epistemic, because the difference revolves around the amount of information available — the quantity 
of the lingusitic resources — and not on what what would be a semantic consdieration, the quality of such 
resources {i.e. whether they comprise indicative or subjunctive statements, or are generally capable of 
sustaining reference at all).
 ^Hale’s suggestive description of the problems which face platonism; see Hale (1996), ppl28 
" See §X, ii for a definition and explanation of the quasi-realist strategy.
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be numbers, sets and functions, Heilman contends that the surface syntax is misleading: a 
conclusion very similar to that drawn in Benacerraf (1965).
i M athematics without numbers^ sets or functions.
The pure-structuralist strategy is to show that while the statements of mathematics 
are true, they do not involve reference to abstract objects. This is done by showing how 
mathematical statements can be rephrased in teims of quantified or modal conditionals. 
Benacerraf s method is to use quantified conditionals; for example, if A is some 
arithmetical statement and A’(x) is a suitably parametrised form of the statement A, then 
the reductionist reformulation of the statement A is:
(S) (Vx)(x is an co-sequence A ’(x))
Hale has offered a simple dilemma to question this strategy: Do co-sequences exist
or not?^ If there are no co-sequences, then there seem to be terrible problems resulting 
from the truth functionality of implication, as then all statements of the form (S) become 
true, even when A is something such as 3+4=6. However, if the pure-structuralist 
answers positively, that there are co-sequences, then there is a further dilemma: whether 
these are composed of abstract or concrete objects. If concrete, this makes structuralism 
the hostage of contingency; if abstract, then where are the advantages concerning issues 
of abstract reference, etc P.
This line of attack depends on the implication in (S) being a material implication; 
the conclusion can be blocked by taking this as a modal implication {e.g. a strict 
implication, or some form of counterfactual)."® Heilman offers the following interpretation 
of the ‘proper’ reading of an arithmetical statement A:
(MS) 0(Vx)(x is an (o-sequence -» A ’(x))
The question of the existence of co-sequences is now no longer an obvious problem, so 
long as it is possible that there exists an co-sequence.
 ^Hale (1996)
•® No one has yet suggested that the implication here be relevant entailment, in which case the non­
existence of numbers would not result in all arithmetical statements being vacuously true.
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i i  Objections to an objects-free account.
Hale has two main criticisms to offer of this line: both concern the grounds the 
modal structuralist might be able to give to assert the required modal existence claim. The 
first criticism is a reworking of a problem aimed previously at Field. It concerns the 
intelligibility of the notion now under consideration, the contingent existence of abstract 
objects. If to-sequences do not exist in the actual world, what would the world have to be 
like for them to exist? What changes would there have to be, for them to exist? There 
would be no way of telling one way or the other. Hale has a barrage of further 
considerations to show why the notion of contingently existing but abstract objects is 
unintelligible; he also offers the following, stronger argument.
Heilman must support the claim that it is possible that there is an œ-sequence. But 
what are the epistemological grounds for such a claim? Hale argues that the only possible 
justification for such a claim must rest on conceivability, precisely, the conceivability of 
the existence of an œ-sequence. Yablo (1993) distinguishes several species of 
conceivability, arguing that for ‘conceivably P’ to defeasibly entail ‘possibly ? ’, what is 
required is the imagination “in sufficient detail, of a situation which invites description as 
one in which F”"’. Hale takes the modal structuralist’s task as falling into two parts: to 
show whether it is conceivable that such a sequence can be constructed, and if not, 
whether there could be an œ-sequence independent of such a construction.
Rather than go into detailed considerations of œ-sequences by way of supertasks, 
it is sufficient to show that the move from objects to modal structures is not the quick fix 
which it appeared to be at first sight. The strategy that the pure-structuralist employs is to 
replace problematic notions of mathematical epistemology with simpler, more intuitive 
notions of quantification or modality. Shapiro has argued that in order to pursue the goals 
of the project, any attempt to cash out these intuitive notions inevitably involves 
complicated technical and philosophical considerations which are at least as difficult to 
solve as the original problem.'® Hale’s argument above is just one example of the way in 
which this supposed epistemological simplicity is eroded, collapsing into a pile of 
questions which are as difficult, or harder than, the original problems faced, at the cost of 
face value semantics.
” Hale’s gloss: Hale (1996), pl42  
“ Shapiro (1993)
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X V I Î I Further problems with structuralism
Various problems have already been mentioned in connection with abstract- 
structuralism and pure-structuralism; in the next three subsections, the problems which 
relate more specifically to a structural interpretation of arithmetic will be considered. 
These include problems with Benacenaf’s Referential Puzzle (subsection i), with pattem- 
recognition and the translatability of epistemological puzzles dealt with in the following 
two subsections.
i Determinacy o f reference
There is a dangerous circularity involved in Benacerraf s argument. By 
considering various embeddings of arithmetic in set theory, he argues that it is impossible 
to tell, if numbers aie sets, which sets numbers are; moreover this leads inevitably to the 
sti'onger result that there is no way to tell which objects they are.
Wright has argued that the argument for referential indeterminacy which 
BenaceiTaf has uncovered in relation to numbers, if cogent, will be entirely general. Hale 
succinctly summarises Wright’s argument to this effect:
while Benacerraf makes a good case for the indeterminacy of reference of numerical terms 
with respect to classes, he should draw anti-platonist conclusions from it only if he is 
ready to draw sceptical conclusions about reference quite generally, since the 
indeterminacy he has, plausibly, uncovered is in no way peculiar to numerical reference, 
but, just as plausibly, afflicts singular reference to classes themselves, and reference to 
concrete objects quite generally.^
There are two ways to respond to Wright’s criticism — to show how the indeterminacy is 
restricted to mathematics, or to accept the global consequences of the argument. As such 
full scale referential scepticism is unappealing, trying to restrict the indeterminacy seems 
the only plausible route.
Returning to the middle step in the argument — that there is no way of 
determining whether 2={{0}} or 2={0, {0}}, and by considering the resources 
required to even express this point, Benacerraf is making use of determinate reference to 
sets. At best this complicates the story which must be told concerning the restriction of 
indeterminacy to mathematics, showing that Benacerraf would be required to show how
Hale (1987), ppl98
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the indeterminacy is confined to aritiimetic, and why it does not spread to set theory. This 
would force a rejection of extreme structuralism — the thesis that “All mathematics is 
structural” — but it would allow for the possibility of a tenable structuralist theory of 
arithmetic. However, the chances of giving such an account — forging a distinction as to 
why reference is determinate with respect to set-theoretic singular terms, while 
indeterminate in the case of numerical singular terms — are slim. Set theory and 
arithmetic are too similar for there to be such a profound difference between the two 
areas: for example, they have a similar universal character and share a deep 
epistemological significance for the philosophy of mathematics. As yet, no attempt has 
been made to give such an account, and without it, Benacerraf’s argument fails.
Hale has suggested a separate reason as to why Benacerraf’s argument fails. Quite 
rightly, BenaceiTaf shows that there is no way to discriminate between œ-sequences using 
the resources of Peano Arithmetic (PA). However, Hale argues that by using N= and the 
Soital inclusion Principle, a principled means of constraining the identification of the 
natural numbers is available.^” Until recently, I had little sympathy for this strategy; as 
Boolos has pointed out, PA and FA — Frege Arithmetic — are equiconsistent, and it is 
natural to suppose that FA would not be able to achieve what PA fails to doP Recently, 
Heck has shown that while these two theories are equiconsistent, FA is far stionger than 
PA.“  His notion of relative strength is based on the following principle:
(PRS) Let T 1 and T2  be equiconsistent theories expressed in the same language, such that every 
axiom of T 1 is a theorem of T 2 , but not conversely. Then T2  is strictly stronger than 
Ti.
To consider the relative strength of two theories T 3  and T4  formulated in different 
languages, what is required is a bridge theory which relates the referents of the primitives 
of T] to those of T 4 . We can then ask whether, with the aid of one or other bridge 
theory, the theorems of T4  can be proven in Tg.^ ®
Given the strength of FA relative to PA, it is indeed plausible to suppose that FA might 
turn the trick. In his original discussion. Hale suggested that
Hale (1987), pp20M 9
The equiconsistency of PA and FA is demonstrated in Boolos (1987a) 
See Heck (1997) for a detailed proof of this result.
“ Generalisation of a passage ibid., p592
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while there is a sense in which N= and S^ do not by themselves suffice to constrain the 
identification of particular natural numbers with particular sets to within uniqueness, the 
indeterminacy which remains is of a very special kind which, properly understood, 
neither results from, nor casts doubt upon the correctness of the claim that the natural 
numbers are sets/®
While insufficient by itself, Hale’s strategy, plus the doubts concerning the 
circularity of Benacerraf s argument, cast serious doubt on the argument for structuralism 
based on indeterminacy of numerical reference.
ii  Pattern recognition and Causal Theories o f Knowledge
Some of the problems with pattem-recognition have already been discussed; most 
notably that it leaves the final step a mystery, offering no account of the relationship 
between the concrete patterns and the abstract ones.
There are further problems for the pattem-recognition solution to the problems of 
mathematical epistemology. Let me consider two such problems, relating to the necessity 
and sufficiency of the account. Suppose that the account worked — that there was a way 
to show that genuine mathematical knowledge does come by way of pattem-recognition, 
and that an account of the mysterious middle step could be given in a non-question 
begging manner. Then there is still the problem which Frege put to Mill, that this account 
only works for small size collections. In fact, the account will only work for finite 
structures: so by itself, that account is unable to say anything about the epistemology of 
transfinite stmctures, which includes most of the interesting areas of mathematics — such 
as arithmetic or real analysis. Shapiro postulates that various linguistic methods can be 
used to augment the pattem recognition process, once that process is off the ground. He 
outlines a procedure, which he attributes to Robert Kraut, which is a generalised form of 
the abstraction principles upon which Wright has based his resuscitation of Frege. 
However, if these linguistic procedures work, it seems difficult to find a role for the 
pattem-recognition, as these linguistic procedures should be able to account for both finite 
and transfinite systems and structures.
The Sortal Inclusion Principle, see §XII, i
Hale (1987), p208
Shapiro (1997), Ch4, pp 109-36
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i ii  The translatability o f  epistemological problems
Shapiro has criticised Field and Heilman (and by association, Benacerraf too) for 
their use of elaborate reductive translation schemes. He comments that:
The fact that there are such smooth and straightforward transformations between the 
ontologically rich language of the realist and the supposedly austere language of the 
fictionalist indicates that neither of them can claim a major epistemological advantage 
over the other/’
One unhappy consequence of such a smooth translation, for the anti-relaist, is that all of 
the major epistemological problems the platonist faces will merely be ‘translated’ into 
parallel problems; moreover, the anti-realist has the additional burden of having to sustain 
the translation process.
On a ‘swings and roundabouts’ analysis of philosophical positions, the realist 
fares no worse than her anti-realist opponent when it comes to tackling epistemological 
problems: yet that was supposed to be one of the original motivations for accounts such 
as offered by Field and Heilman.
X I X  The Extension Argum ent
Structuralism is usually taken, crucially, to involve a change in perspective from 
object-based accounts of mathematics, to a structure-based account; performing this 
change in point-of-view is supposed to lead to a number of philosophical insights which 
either solve philosophical puzzles or expose them as pseudo-questions, which only held 
any command over us while we were in the grips of an object-based account. On closer 
inspection, however, these solutions turn out to be mirages — as shown above, the 
structuralist has no solution to the puzzles of referential indeterminacy, ontological 
inflation nor epistemological bankruptcy which bother the traditional positions.
Rather than take this as grounds for an outright rejection of structuralism, it is 
worth re-examining the structuralist’s arguments, to see where the arguments go wrong 
and to question whether anything could be salvaged from the position. The main task will 
be to reconstruct the argument for structuralism: to present structuralism, not as a 
remedial solution which appears from nowhere, but more properly as developing out of
Shapiro (1993), p463
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the problems which face the traditional accounts: platonism in particular. Once properly 
expressed, it will become clearer where the argument fails, and which parts of 
structuralism could be salvaged.
The first subsection reconsiders Benacerraf s arguments, while the second looks 
again at the notion of structure and how that notion developed in mathematics. The third 
subsection ties this all together and presents what I take to be the correct shape of the 
argument for structuralism, which in turn leads to a simple analysis of the different ways 
of blocking this argument.
i W hat Numbers could not be
On numerous occasions, I have differentiated between the argument Benacerraf 
gives in “What Numbers could not be” and the argument he is popularly taken to have 
advanced. It is now time to properly justify this claim. Benacerraf s real argument runs 
something like this. Given that there is a reduction of almost all mathematics to set theory, 
if numbers are objects, then in the reduction of arithmetic to set theory, numbers will be 
sets. If number terms are genuine singular terms, then their reference will be singular and 
determinate: yet given the multiple realisations of arithmetic in set theory, for example by 
both the von Neumann ordinals and the Zermelo sets, reference may be singular, but it is 
not determinate. So if there is to be singular and determinate reference, numbers cannot 
be sets. As sets are simply collections of objects, it follows that if there is to be singular 
and determinate reference, numbers cannot be objects either: hence number terms cannot 
refer both singularly and detenninately.
Benacerraf suggests — and this step is crucial — that if numbers are places in a 
structure, this would allow for the apparent singular nature of the reference, while also 
accounting for the indeterminacy of the reference relation.
This may be unfamiliar to some, as Benacerraf s other argument — from 
“Mathematical Truth” — is often conflated with this one, resulting in what Azzouni refers 
to as the Twin Puzzles of Access. Azzouni’s treatment is perhaps the most concise 
summary of the popular interpretation of Benacerraf s argument. The Twin Puzzles run 
something like this: if mathematical objects are abstract and acausal, how can we have any 
knowledge of them (The Puzzle of Epistemic Access); moreover, how could we even 
refer to such abstract entities? (The Puzzle of Referential Access.) These are genuine
-  106 —
CH A MER 3: STRUCTURALISM 
puzzles — and much of the current debate in the philosophy of mathematics revolves 
around these issues — but they are not the problems which Benacerraf raised.
Benacerraf himself concluded that as number terms do not have singular 
determinate reference, numbers must be places in structures — in what Dedeldnd called 
simply infinite structures, or what is more commonly referred to in the literature as co- 
sequences. He argued that the proper way to understand structural talk in mathematics as 
being hypothetical, rather than indicative, that is, rather than treat at face value statements 
of arithmetic such as ‘5+7=12’ or ‘There are four prime numbers less than 8’, the proper 
logical form of such expressions is: ‘for all x, if x is an co-sequence then 5 x V l:^ l2 f  and 
‘for all X, if x is an co-sequence then there are four prime numbers less than Sx' .
So the conclusions which Benacerraf reaches in response to his investigations into 
the referential capacities of number terms when interpreted in set theory, are: that in such 
a setting, number terms do not refer in a singular and determinate fashion, and hence, it 
would be more appropriate to inteipret such terms as places in a structure. In a structure, 
the general form is hypothetical, and so places do not refer to objects.
For this crucial step — the appeal to the notion of structure — to be something 
more than an ad hoc manoeuvre, there needs to be a prior analysis of how reference 
functions in the more obviously structural areas of mathematics. This is required not only 
to show that reference in those areas is not to objects per se, but to places in structures, 
but also to show that this reductive account is the most appropriate way to exploit this 
feature.
i i  S tructure
Of course, this prior analysis of the notion of structure never took place. 
Mathematical attempts had been made — particularly by the Bourbaki group. But no-one 
prior to Benacerraf had even thought of giving this linguistic account of reference in a 
structure.
Reading articles and books on structuralism today, there certainly are attempts to 
give an analysis of the notion of structure — but this always strikes me as the wrong way 
round: the structuralist machinery is always set up to establish the conclusion that 
numbers are places in a structure. Benacerraf’s argument, if valid, requires that there be 
an independently motivated account of structure, which he can then utilise to solve the
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problems with the platonist conception of arithmetic.
The objects-platonist or neo-Fregean, puts forward an argument as to the proper 
analysis of the concept Number, possibly also, the concept Real Number, and with some 
stretch of the imagination. Complex Number too. But Frege never tried to deal with 
questions such as the status of concepts such as Group, Ring or Field. So at first sight, 
there should be no competition between a philosophy of arithmetic (such as Frege’s) and 
such philosophy of structure. Only when such an account of structure is plugged into 
Benacerraf s argument should any contention arise between Benacerraf and the Fregean.
Group theory is possibly the best example of a structural theory. A group is a set 
which meets the following characteristics: given a set g  and a binary operation +, 
< g , +> is a group if the following hold:
(G-i) closure — for any <3 ,  6  in the set, there is some c in the set such that 
fl+6=c;
(G-ii) identity — there is a unique element, e, so that for any element <3 , 
a+e=e-^a=a\
(G-iii) inverses — each a element has another element, 6, related to it, so that 
a-\-b=b+a=e. This is the inverse of <3 , written ar^\
(G-iv) associativity — for any a, b, c in the set (<3+6)+c=<3+(6+c).
If the operation is such that a+6=6+a, then we say that the group is abelian, or that it 
commutes. There are powerful and elegant results relating to the representability of finite 
groupsf® the number of subgroups of a g r o u p a n d  which of those subgroups are 
normal
Fundamental Theorem of Finite Abelian Groups: all finite abelian groups can be represented in a unique 
way, up to isomorphism, as the product of finite cyclic groups, i.e. as a product of groups whose only 
subgroups are the identity and trivial group.
Lagrange’s Theorem: the order of a subgroup H of a group g  will divide the order of the group, i.e. 
o(g)=o(H).o(g: H)
■*“ The Sylow Theorems: if g  is a group of order p>^ .k, where /? is a prime and k an integer, such that p  
and k are co-prime, then
i) g  has a subgroup of order y » , for m^n. Most Importantly, g  has a subgroup of order p^ \^ this is 
a Sylow p-subgroup of g.
ii) any p-subgroup of g  is contained in a Sylow p-subgroup.
iii) any two Sylow p-subgroups will be conjugate in g
Iv) the number of Sylow p-subgroups is of the form i+Ap, where k is some positive integer,
v) the number of Sylow p-subgroups divides the order of g.
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Rather than think of any individual object in the structure having an important 
mathematical role, the key insight when dealing with structures is that the whole structure 
is mathematically important: no part of the structure can perform in isolation.
There are two main motivations which drive the investigation of structures. One 
of these concerns generality: group theoretic notions arise naturally in various setting in 
mathematics — group theory arose as a way of cashing out the common conceptual core 
in various disciplines, such as the study of non-Euclidean geometries, permutation theory 
and studies in number theory of the roots of equations. The other key motivation in the 
investigation of structures is by way of comparison with sets. Several nice properties of 
sets include:
i subsets: every subcollection of a set is a set, called a subset
ii intersection: any two sets have an intersection, which is itself a set
iii union: any two sets have a union, which is itself a set
iv Cartesian product: two sets can be combined to form a third set, consisting of
ordered pairs of the elements of the two sets.
Structures arise (in one sense) from considering sets in particular ways. For example, 
there are ordered and partially ordered sets, additive sets, or more generally, sets with one 
or more binary relationship defined on them: a group for example, is a set with one binary 
operation defined on it. A fruitful line of inquiry to to consider, to what extent, if any, 
sets with a particular structure will behave like an unstructured set. So, for example, take 
group theory. Questions to ask in this line of inquiry include: Is every subcollection of a 
group, a subgroup? (No — so what extra conditions are required of a group that every 
subcollection be a subgroup?) Are there Cartesian products of groups (Yes — what do 
they look like? Are there any natural examples? What can be done with this notion?)
This idea of structure can sometimes be hard to grasp. Rather than talk as I do, 
about sets, Shapiro explains structures through more familiar examples: he describes 
football teams and basketball defences. He highlights the difference between the position 
a player plays and the player themselves. This is kin to the familiar type-token distinction, 
but here, the type is relative to the rest of the structure. A position in a team — viewed as 
a type — is relative to the team, and the other positions in that team. The tokens however,
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do have an independent existence — in this case, as persons.
Perhaps the best way to grasp the notion of structure is to follow the development 
of one of the earlier branches of structural mathematics, group theory. It has a well- 
documented histoiy, and so the progression of the idea of a group is relatively easy to 
follow. The concept ‘group’ developed in parallel in three different areas of mathematics 
— in geometiy, in number theory, and in the study of permutations. A geometry may be 
characterised by the set of isometries that hold for it, that is, the set of rigid body 
movements that the space allows. While this work culminates with Hilbert and Felix 
Klein, other such famous names such as August Mobius and Jakob Steiner worked to 
pick out groups as the fundamental notion underpinning a general theory of geometry. In 
1827, Mobius devised a classification of geometries according to various properties that 
are invariant under a particular group, while Steiner’s work on synthetic geometry is a 
study in what we now call transformational groups.
In number theory, we trace the root of the idea back to Leonard Euler’s work in 
1761 on modulai* arithmetic, which included several results on the decomposition of finite 
abelian groups: Carl Friedrich Gauss’ work in 1801 took these studies in modular 
arithmetic further, and included the result that there is a subgroup for every number 
dividing the order of a cyclic group, and hence that groups of prime order are cyclic.
In studying the roots of algebraic equations, many of the traditional problems, 
such as the insolubility of the quintic,'" were analysed by group theoretic procedures by 
Paolo Ruffini, who showed that the group of permutations associated with an irreducible 
equation is transitive; Niels Abel, who gave the first recognised proof that the quintic 
cannot be reduced; Augustin-Louis Cauchy further developed this, which led to the work 
of Evariste Galois, who in 1831 was the first to really appreciate that the solution of an 
algebraic equation is related to the group of permutations of the equation: why there is no 
general solution to the quintic depends on a group theoretic answer.
Early in 1849 Arthur Cayley recognised a connection between his work on
permutation groups based on the arithmetical notion of multiplication, and Cauchy’s work
on permutations of roots of equations. Liouville had already made a similar connection
between Cauchy’s work and Galois’ work on roots, but without extracting ‘group’ as the
common core. In 1854 Caley published two papers, defining the notion of an abstract
group, and recognising that matrices and quaternions are groups. We find that the 
■" i.e. equations of the form ax^+bx'^+cx^+dx^+ex+j^O
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characterisation that we now have, either via the four group axioms or by presentation, 
are not only faithful to the individual disciplines, but also fixes a new concept of greater 
generality over the three disciplines/’
Ring theory represents the other major thread weaving through the history of 
abstract algebra. It began as a way of explaining deficiencies in various attempted proofs 
of Fermat’s last theorem, especially relating to unique factorisation. The integers are an 
example of a fairly special ring, a Boolean algebra an example of another type of ring. It 
was not until the work of mathematicians such as Richard Dedekind and Emmy Noether 
that rings were studied for their own sake, rather than as a way to represent the integers.
Modem ring theoiy is seen very much as the theory of two binary operations (one 
of which is abelian), and as such, an extension of group theory as the theory of one 
binary operation. It is fairly standard to take the first binary operation to be commutative 
addition, the second to be multiplication. Theorems in group theory — such as the First 
Isomorphism Theorem:
(@)
i.e. the quotient group of a group g  and its unit points under a morphism <p, is isomorphic 
to the target set under that morphism'*  ^ — also hold in ring, field and module theories, and 
the proofs are essentially the same.
The main method of studying structures is to examine the extent to which the 
structures under consideration retain set-theoretic properties: for example, under what 
circumstances does a structure have substructures in the way that a set has subsets; do the 
notions of intersection, union and Cartesian product always remain the same, or is it that 
these notion function ‘normally’ only in restricted circumstances? Is there a notion of 
equivalence which preserves structure, and so on. It is also profitable to consider the 
extent to which structures overlap — semi-lattices and idempotent semi-groups, for 
example, exhibit the same structure; adding a one place variable to a field reduces it to a 
unique factorisation domain, and so on.
■'* For more information about the history of group theory, see Boyer (1968), pp591-4,638-43 
The quotient group is formed by taking the initial group and factoring out by the kernel of the 
morphism y , i.e. the group of points which map to the identity element. This quotient group is 
isomorphic to the group which is the image of the homomorphism.
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Isomorphism is the central notion behind sameness of structure — Mayberry 
sums this up as follows:
Isomorphic structures are mathematically indistinguishable in their essential properties^
This replaces the vague notion of ‘sameness of form’ with a precise extensional 
definition; however, it is not the only option available in this area: model theoretic notions 
of definability, as well as Resnik’s structural equivalence are offered in the literature as 
alternatives. The differences between these notions will be discussed in more detail at the 
end of Chapter 4.
There are two main types of structure — what are called algebraic structures, and 
those which are categorical. Theories of categorical structures, such as DLO or the co- 
sequence,'*® have only one model (up to isomorphism) for each cardinality, which is one 
of the reasons it is so tempting to replace talk of numbers with talk of the co-sequence: 
there is only one model of thetheory of co-sequence with cardinality oo. Theories of 
algebraic structures, on the other hand, may have many models for each cardinality: 
examples include groups, rings and fields, and such structures form the bulk of 
mathematical investigation into structures. It is tempting to use this distinction to explain 
the differences between structures and systems: but this is to confuse the availability of 
multiple models, with the availability of a multiplicity of instantiations, and it is this 
second distinction which separates structures from systems, not the first.
It should by now seem plausible that there is not only a particular method of 
studying structures such as groups, but that the proper interpretation of structural 
language will be different from, at least, the face value construal of the language of 
arithmetic. So how should the language of structural mathematics be described?
Two features of structural language are important, and are part of Benacerraf’s 
structuralist account. These are the roles of instantiation and axiomatization. A group is a 
structure which meets the group axioms. So for example, taking the numbers from 1 to 
12, written on a clock-face, so that 1+11=12; 2+11=1; 4+11=3, etc. This system of 
modular arithmetic forms a group, and this is a structure which can be exemplified by a
Mayberry (1994), p20
DLO is the dense linear order, and is the underlying structure of the rationals. The simply infinite 
system, or œ-sequence, is the structure underlying the natural numbers: it has an initial element and an 
immediate successor function.
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variety of other systems. So the system of arithmetic (mod 12) is just one instance of a 
perfectly general structure with 12 elements. The theory of groups concerns not so much 
the instantiations of groups, but the study of the structure which underlies all such 
instantiations. Each place in a structure can be filled by any of its instantiations, which 
suggests that reference to the place is to a certain extent indeterminate, or is divided 
among its possible exemplification-instants. So a theory of structural language would 
have to account for such features of reference. Benacerraf s account does indeed do this 
— but the recent proliferation of structural theories suggests that this may not be the only 
or even best way to account for this feature of structural mathematics.
The method of defining structures by way of axiom schemes relates to this — if a 
system satisfies the group axioms, then it is a group, and in virtue of satisfying these 
axioms, can be shown to have various properties. So the hypothetical nature of structural 
mathematics becomes apparent: if any piece of mathematics satisfies the axioms of a 
structural theory, then it has that structure, and various structural features must hold of 
that piece of mathematics. Again, Benacerraf s account of stiuctures accommodates just 
this point — and again, it may not be the only way that such an account could be given, 
but it is certainly one way to give such an account.
iii The argument fo r  structuralism
Filling in this missing step — providing the ‘prior’ account of stiucture — leads 
to what might be called an extension argument. Making this explicit, the argument will 
have the following shape: an account of the obviously structural areas of mathematics 
(group theory, ring theoiy, etc) reveals that statements of structural mathematics are not 
indicative, but hypothetical, and that the singular terms do not refer to determinate 
objects, but to places in a structure. Thinking numbers are objects leads to certain 
problems associated with the account of the reference of singular terms to determinate 
objects. These problems can be solved for arithmetic, by extending the account of the 
structural areas of mathematics, beyond the obviously structural, to include arithmetic, or 
more extremely, all of mathematics.
As Azzouni has described any account which replaces problems with one sort of 
entity by talk of another sort of entity as ontologically radical, call the move which simply 
claims that arithmetic is part of the structural area of mathematics radical structuralism.
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and call the move to ‘all mathematics as structural’ extreme structuralism. Further, let the 
position which claims that the structuralist account is good only for the obviously 
structural areas (which restricts the area of structural mathematics to algebraic structures) 
be modest structuralism.
Objections to a radical or extreme structuralist account should have one of the 
following two shapes: either an internal objection, based on a disagreement of what 
should count as an appropriate account of structural mathematics, or an external one, 
based on an objection to the extension argument. Above, I suggested that the appropriate 
desiderata for a structuralist account were accommodation of the roles of instantiation and 
axiomatization in structural mathematics, and that Benacerraf’s account was just one way 
of meeting these desiderata. Heilman, Shapiro and Resnik all give accounts which also 
meet these criteria to vaiying degrees of success. So an example of internal objections 
would be Shapiro’s complaint that Heilman claims an advantage for his account based on 
the intuitive appeal of notions of primitive modality, but that by the time his account is 
finished, these primitive notions have become highly complex and sophisticated, and 
have lost all of their intuitiveness.
Parsons gives something which might be developed into a external objection — 
he comments that structuralism relies on a notion of ‘set’ which cannot be cashed out in 
terms of structure, and argues that the transition from objects-based accounts to structure- 
based accounts, leaves a residue — the items of mathematical systems, which he calls 
quasi-concrete objects, which play “an ineliminable role in the explanation and motivation 
of mathematical concepts and theories.”"® Mayberry makes a similar point concerning the 
role of axiomatic definitions — he argues that structural theories require an ambient set- 
theoretic background, and that the nature of set-theoretical axioms differs from the 
definitional role of the axioms of structural theories."^
Each of Parson’s and Mayberry’s external objections rest on pointing out 
disanalogies between features of theories of algebraic structures (the core of obvious 
structural mathematics) and features of theories — in both cases, set theory — in the 
proposed extension of that area. Their arguments (or some reformulation of them) would 
seem to block extreme structuralism, but leave radical structuralism untouched.
Parsons (1990), p309 
Mayberry (1994), p26
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X  X  The relationship with logicism
The criticisms offered above — especially Wright’s attack on Benacerraf’s 
argument — have been largely ignored by structuralists. Recall that the counter-argument 
called either for the acceptance of a global conclusion concerning the indeterminacy of 
singular reference, or for a principled distinction between the determinate and 
indeterminate cases. If Benacerraf’s argument concerned only the singular terms 
occurring in theories concerning algebraic structures — if it were an argument only for 
modest structuralism — then this distinction would be ready and apparent: reference in 
systems is determinate, while in structures it is indeterminate.
Wright’s arguments fail to impress the structuralist, not because they are not 
cogent, but because it is too easy for the structuralist to conflate the distinction which is 
easily drawn in the modest case, with the distinction Wright is calling for in the radical or 
extreme case. Separating these two results in the following: to sustain Benacerraf’s 
argument requires extending the modest distinction — between indeterminate reference to 
the places of algebraic structures and determinate reference to singular terms in set theoiy 
— to include the numerical case. The slim chance of sustaining such an account, as 
mentioned above, rests on the lack of forthcoming disanalogies between arithmetic and 
set theory: any argument which would extend the distinction to arithmetic would 
globalise, first to include sets and then — by Benacerraf’s own argument — to include 
objects in general.
When seen in the light of the Extension Argument, the structuralist’s usual refusal 
to accept Wright’s conclusion is explicable, as she is already convinced that she has such 
an account of the differences between structures and systems, based on an acceptance of 
what has been distinguished here as modest structuralism. Perhaps a more perspicuous 
way of presenting Wright’s argument would be to take it as showing Just what would be 
required to sustain the Extension Argument based purely on BenaceiTaf’s thoughts about 
indeterminacy: a clear distinction as to why the indeterminacy of reference might extend 
from the case of singular terms occurring in theories of algebraic structure, to the case of 
numerical singular terms, yet stop short of the parallel case in set theory.
In the next subsection, Hale’s arguments are considered and analysed, again in 
the light of the Extension Argument. The subsection it supplies a similar treatment of 
Wright’s objection based on the conceptual priority of ‘equinumerosity’ over that of
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‘progression’
i Haleys attack on structuralism
Parts of Hale’s attack on structuralism have been mentioned, especially his 
criticisms of pure-structuralism. This is only a small segment of a much more complex 
argument, which runs something like this. If the structuralist puts forward the view that 
structures and their places are abstract, how is this supposed to gain any headway on the 
platonist’s position, and how is it supposed to offer solutions which the platonist is 
unable to offer? On the other hand, if the account put forward is along the lines of pure- 
structuralism, then while there may be no such thing as a structure underlying all of the 
various instances, what is to be said of the places in such structures? He offers the 
following dilemma: such places should be either abstract or concrete objects. If they are 
abstract objects, then the position collapses into abstract-stiucturalism — which itself he 
sees as collapsing into platonism; if the places in structures are to be concrete, then this 
would appear to make mathematical knowledge contingent, as even if there are 
sufficiently many concrete objects to exemplify structures with transfinite cardinalities, 
there might not have been. So if Hale is conect, there can be no correct structuralist 
account of mathematics, not even a modest one.
What Hale objects to, are, of course, the structuralist accounts of arithmetic. He 
thinks that the neo-Fregean line given by himself and Wright, suffices to show that 
numbers are objects. But his arguments against structuralism are too powerful — if they 
are correct, then not only do they show that the structuralist cannot give an account of 
arithmetic (the conclusion Hale is after) they also show that no structuralist account of any 
portion of mathematics will be correct, not even the structuralist’s account of the 
structural areas of mathematics, such as group theory. Recall that his argument showed 
that abstract-structuralism collapses to platonism, and that pure-structuralism either 
collapses to abstract-structuralism and hence to platonism, else is forced to give an 
account of mathematics in terms of concrete objects, which looks remarkably similar to 
Benacerraf’s original dilemma: platonism or a causal theory of knowledge.
Looldng at the arguments Hale gives, especially concerning the apparent collapse 
of abstract-structuralism into platonism, or the choice he gives pure-structuralism between 
taking the places in a structure to be abstract or concrete, shows that Hale is not factoring
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into his discussion the two considerations of instantiation and axiomatization mentioned 
a b o v e E v e n  if the abstract-structuralist does take the places in a structure to be abstract, 
the story she tells of reference to the places in a structure will differ from the story the 
platonist tells of reference to an abstract object, because of the differences in instantiation. 
Places in a structure are like holes which are filled by object-like pegs; numbers on the 
other hand, while similarly abstract, are peg-like. So while holes and pegs are both types 
of object, they are not the same type of object, nor do they have the same properties or 
roles. So the collapse of abstract-structuralism into platonism only works if the 
instantiation features of structural mathematics are ignored.
Likewise, Hale’s dilemma, whether for the pure-structuralist, the places in a 
structure are abstract or concrete, fails to account for the hypothetical nature of statements 
of structural mathematics, which come from their axiomatic origins. According to the 
Fregean account, singular terms in indicative contexts refer to objects. But in non- 
indicative settings — Frege explicitly mentions modal and belief contexts — this link 
breaks down. If the grammar of structural mathematics is hypothetical (or indeed, any 
other form of subjunctive context) then there is no reason to think that the terms referring 
to places in a structure (even if they are genuine singular terms) refer to objects, and 
hence, no reason to think that they refer either to concrete or abstract objects.
ii W right on structuralism
There are a number of components to Wright’s defence of Frege’s platonist
strategy against Benacerraf’s structuralist attack. He distinguishes three aspects of the 
(genuine) argument which Benacerraf gives:
i progression is the fundamental arithmetical notion;
ii grasp of what a progression is suffices for the grasp of finite cardinal number;
iii there is a slide from ‘any progression of objects can serve as the natural numbers’
to ‘number-theoretic truths are essentially tiuths of any progression’.
His reply consists in: showing that by concentrating on the equinumerosity of objects
falling under concepts, it is possible to achieve an understanding of number prior to and
independent of the notion that the numbers are arranged in a progression — so that (i) 
See §XII, i
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fails; examining the conditions which are required for Benacerraf’s argument to proceed, 
including the status of the comparison between the von Neumann sets and the Zermelo 
sets, and the translation of arithmetic into class or set theoiy; Wright argues — as has 
been mentioned previously — that this step cannot be achieved locally and that if the 
argument is cogent, without some principled reason why arithmetical terms might be 
indeterminate and set-theoretic terms not, the argument generalised into a global Quinean 
thesis about the indeterminacy of translation; finally that even if it is true that ‘any 
progression of objects can serve as the natural numbers’ — which will admit the 
legitimacy of Frege’s conception of numbers as objects — then so far the argument has 
not yet provided grounds for rejecting that conception as legitimate.
It is the first of these subarguments that I want to concentrate upon here: the 
conceptual priority of ‘equinumerosity’ over ‘progression’. Wright argues that we can 
imagine someone innocent of the concept ‘progression’, yet equipped with sufficient 
resources to answer the question “How many?” . He unpacks this claim by way of an 
analogy with the measuring of lengths. It is possible to measure lengths — to be 
equipped with resources suitable to answer questions of the form “How long?” — by 
appeal to a particular paradigm: a particular chord of rope, for example. Measurement will 
then take place on the basis of ‘the same length as’ the rope. Similarly counting will get 
off the ground according to the notion of ‘the same number as’, i.e, ‘equinumerosity’. 
Just how rich a notion of number this yields will be investigated in §XXXIII, ii.
Wright claims that the notion of progression only becomes important once a 
notation is introduced, and the numbers considered as arranged serially:
The concept of a progression comes in as a condition which any notation adequate for 
the purpose of giving specific information concerning the size of arbitrarily large finite 
totalities must satisfy.'*®
There is of course a simple reason why Wright’s argument has received little
attention in the literature, and why it has had so little effect on the structuralist. The reason
lies — and this has been mentioned several times — in the difference between
Benacerraf’s real argument and the argument he is popularly taken to have presented. The
popular interpretation of the argument focusses on. the apparent indeterminacy of
reference to abstract objects: the conceptual priority of ‘equinumerosity’ over 
Wright (1983), ppl 19-20
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‘progression’ seems entirely ill-suited as a reply to the problems associated with the 
determinacy of abstract reference. It is only when Benacerraf’s arguments are taken in the 
spirit with which they were originally presented, without conflation with the arguments 
presented in his earlier article on truth“  , that Wrights reply begins to appear persuasive.
iii A n a ly s is
The standard argument for structuralism relies on the popular interpretation of 
Benacerraf’s argument: due to problems associated with the abstractness and causal 
inertness of mathematical entities when conceived of as independent objects (The Twin 
Puzzles of Referential and Epistemic Access) this traditional picture should be replaced by 
a structure-based account.
Despite this being the preferred expression of the argument for structuralism, it is 
not the real argument for structuralism: the real argument — which is styled the Extension 
Argument above — takes there to be an independently motivated, up-and-running 
philosophical theory concerning the obviously structural — algebraic — areas of 
mathematics. Given that this account can deal with the apparent indeterminacy of 
reference to places in a structure, as the problems for platonism which Benacerraf 
articulates revolve around reference, it is natural to argue for an extension of the structural 
solution, from the algebraic case to the arithmetical one.
Most structuralists, although they develop their account by way of the first 
argument, are at least partially aware of the Extension Argument: criticisms, such as 
Hale’s which is outlined above, fail to persuade the structuralist because she is 
sufficiently aware of the Extension Argument to realise that were Hale correct, not only 
would radical structuralism be untenable, so too would modest structuralism. As Hale’s 
arguments focus on arithmetic, it seems too incredible that they should have such far 
reaching conclusions as to show the impossibility of any form of modest structuralism.
On the other hand, the structuralist is sufficiently unclear about the articulation of 
the Extension Argument — which is essentially Benacerraf’s own argument with its 
central lacuna bridged — to be persuaded by Wright’s arguments.
X X I  C onclusions
' Benacerraf (1963)
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The first section began by introducing the notions of philosophical structuralism 
and mathematical structuralism: in the light of the discussions in the previous two 
sections, it now is possible to complete the description of these positions. Modest 
structuralism — an account of the core areas of structural mathematics — should be seen 
as a philosophical account of mathematical structuralism, while radical and extreme 
structuralism are more properly styled as foims of philosophical structuralism.
The two main (philosophical) structuralist positions are ante rem and in re 
structuralism: these were introduced and criticised in the third and fourth sections. The 
main problems with ante rem structuralism revolved around Shapiro’s distinction between 
offices and office-occupiers: despite the intuitive difference between places in a structure 
(offices) and objects (office-occupiers) both wind up — on a naive analysis — as genuine 
Fregean objects. The sophisticated analysis, required to drive a wedge between these two 
classes of items, is Shapiro’s relativity thesis, which is not without its own problems. 
The problems with in re structuralism are directed at the complicated machinery which 
Benacerraf and especially Heilman use to sustain their reductive accounts.
The fifth section was directed at the philosophical structuralist strategy in general, 
to show that if structuralism is taken as a remedial ‘Copernican revolution’, it ultimately 
collapses. Firstly, confusions in the final analysis of the notion of pattern recognition 
suggest that there is no immediate epistemological advantage to be gained by approaching 
philosophical puzzles from the structuralist perspective. Secondly, the argument from 
indeterminacy is either self-defeating (leading to a global conclusion about the 
indeterminacy of all singular reference, numerical or otherwise) or else is lacking a vital 
step. (The lacuna is the lack of a solid principle explaining why numerical singular 
reference may be indeterminate while that of set-theoretic singular terms is determinate.) 
Thirdly, any reductive account seeking commitment to a more meagre ontology is faced 
with a host of problems in accounting for mathematical knowledge, in addition to the 
burden of sustaining the complicated reductive translation — moreover, these problems 
will be the translations of the original puzzles facing more traditional positions, and will 
be at least as difficult to solve.
The only means of salvaging anything from this pit of despair, is to consider 
afresh the arguments for structuralism, to turn away from the picture of structuralism as a 
quick fix to the problems facing platonism, and to (re)construct the proper shape of the
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argument for structuralism. This not only involves distinguishing Benacerraf’s own 
arguments from the popular interpretations of his work, but also involved filling in the 
missing step of his argument — which results in the Extension Argument: one account of 
the obviously structural areas of mathematics — modest structuralism — reveals that 
statements of structural mathematics are not indicative, but hypothetical, and that the 
singular terms do not refer to determinate objects, but to places in a structure. Thinking 
that numbers are objects leads to certain problems associated with the account of the 
reference of singular terms to determinate objects. These problems can be solved for 
arithmetic, by extending the account of the structural areas of mathematics, beyond the 
obviously structural, to include arithmetic, or more extremely, all of mathematics.
The final section briefly reviewed some of the arguments which Hale and Wright 
have offered against structuralist interpretations of arithmetic, and examined the relative 
merits of these arguments in the light of the Extension Argument.
The next Chapter returns to the modest structuralism mentioned in this Chapter, to 
examine the exact details of this position, and how it connects to other aspects of the 
philosophy of mathematics.
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X X I Î  M odifying the structuralist account
It might seem that with all the problems presented in the last Chapter, there would 
be no point in trying to present a philosophical account of structure. Such problems 
include those facing structuralism in general — that the epistemological advantages it 
offers are illusory, that its ontological reduction is contestable and its solution to problems 
of referential access circular — as well as problems facing both abstract-structuralism — 
that it overgeneralises on the office/object distinction, at the expense of a faithful 
representation of this distinction in mathematical practice, while also offering no real 
explanation of the applicability of the account — and pure-structuralism — that the initial 
plausibility of the account is eroded as the intuitive notions used in the account are 
replaced by sophisticated and artificial formal notions.
But it should be remembered that the structuralist’s involvement in these issues, 
and her claim that all mathematics is structural, arose from a desire to replace objects- 
based accounts with structure-based accounts. Recall that philosophical structuralism, as 
a quite general position, was presented as a combination of two tenets: that philosophy of 
mathematics should relate to the working practices of professional mathematicians, and 
that those practices give an insight into how to solve certain philosophical problems; 
where ‘practices’ is inteipreted as the methods of mathematical sti'ucturalism.
Clearly it is the second of these two tenets which motivates the desire to do away 
with the objects-based accounts; dropping this extreme doctrine will lead to a more 
modest structuralism, one which accepts that as well as structural areas of mathematics, 
there are parts of mathematics not best described in structural terms, such as mathematical 
systems. This gives a very different picture of the role of structures in a philosophy of 
mathematics; it implies that an account of structure will be a burden additional to, and not 
in place of, an account of the objects occurring in mathematical systems.
Therefore, the task for the philosopher is to give an account of the nature of 
mathematical objects, especially in relation to reference to such objects and knowledge of 
them; to delineate the scope of structural mathematics, and harking back to Benacerraf’s 
insight, to give an account of why reference — in the usual sense — lapses in the case of 
structural mathematics. Moreover, a general framework will be required, spelling out just 
how the structural and the non-structural areas of mathematics relate.
The rest of this first section looks at the distinction between structures and
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systems, and places this distinction on a firmer footing. Frege’s views on arithmetic form 
the core of an account for mathematical systems; the remaining sections offer alternatives 
as to how the remaining tasks might be completed, that is, to give a characterisation of 
structure and explain how structural and non-structural areas of mathematics relate. The 
second section (§XXIII) deals with the first of three ways that such a structuralist 
position might develop, based quite closely on extending the Fregean account of systems; 
§§XXIV-V deal with two more ways of doing this, based on modifying the abstract- 
structuralist and pure-structuralist accounts.
i Structures and Systems
The difference between structures and systems — as pointed out in §XIV, i and 
§XIX, ii — is that systems are particular instantiations of structures; or rather, structures 
are the underlying basis of systems. If a distinction is to be drawn in such a fashion, it 
might be drawn in terms of those parts of mathematics where the items are particulars — 
individuated in some way — contrasted with those areas where the items are entirely 
general, as in group theory, where the places in a structure stand for arbitrary objects. On 
this interpretation of the structure/ system distinction, familiar systems such as natural 
numbers, integers, reals, rationals and complex numbers are all systems, with groups, 
topologies, varieties, etc. being examples of structures.
This characterisation relies purely on the semantic content of the mathematical
theories in question, and the extent to which the items featuring in the theory are
deteiTninate or vague. Another characterisation might be given in terms of epistemological
differences between those parts of mathematics where grasp of individual objects is
structurally mediated — as in groups, rings and vector fields — and those areas where it
is not: such as in arithmetic and set theory. Recall Wright’s argument that the concept
‘equinumerous’ is prior to the concept ‘progression’, and that grasp of the natural
numbers need not depend on a prior grasp of the structure of the natural number system. ‘
However (contra Wright (1983) §xv) on the basis of such epistemological differences, I
claim real analysis falls on the structural side of the divide: unlike the arithmetical case,
grasp of an individual real number — as a real number — does depend on a prior grasp
of the structure in which it occurs. If the objects of a system are taken to be something
like a natural kind — they are, after all, individuated by sortal concepts as natural kinds 
‘ See §XX
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are — then taking a number to be a natural number, a member of a paiticular mathematical 
kind, does not depend upon knowledge of the stmcture of that kind. On the other hand, 
to appreciate a number as a real number (and not just its rational approximation) requires 
structural knowledge not required in the arithmetical case, e.g. knowledge that the reals 
are arranged as to be continuous, dense and connected." This is a major difference 
between the reals (and complex numbers) and the natural or rational numbers, and 
suggests that there may be two different ways of distinguishing systems from structures. 
In general, it will be the semantic distinction that is taken as primary; the epistemological 
differences will be returned to at the end of Chapter 5, where a fuller treatment of real and 
complex analysis will be given.
ii  Frege on mathematical systems
To develop the sort of modest structuralism which has been suggested, at least 
three component accounts are required: one for mathematical systems and the objects of 
such systems; one for structures and for the places in those structures, and finally an 
explanation of how these two areas relate and exactly what the difference in status is, 
between objects proper and places in a stiucture.
Given the treatment of Frege’s arithmetical platonism in Chapter 2, it is an 
obvious choice to take this as a basis for an explanation of mathematical systems. This 
will supply an account of arithmetic, and with minor modifications should also give an 
account of set theory. Dealing with other examples of systems — such as the rationals, 
reals and complex numbers — may prove more difficult. Frege did try to develop an 
account of real analysis based on his treatment of arithmetic: generally the prospects for 
success of this endeavour are less than enthusiastic. For the moment however, assume 
that there is an account available for the reals and complex numbers, in the spirit if not the 
letter of Frege’s arithmetic. As was mentioned above, this issue will be returned to at the 
end of the next Chapter.
Meanwhile, recall that the revitalisation of Frege’s logicist project was glossed in
Chapter 2, touching on the work of Dummett, Wright, Hale, Boolos and Heck. The main
thought was that by interpreting the Context Principle as applied to reference, the
following thesis emerges: that singular terms in true statements, in appropriate (indicative) 
 ^This may explain some of the problems caused by the discovery by the Pythagoreans of real numbers. 
Without the grasp of concepts such as continuity and denseness they could not appreciate, for example, Vi2 
as part of a system — the reals — and hence took it as an isolated aberation.
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contexts, refer to objects. As numerals are such singular terms, and as numerical 
identities are true and offer the appropriate context, numbers are objects. Hume’s 
Principle (N=) was introduced to define Number, and to generate arithmetic.
iii B enacerra f s insight and some desiderata
In the previous Chapter, two claims were made concerning Benacerraf’s work. 
Firstly, that the interpretation of Benacerraf (1965) as arguing for the indeterminacy of 
reference to mathematical abstracta, not only cannot be sustained, but that this 
misrepresents Benacerraf’s actual argument. Rather he should be taken as arguing that as 
singular reference — were it to occur in a discourse — would be determinate, there can 
be no singular reference occuning in arithmetic, due to the multiple instantiations of co- 
sequences which are possible. Secondly, that Benacerraf appeals to an analysis of the 
obviously structural areas of mathematics — to a theory of modest snucturalism in effect 
— in order to conclude that the statements of mathematics do not have the logical 
structure that their grammar suggests — they are quantified hypotheticais.
Using Benacerraf’s first insight — that reference is not singular reference in those 
areas of mathematics where reference is not to unique and determinate objects — in the 
light of the overall failure of the Extension Argument to sustain radical structuralism, 
requires some further work.^ If Frege is right — and I take it that Chapter 2 supports the 
claim that he is — then because numerical identity statements provide the appropriate 
semantic contexts, numerals refer determinately to objects, to numbers. To hold onto both 
the Fregean and Benacerrafian insights, required that there be some gap between co- 
sequences and arithmetic: that perhaps while co-sequences capture all of the mathematical 
uses of numbers, they fail to capture the full concept of Number.
Benacerraf writes:
“Objects” do not do the Job of numbers singly; the whole system performs the Job or 
nothing does. I therefore argue, extending the argument that led to the conclusion that 
numbers could not be sets, that numbers could not be objects at ail; for there is no more 
reason to identify any individual number with any one particular object than with any 
other"*
 ^The failure of the Extension Argument to secure extreme structuralism is briefly discussed in §XIX, iii\ 
Wright’s criticisms, discussed in §XX, ii block the arguments in favour of radical structuralism.
"* Benaceiraf(1965), pp290-I
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This conclusion to a Benacerraf-style argument, in the light of the distinction between co- 
sequence and arithmetic becomes: in structural contexts, although there appear to be 
singular terms occurring in true statements, this does not guarantee their singular 
reference: instead the ternis are features of generality.
Obviously, there are different ways of developing an account of modest 
structuralism: Benacerraf’s in re strategy is but one way of articulating modest 
structuralism. There may be ways of refining Shapiro’s ante rem account, concentrating 
on that feature that when fewer linguistic resources are used to describe an office than are 
used to pick out an object, that leaves the office open for a kind of indeterminacy or 
vagueness that is not otherwise possible. Alternatively, one might take a third route, and 
think of the terms referring to places in a structure not as proper names, but as arbitrary
names.^
iv  Some desiderata
Already, three aspects of an overall philosophy of mathematics have been 
identified: an account of systems and the objects occurring in them, along the lines of 
Frege’s treatment of arithmetic, i.e. supported by the key thought that singular terms in 
true statements occurring in the appropriate contexts, refer to objects. In addition, an 
account of structures and places in a structure should be given; this should be compatible 
with the basic Fregean insight, but should accommodate the thought that the terms 
referring to places in a structure are features of generality: perhaps such terms might be 
called arbitrary or general names. Thirdly, an account is required that will explain how 
these two areas relate, why Frege’s thesis breaks down or applies only in a weakened 
form in structural contexts, and what the difference in status is, between objects of a 
system and places in a structure.
At the end of §XIV, a possible amendment of Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism 
was suggested, based on a notion of narrow reference — a stratified account of reference, 
somewhat similar in strategy to Dummett’s use of thin reference — which takes places in 
a structure to be only fully determinate in a narrow range of cases (those involving other 
structural terms) and are indeterminate in the wider case. Interpreting Shapiro’s ante rem 
structuralism in this way will result in the following view: that offices are a certain kind of
This may be a promising route, based on notions given in Lemmon (1965) and Fine (1985); see 
§XXIII, / below.
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object — ones which cannot be fully identified, and can only be distinguished with 
respect to the other elements of the structure in which they occur. Once more information 
is available — once the quantity of the linguistic resources is increased — these offices 
can be distinguished and discriminated from ordinary objects. This way of meeting these 
desiderata is considered in §XXIV.
Rather than take reference as the weak link in the chain, it is possible to 
concentrate upon another aspect of Frege’s semantic thesis. Benacerraf’s conclusion is 
that singular reference does not occur because structural statements are not indicative. He 
argues that they are quantified conditionals, and many have sought to perform 
reductionist rephrasing of mathematical statements as a result. Heilman’s modal 
structuralist account is an attempt to make the logical structure of these expressions 
explicit in a different fashion, using a primitive notion of possibility rather than 
quantification.
Explicit rephrasing may not be necessary. If the statements are not indicative, then 
they may be straightforward subjunctive expressions; not only does this meet the 
desiderata above, it will also sidestep most, if not all, of the criticisms raised against the 
more usual forms of pure-structuralism. §XXV is devoted to developing such an account 
of modest in re structuralism.
XXIII Substitution  & Divided Reference
Before trying to modify the structuralist accounts presented in Chapter 3, it is 
worth briefly considering whether there is a more natural extension of Frege’s 
arithmetical platonism. The simplest tale will be that abstraction principles — or some 
other means of fixing truth conditions — determine a base ontology of numbers, sets, 
classes and so on. Given this base, structures could be seen as no more than the various 
combinations of those elements; Putnam’s phrase describing a structure as a “possible 
combination of objects”® springs to mind.
i Systems, structures and substitution
Systems, on this view, are primary — they are constituted by the various 
independent mathematical objects of a particular type, e.g. sets, natural numbers, and
* Putnam (1967)
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rational numbers. Structures are to be seen as the possible combinations of the objects of 
such systems. A structure will then be a family of system-like arrangements, and 
reference to a place in a structure would be divided among the possible substitution 
instances from the family of systems in that common arrangement.
This would hold the spirit of Benacerraf’s comments to the effect that structures 
characterise what a family of systems have in common. There will be no more to the 
structures than the systems — and the objects of those systems — which constitute them. 
Reference to a place in a structure is shorthand for reference to any of the objects which 
occupy that position in the systems underlying the structure. Talldng in terms of reference 
to a place in a structure will be shorthand for the class of objects which can fill that place.
There are two ways of interpreting this use of the substitution class; either to take 
the places in a structure as representative of all the possible substitutions, in the sense that 
reference to the places in a structure could be replaced by reference to any of the various 
instantiations of those places, or to take the places in a structure as an intermediary 
between the terms of the theoiy and the set of instances taken collectively.
The first of these options involves treating the places in a structure as 
representational or arbitrary objects, and taking the terms referring to such places as 
arbitrary names. Articulation of this view would draw on the following thought:
Think of what Euclid does when he wishes to prove that all triangles have a certain 
property; he begins Met ABC be a triangle’, and proves that ABC has the property in 
question; he then concludes that all triangles have the property. What here is ‘ABC’? 
Certainly not the proper name of any triangle, for in that case the conclusion would not 
follow. ... It is natural to view ‘ABC’ as the name of an arbitrarily selectedtriangle,B. 
particular triangle certainly but any one you care to pick. For if we can show that an 
arbitrarily selected triangle has F, then we can certainly draw the conclusion that all 
triangles have F. ... introduce ... names of arbitrary selected objects in the universe of 
discourse, and call them for short arbitrary names?
Euclid’s proofs work on a simple approach to axiom schemes and to the notion of 
representational objects; mathematical structuralism, heavily influenced by Klein and 
Hilbert’s structural treatment of geometry, is a refinement of this proof technique: places 
in a structure are arbitrary objects par excellence. Fine describes arbitrary objects in the 
following manner:
Lemmon (1965), pp 106-7
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In addition to individual objects, there are arbitrary objects: in addition to individual 
numbers, arbitrary numbers ... With each arbitrary object is associated an appropriate 
range of individual objects, its values; with each arbitrary number, the range of indvidual 
numbers ... An arbitrary object has those properties common to the individual objects in 
its range.®
However, despite the appeal — and appropriateness — of explaining places in a structure 
in terms of arbitrary objects, the accounts which Lemmon and Fine give are entirely 
general, and need not be restricted to the structural case. According to Fine, what a theory 
of arbitrary objects shows is that there are genuine alternatives to the ‘Frege-Tarski 
analysis of quantifiers’, i.e. alternatives to the standard semantic analysis of objectual 
quantifiers. If he is correct, then there would be nothing unique about a description of 
places in a structure in terms of arbitrary objects, and hence, no difference between such 
places and the elements of systems such as the natural or rational numbers. This proposal 
will not be considered in any further detail here.
The second option involves treating the reference as divided among the class of 
substitution instances. Early in his career, Russell toyed with the notion of divided 
reference as a way of understanding ‘any’; he thought there may be various types of 
reference relating to the different manners in which quantification can occur.® He 
eventually gave this up in favour of a single uniform notion of reference; nevertheless, his 
earlier thoughts — or something like them — may be appropriate in this setting.
Using this notion of divided reference would account for the apparent 
indeterminacy of reference in sti uctural areas of mathematics without giving up reference 
as a genuine relation between term and object, or the notion that there is a distinction 
between structures and systems, and the differing roles played by elements of structures 
and elements of a system. It will also satisfy the following desiderata: respect for the 
Fregean account of systems; and terms referring to places in structures are taken to be 
features of generality, and not of singular reference.
Fine (1985), pi; he also makes the following claim:
If now I am asked whether there are arbitrary objects, I will answer according to the 
intended use of ‘there are’. If it is the ontologically significant use, then I am happy to 
agree with mu opponent and say ‘no’. ... But if the intended sense is ontologically 
neutral, then my answer is a decided ‘yes’, {ibid., p7)
Russell (1903), pp53-65
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ii Problems with the divided reference account
There are a number of problems with the position just outlined, problems which 
should influence the development of the two modest structuralist positions promised 
earlier in this Chapter. Given the desiderata for a philosophical account of mathematics 
given above: to accommodate the Fregean view of systems, to articulate a theory which 
deals with the obviously structural areas of mathematics, and to explain the connection 
between these two accounts, there are a number of ways that a position could be found 
wanting. In the case of the divided reference account, while it does seem to respect the 
Fregean development of arithmetic, and offers an explanation of the differences between 
reference to objects and reference to places in a structure, it fails to capture certain core 
aspects of structure.
One initial problem concerns how the structure/ system distinction is to be drawn. 
The appeal of the divided reference account is that it appears closest in spirit to the 
Fregean account, which utilises abstraction principles such as N=; one obvious way of 
distinguishing systems from structures would be to take any collection of objects 
introduced by way of abstraction principles, and structures those which cannot be 
introduced in such a fashion.
This proposal is however insufficient, for a number of reasons. Were abstraction 
principles taken as the crucial factor in including or excluding objects from a base 
ontology, then it becomes difficult to see how this continues to support the structure/ 
system divide. For example, even if some sort of abstraction principle can be established 
for the reals — as Frege thought — based for example on the notion of magnitude, and 
the ratios of magnitudes, as is suggested by Newton:
By a number we understand not so much a Multitude of Unities as the abstracted ratio of 
any Quantity, to another Quantity of the same kind, which we take for Unity. And this 
is threefold; integer, fracted and surd: An Integer is what is measured by Unity, a 
Fraction that which submultiple or part of Unity measures, and a Surd, to which Unity 
is immeasurable.*®
The availability of such an abstraction principle would not alone suffice to introduce real 
numbers — as it would not, for example, introduce uncountably many objects. As 
mentioned above, grasp of the sense of a term referring to a real number will involve 
possession of structural knowledge, e.g. that the reals are dense, connected and
Newton (1707), p2.
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continuous, and form a closed field.
The use of an abstraction principle would seem insufficient to provide this 
information, and hence it is questionable whether the reals would be included in the base 
ontology. On the other hand, if weaker methods were employed, this would seem to open 
the door to a number of complications, most notably with respect to functions. Frege's 
notion of a concept is based on his appreciation of real- and complex- valued functions; 
however, in functional analysis, sequences and series of functions are used to develop 
function spaces, which in turn leads to the notion of operator spaces and operator 
algebras, and this development depends on reifying functions. A function space, built up 
from a notion of a function as an object, can be generalised to include the notion of an 
operator, which in turn leads to a very natural presentation of a general linear space.
It might seem that the obvious move for the Fregean would be to allow in the base 
ontology only those items which can be introduced by way of abstraction principles on 
sortal concepts; but as the above example shows, this may not be sufficient to supply all 
the structures that are available. Function spaces depend on a reified notion of function — 
but functions ought not to be able to be introduced as objects in the Fregean sense, else 
the object/concept distinction is liable to collapse.
Altliough the divided reference account seems able to give some explanation of the 
differences between structures and systems, it does so only when there is some prior 
characterisation of this distinction available: in itself, the notion of divided reference 
seems powerless to separate these two notions. A further method is required to single out 
systems from structures.
Even if some further refinement were added to the account, it seems difficult to 
see how the notion of divided reference could be employed to do justice to the way in 
which mathematicians talk of structure or the way that they use places in a structure. This 
is perhaps the major stumbling block for the divided reference account: to account for the 
way that the mathematician is able to talk purely in terms of places in a structure, without 
picking a model. When a mathematician wishes to find the reference of a structural term, 
two things are done. Under normal circumstances, the sense of a term picks out the 
reference of the term. The route to the reference is through properties that the object 
referred to has — properties signalled by the term. Given any particular model, the sense 
of any term of the theory will pick out an object of the domain using both properties
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essential to the model being a model of that structure, and properties unique or accidental 
to that particular model. But if no model is specified, then the sense of any term in the 
theory consists only of essential, structural properties; no accidental or non-structural 
properties are available to fully pick out the reference. A place in the structure is 
determined; the sense is sufficient to yield truth conditions for general statements of the 
theory and uniquely to establish a coirespondence between terms and places in structures.
Moreover, it appears that when a particular model is fixed, reference works as a 
two stage process — first the place in a structure is determined, then through the place or 
office, an object is identified as the referent of tlie term. This much can be accommodated 
by the theory — the divided reference view works well when models are fixed and the 
structural theory is interpreted. As the places in structures are incomplete, and depend 
only upon the objects that fill, or are substituted into these positions, statements which 
talk only in terms of places in structures ought not be possible: there should be no way to 
cut the ties between the objects upon which the structure depends, and the places in the 
structure. Yet mathematicians talk this way all the time, and they do so in ways that 
presupposes that such talk is truth apt: the discourse has all the features which normal 
asseitoric practices have.
The divided reference account captures something of the differences in levels of 
generality between structures and systems: systems concern particular objects arranged in 
particular ways; structures concern the arrangements of any objects whatsoever. 
However, while it manages to capture something of this difference, it ultimately fails to 
provide a sufficient articulation of the differences.
XXIV Structural reference
What is required is an account which is sensitive to a number of features. It must 
allow for an ontology of sets, numbers, functions etc. while admitting structures and 
places in structures. Moreover, the terms that name places in structures would appear to 
be genuine singular terms, and so places in structures are objects, and so feature in the 
ontology — in addition to the unstructured abstract objects of the traditional variety. It 
must be possible to refer to such structural objects, but also to instantiate the places in a 
structure with sets, numbers, functions or even other structures or substructures; hence 
the structured objects must exhibit some degree of incompleteness, generality or
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indeterminateness.
Hale challenged Shapiro with the following charge: that by claiming determinate 
reference is no deep matter, something to be assumed rather than argued for; the best that 
the abstract-structuralist can maintain is a theory of thin reference towards such abstract 
objects. For Hale, thin reference is unacceptable, as he takes it that there is a real question 
to be answered as to whether “Caesar is nine”; he takes it that arithmetic should be 
conceived in a realist fashion. Yet if an eclectic view is to be held, need the moderate 
structuralist deny that arithmetic admits of thick reference, while acknowledging Hale’s 
comments about thin reference when the discourse is considered structurally?
Dummett’s distinction — based on semantic considerations — is between thin 
reference and thick or realist reference. Rather than use his terminology, and based on 
modifying Shapiro’s relativity thesis, the purpose at hand is best suited by distinguishing 
a narrow conception of reference from a wider one. Recall that Shapiro’s relativity thesis 
was analysed as comprising two components — one inter-structural and one intra- 
structural. Concentrating on the inter-structural component, the key thought is that what is 
a place in a structure from the perspective of a theory T, may be a genuine object once the 
linguistic resources are augmented, i.e. what is a place in a structure according to T, is an 
object according to T + J.
The first part of this section looks at ways in which this notion of narrow referene 
might be articulated; the second part looks at how this might be applied to places in a 
structure to give a modest ante rem account, to be used instead of Shapiro’s own account 
of offices. The third part looks at the problems with such an account.
i Narrow and wide reference
Unlike Dummett and Azzouni’s theories of differentiated reference, the modest 
ante rem strategy is not based on the quality of the reference — there is no issue here 
about whether the relation of reference differs across the two types of term — rather it is 
based on the quantity of infoimation available to determine the reference of the term in 
question. For example, using only the resources of a theory T, little can be known about 
the referents of the terms occuring in a theory: the reference of the terms can be 
distinguished only up to discriminating between items occuring in the structure: these 
referents cannot be distinguished from other objects in general. Although this suggests
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that ultimately the reference is indeterminate, relative to the theory — i.e. when questions 
about the reference are restricted to the terms occuring in the theory — reference is indeed 
determinate.
This leads quite naturally to the thought that structural terms might possess 
determinate reference only when considered in a narrow context; treating them as part of a 
broader picture will result in a loss of referential determinacy. However, adding an 
interpretation ^  to a theory T widens the domain over which the reference of these terms 
is determinate. From this broader vantage point it is possible to consider the relationships 
which hold between the referents of terms of the theory and items of potentially different 
sorts.
This distinction between narrow and wide reference dovetails into the account of 
identifying knowledge given in Chapter 2 .“ Grasp of the meaning of a singular thought 
requires the ability to single out the object the thought concerns. Accordng to Wright, this 
identifying loiowledge has two components: firstly a means of distinguishing the object in 
question from objects of different sorts, i.e. the ability to tell the difference between 
objects falling under one sortal concept from those falling under quite different sortais — 
which Hale describes as a criterion of application — and secondly a means of identifying 
objects which fall under the same sortal concept. This is a criterion of identity and 
distinctness.
It seems obvious that the terms of a theory T will support a criterion of identity 
and distinctness, and without will not suffice to furnish a criterion of application. This 
allows the identification of two notions: terms with a narrow reference and terms whose 
reference is supported only by partial identifying knowledge, i.e. terms, the referents of 
which meet the criterion of identity but not of application. Similarly, those terms with a 
broad reference will be such that they are supported by full identifying knowledge of their 
referents.
If places in a structure were regarded as offices, then it would be possible to build
a criterion of application out of the criterion of identity, just as Wright proposes to solve
the Caesar problem for numbers. However this approach using thin reference is
introduced to be an alternative to Shapiro’s use of offices. If there is no way to build a
criterion of application from the internal criterion, then this would make this a genuine
alternative to Shapiro’s account. But to sustain this view would require that while the 
" See §IV, V
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terms referring to places in a structure are grammatically singular, they are not instances 
of genuine sortal concepts.
This would seem entirely plausible — for while ‘group’ may be a sortal concept, 
the concept of a ‘place is a group structure’ will not sort objects. To say that ‘group’ is 
sortal is to say that groups may be individuated and counted. They will belong to a 
category (in the philosophical, rather than mathematical sense) of objects with similar 
criteria of identity; ‘place in a group structure’ characterises objects which have already 
been individuated by some prior means, and so is not properly sortal.
Strawson distinguishes between sortal and characterising concepts in the 
following way:
A sortal universal supplies a principle for distinguishing and counting individual 
particulars which it collects. It presupposes no antecedent principle, or method, of 
individuating the particulars it collects. Characterising universals, on the other hand, 
whilst they supply principles of grouping, even of counting particulars, supply such 
principles only for particulars already distinguished or distinguishable, in accordance 
with some antecedent principle or method.'^
Examples of sortais include: ‘tiger’, ‘tree’ and ‘number’; characterising concepts include 
‘butter’, ‘red’ and ‘gold’. On its own, ‘red’ does not individuate objects, but when added 
to some prior individuation, for example, by a concept such as ‘lorry’, does supply a 
principle of grouping together particulars — red lorries.
The following is therefore proposed: that the terms occuring in a theory T, 
refering to places in a structure, are syntactic singular terms; nevertheless full blooded 
singular reference does not have wide scope because the concepts involved — 
characterising concepts — supply only partial identifying knowledge. The criterion of 
identity and distinctness will be satisfied as the axiomatic definition of the structure will 
provide sufficient means to discriminate places in a structure. However, the criterion of 
application — to distinguish the places in a structure from other objects — will not be 
forthcoming while the linguistic resources are restricted to the theoiy T alone.
ii M odest abstract-structuralism
Although the discussion above focussed on the notions of narrow and wide
Strawson (1959), pl68
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reference, it is clear that this is drawn by way of analogy with Dummett’s notions of thin 
and thick reference, concentrating on epistemological, rather than semantic features of 
reference. Despite this difference, there are some striking similarities: recall Hale’s 
comments about thin reference:
Once it is allowed that a syntactic singular term has semantic content, it is unclear (at 
best) whether, or what, more could be demanded for it to count as possessing reference, 
understood as a relation to something external.'®
Rather than take a thin — narrow — conception o f  reference as a drawback, the m odest 
structuralist pins her hopes on this as the characteristic advantage o f her position. In the 
structural case, it is clear what can be added to naiTow reference to ensure com plete — 
wide — reference: instantiation o f  the structure w ill put the objects in question in the 
market for satisfaction o f a criterion o f application, and so for full identifying knowledge.
Identifying knowledge is also seen as marking the border between realist 
reference and thin reference. With reference pointing to something external, i.e. when it is 
taken in a wide sense, Caesar type questions are extremely important; however, in a 
structure, only the properties and relations that hold relative to the other members of the 
structure play any part in determining equalities — which explains why the notion of 
equality that is in force in structural theories appears to function in a much weaker fashion 
than genuine identity. The claim then is that places in a structure can only be identified in 
that sti'ucture, and have no identity relations to anything outside of the structure — which 
ties in Resnik’s comments about there being no facts of the matter concerning inter- 
structural identity. This gives a workable notion of equality relative to any particular 
structure, and will supply an internal criterion of identity: reference is thin precisely 
because a criterion of application is lacldng.
This modification to abstract-structuralism removes the distinction between 
objects and offices, based on the relativity of linguistic resources, and replaces it with a 
distinction based on epistemological quantity of those resources; whether full or partial 
identifying knowledge is available, will determine whether reference is to an object or to a 
place in a structure.
The modest abstract structuralist account of stiuctures does seem to fulfil all of the
appropriate requirements — as exhibited above, it is sensitive to the problems of 
*® Hale (1987), pl36
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philosophical structuralism and to the problems that arose with the divided reference 
view. Two further points need to be established. One concerns the status of the axioms of 
structural theories: just as N= fixes the truth conditions for arithmetic, it needs to be 
shown that the axioms of structural theories act in a similar fashion to fix truth conditions. 
The second point to establish is that this new notion of nanow reference — based not on 
contextual definitions, but rather on Dummett’s auxiliary definitions in terms of 
incompleteness and partial identifying knowledge — is able to overcome the criticism that 
Hale and Wright have levelled against Dummett’s original notion of thin reference.
i i i  The status o f  axioms
In extending the Fregean thesis to structural mathematics, most of the attention 
has been focussed on the ways in which structures differ from the systems which may 
instantiate them; little time has been spent on the presentation of the structural theories. 
Whether the mathematical theories are treated model-theoretically — in which case more 
emphasis is on the formal language — or less formally, the method of axiomatic 
definitions is at the heart of structural mathematics.
Maybeny comments about such definitions that:
in the past one hundred years a particular method of definition — the so-called axiomatic 
method — has become so widespread and so indispensable that its invention has 
profoundly altered our practice from that of our predecessors both immediate and 
remote.'**
A set of axioms will describe a species or family of structures — the axioms define the
central concepts involved and fix the truth conditions for the introduction of a class of
objects — the places in a structure. The truth conditions for statements about Number are
fixed by N= by ‘carving up the content’ of epistemologically prior states of affairs.
Likewise structural concepts are reconceptualisations of already familiar areas of
mathematics; recall for example, the way the notion of a group grew out of studies in
geometry, number theory and the theory of permutations.
As with Number, it is the truth of the statements concerning the epistemologically
prior state of affairs which validate the structural axioms; all the axioms do is establish the
truth conditions, and do not by themselves guarantee that the axioms are instantiated, that 
'■* Mayberry (1994), pl7
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is, there is no guarantee that the axioms are true of anything.
Structural definitions, unlike ‘genuine’ or Euclidean axioms, are not true or false 
simpliciter — rather, once the concepts are defined by the axioms, statements involving 
those concepts will be true or false. Axiom schemes can be more or less faithful to the 
intuitive concepts arising from the examples which inspired the axioms, in just the same 
sense that other definitions — such as the definition of polyhedra discussed earlier — 
either successfully capture the intuitive notions already in use, or else fail to faithfully 
clarify the concepts in question.
It is important to properly distinguish these two styles of axiomatic presentation: 
Euclidean axioms are ‘clear and self-evident truths’; just as N= can be described as 
analytic of the concept ‘Number’, so too could the Euclidean axioms be described as 
analytic of the concepts ‘point’, ‘line’ and ‘plane’. Hilbert pointed out that the five 
Euclidean axioms are only a partial explanation of our concepts ‘point’, ‘line’ and ‘plane’: 
for a complete structural definition of such entities as points, lines and planes, further 
axioms are required.^® The axiomatic definitions of algebraic structures, on the other 
hand, do not begin with a clear vision of their subject matter. Instead, the axioms for 
algebraic structures are developed often by trying to find similarities between two 
different systems: it may take many attempts before a successful axiomatic 
characterisation is achieved. Naturally enough — and this is one of the problems 
recognised more clearly by historians of mathematics than by philosophers — only the 
successful axiom schemes ever appear in print: in journals or in textbooks.^®
A successful axiomatization will offer a new conceptualisation of the areas it 
emerges from, and will therefore fix truth conditions which are entirely general; 
statements about the objects introduced in this fashion will only be shown to be more than 
trivially true once it is shown that some system instantiates the axioms.
iv  The theory o f  narrow reference
The theory of narrow reference has been inspired by Dummett’s theory of thin 
reference. Of the various criticisms which Hale and Wright, in particular, have brought
Euclid’s work contains a number of implicit assumptions; Hilbert’s motivation in lecturing on, and 
finally writing Der Grundlagen der Geometrie was to turn these tacit assumptions into explicit axioms.
This method of working towards clarity, rather than from it, was described in §11 as the Stratoan 
methodology, in contrast with the top-down proof techniques of the Euclidean method. This is discussed 
in more detail in Ch5, §XXIX
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against Dummett’s notion of thin reference, there are some which appear at first sight to 
count against any stratified theory of reference. The main criticism to concentrate on, is 
the charge that Dummett’s notion of thin reference is not stable — that there is no way to 
keep the notions of thin and thick reference separate, once it is admitted that the singular 
terms involved have genuine syntactic structure and occur in true statemetns. Similarly, 
Wright has argued, in effect, that Blackburn faces a similar difficulty: that he should 
provide a principled way to distinguish between a discourse governed by norms sufficient 
for assertoric content, and those which are equipped with a deep notion of assertoric 
content. Without such a distinction, there is no way to separate those discourses apt for 
quasi-realist reduction and those apt for a realist construal.
The failure of these attempts to stratify the notion of reference — based on 
semantic consdierations — need not rule out the possibility of differentiating two (or 
more) notions of reference based on epistemological factors, e.g. identifying knowledge. 
One key reason for this is that on the semantic model, the result is inevitably to construe 
one form of reference as a genuine relation between term and object, and the other as 
simply bearing some superficial resemblance to such a relation, and in the final analysis to 
conclude that it is non-relational. However, where the distinction between one form of 
reference and another is drawn not in terms of whether reference is a genuine relation or 
not, but in terms of the quantity of discriminating information available, then it seems this 
will sidestep the criticisms which Hale and Wright have levelled against this general 
strategy.
V Problems with modest abstract-structuralism
Even if the account of narrow reference, based on partial identifying knowledge, 
avoids the criticisms which sank Dummett’s original notion of thin reference, the modest 
abstract-structuralist is not yet out of the woods. It has yet to be shown that the theory of 
narrow reference is suitable for the purpose at hand — to offer an account of the 
differences between structures and systems, and in particular to explain reference to 
places in a structure.
Recall that if the statements of structural mathematics are taken to be indicative — 
as Shapiro takes them to be — then expressions that pick out places in a structure are 
genuine syntactic terms (see §XVI). Moreover, on the ante rem view that places in a
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Structure are offices, this feature, combined with the truth o f the statements in which these 
expressions feature, leads to the conclusion that offices are Fregean objects.
The thought behind Shapiro’s relativity thesis:
What is structure from one perspective is system from another. What is office from one 
point of view is office-holder from another.”
will only work if the structural concepts are sortai. However, as shown above, if
structural concepts are sortai, offices are objects and the relativity thesis fails. (This is the
criticism raised in §XVI, ii).
The solution offered above was to firstly distinguish sortai from characterising
concepts, and to argue that structural concepts are not sortai, but rather characterising
concepts. As such, the characterising concepts (together with some underlying set-
theoretic resources) would supply the required information to satisfy a criterion of identity
and distinctness, and hence the objects introduced by a theory T would be equipped with
a narrow reference; secondly, once the resources of the characterising concepts involved
are augmented by further individuating information % (such as when the structure is
instantiated) a wider notion of reference would be available.
This twofold strategy — arguing that structural concepts are characterising rather
than sortai concepts, and utilising the narrow/ wide distinction in reference to mark the
system/ stincture boundaiy — will only succeed if it can be shown that narrow reference
does not inflate to wide reference in structural contexts. That is, only so long as the
characterising structural concepts, when added to the basic individuating concepts of set
theory, do not support a criterion of application.
In §XII, a sketch was given of the method Wright has used to generate a criterion
of application from a criterion of identity, to show that number is a sortai concept. The
success of the revised ante rem account will depend on showing that this method will not
work for structural concepts.
Although this technique of building one criterion from another was introduced by
Wright in connection with truth conditions being fixed by an N=, an abstraction principle,
this alone is no bar to its being extended to the case where tmth conditions are fixed by
other means, such as by axioms — as in the structural case: axiom schemes do fix truth 
” Shapiro (1997), Ch4, pl22
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conditions in a manner similar to that of abstraction principles (see iii above).
In a structure, such as a group, identifying elements depends upon the 
relationships which hold between the places in the group, which ultimately rests upon the 
cardinality of the group, the group axioms and the underlying characterisation of a set. So 
an item is an element of a group — a place in a group structure — just in case questions 
of identity and distinctness are settled by the group axioms. So structural concepts are at 
least characterising concepts: grasp of the meaning of a structural concept requires the 
ability to identify and distinguish objects which fall under such concepts.
The next subsection looks at Wright’s solution to the Caesar problem and his 
technique for building an external criterion of identifying out of an internal criterion of 
identifying and distinctness. The aim is to reconstruct this method and to apply it to 
characterising concepts which are augmented by individuating resources in just the same 
way that structural concepts are supported by the principles of set theory, to show that 
ultimately, modest ante rem structuralism is untenable.
v i Sortai and characterising concepts
Wright uses the combination of the sortai inclusion principle (SIP) and N+ to 
formulate an individuating principle which he calls N^, in order to show that Number is a 
genuine sortai concept.
The thought behind SIP is that there is a certain degree of overlap between sortai 
concepts: by formulating a principle which is fairly generous in the attribution of 
instances of overlap, this also enables Wright to delineate those sortais which fail to 
overlap, i.e. those which are mutually exclusive. Recall that SIP was formulated:
(SIP) where Fx is such a putative sortai concept, Gx is a sortai concept under which instances 
of Fx fail if and only if there are — or could be — terms a, b which recognisably 
purport to denote instances of Gx, such that the sense of a^b can adequately be explained 
by fixing its truth conditions to be the same as those of a statement which asserts that 
the given equivalence relation holds between a pair of objects in terms of which identity 
and distinctness under the concept Fx is explained.'®
which when combined with N= yielded N :^
18Wright (1983), pI14
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(N^ )^ G.r is a sortai concept under which numbers fall, (if? and) only if there are singular 
terms a, b purporting to denote instances of G%, such that the truth conditions of a=b 
could adequately be explained as those of some statement to the effect that a 1— 1 
correlation obtains between a pair of concepts.”
Building up a parallel inclusion principle for characterising concepts raises a number of
isues: most importantly, concerning the relative individuating powers of sortai and
characterising concepts.
Characterising concepts will separate and characterise objects — group them into
categories — only once they have already been individuated as objects, that is,
characterising concepts can only be applied in a classificatory fashion when there is some
prior individuation of the domain of objects, Sortai concepts on the other hand, not only
classify objects by kind, they also perform this initial individuating procedure. For
example, it is not possible to count reds in the way that it is possible to count apples:
however, once the domain has been individuated, say into pieces of fruit, then it is
possible to count the red pieces of fruit.
If the sortai inclusion principle turns on there being prior individuation of the
domain into objects — and it seems reasonable to assume that it must do so — then if this
individuating process is also tied to the very same sortai concept which is used to drive
the SIP, then no parallel development of an individuation principle for characterising
concepts will be forthcoming. If, however, all that is required is that the objects are
individuated in some way which remains neutral as to the classification of the objects into
kinds — if the objects of the domain can simply be distinguished as objects — then the
way is still open for there being an inclusion principle for characterising concepts.
As structural concepts are always applied in conjunction with a background set
theory, the individuating resources of set theory may be used to provide just such a
neutral individuation of the domain. Once this has been achieved, the behaviour of sortai
and chaiacterising concepts will be entirely similar, as the important factor in the inclusion
principle is not the (external) criterion of application, but the (internal) criterion of identity
and distinctness — and sortai and characterising concepts are equally well equipped with
the means to satisfy such a criterion.
So nothing in the initial indviduating conditions over objects of the domain
precludes there being a principle of inclusion among characterising concepts, analogous 
^Ubid. p in
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to the SIP. How might such a principle be formulated? The following is an obvious 
candidate:
(CIP) Singular terms from a given range stand for a characterising concept F if and only if 
there is some concept G, whose extension is included in that of F, such that when a and 
b are any terms from that range, understanding a=b involves exercising a grasp of the 
criteria of identity for G’s and some fairly general individuating principles.
As the target concepts are ail to be structural here, this suggests the following weaker 
principle:
(CIP*) Gx is a characterising concept under which structural objects fall, if and only if there are 
singular terms a, b purporting to denote instances of Gjc, such that the truth conditions 
of a=b could adequately be explained as those of some statement derived from those 
axioms which supply Gx with its meaning and the underlying individuating principles.
With the CIP in place, there remains one question. Wliether the combined resources of 
the underlying set theory, the CIP* and the axiom scheme defining a structure A, are 
sufficient to generate not only a criterion of identity and distinctness but also a criterion of 
application in the style of Nd, Were it possible to build a criterion of application out of the 
criterion of identity and distinctness, using the CIP*, the items introduced by axiom 
schemes would be up for full identifying knowledge, contrary to the narrow reference 
view developed above.
An example will show that such a move is possible. Let Ex be is an element of 
a group’; the basic individuating information given by the underlying set-theoretic 
resources, plus the group axioms are sufficient to determine, when a, b are elements of a 
group, whether a=6, i.e. to identity and discriminate the objects falling under the concept 
Fx.~° A  concept Gx ‘x is an element of a ring’ may overlap with Fx: given that a, b fall 
under F, the truth conditions for a=b can be grasped purely in terms of the criterion of 
identity and distinctness for G’s plus some fairly general individuating principles. On the 
other hand, objects falling under the concept Hx ‘x is a Roman Emperor’ will not overlap 
with a characterising concept such as ‘is an element of a group’, as Roman Emperors are
“ This gives the general notion of being an element of some group; were Fx to be ‘x is an alement of the 
group G’, the case can still be made for this more restricted concept. All that is required is the cardinality 
of the group, and where finite, the structure of its simple subgroups.
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individuated by appeal to criteria for personal identity and not to the four group axioms 
plus some resources from set theory.
Unfortunately, for all the attractiveness of the theory of narrow reference, it is 
inappropriate as a means of distinguishing structures from systems. This is not to say, of 
course, that there is anything wrong with the theory of narrow reference — only that it is 
inappropriate for the task at hand — i.e. the articulation of modest structuralism.
X X V  M odest structuralism: Context and supposition
Abstract-structuralism, as conceived of by Shapiro at least, distinguishes what 
have here been called objects in a system from places in a structure, in terms of the 
availability of linguistic resources: objects in a system are distinguished in greater detail, 
and reference is suitably constrained so as to be singular reference. Modified abstract- 
structuralism relied on differential epistemic resources to distinguish these two categories: 
objects in a system were supported by full identifying knowledge, while reference to 
places in a structure has only partial identifying knowledge to back up that reference.
Rather than concentrate on the quantity of the linguistic or epistemic resources 
available, perhaps more success will be had by considering the quality of those resources. 
There are two slightly different ways in which Frege’s thesis might break down in the 
way that Benacerraf suggests, relating to the differences in the quality of the linguistic or 
epistemic resources available.
i Subjunctives and Suppositions
Frege’s thesis was derived in §VIII by applying the Context Principle not only as 
a principle of sense, but also as a principle of reference. The conclusion reached was that 
singular terms in true statements in the appropriate indicative contexts refer to objects."’ 
Benacerraf’s contention is that the propositions of mathematics are quite generally 
quantified hypothetical statements, i.e. that Frege’s thesis fails for want of indicative 
contexts in mathematics. More precisely, the structuralist argument has the following
I talk in terms of indicative and subjunctive statements, which are distinctions in the logical grammar 
of the statements, rather than in terms of categorical and hypothetical statements, which would 
distinguish the statements in terms of their logical form. The reason for choosing to try to express this 
distinction in terms of the logical grammar, rather than the logical form (if these two notions can indeed 
be coherently separated) is that it sits more smoothly with the general thought that it is a mistake to try 
to provide a reductive translation of the statements of mathematics in terms of hypotheticals: recall 
Shapiro’s attack on Field, Heilman and Benacerraf (§XVIII, Hi). See also ii below.
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shape:
( 1 ) Statements of mathematics are not indicative (Modest Structuralism)
(2) Arithmetic is structural (Extension Argument)
therefore
(3) Statements of arithmetic are not indicative (Radical Structuralism)
Rejecting (2), on the basis of the failure of the Extension Argument, suggests a third form
of modest structuralism in addition to the divided reference and narrow reference
positions outlined above: what might be called a form of modest in re structuralism.
The central claim of this account will be that the statements of structural
mathematics are not indicative; rather they are subjunctive statements, or what might be
called suppositions. Both BenaceiTaf and Heilman opt to explicitly paraphrase what they
take to be the logical form of such subjunctive statements — in both cases, at the expense
of the intuitive notions motivating their accounts. There seems no reason why
complicated reductive paraphrases are required, once it is acknowledged that these
statements are subjunctive: recall that in general, Frege held that a term had its usual
reference only in indicative contexts, i.e. where there are no complications due to
intensional factors. In ‘indirect contexts’ as he called them, the reference of a term is that
which is its customary sense, which he called the indirect reference of the term. The
indirect sense of a term — according to DummetF" — is determined by the context in
which it occurs. If the statements of structural mathematics are subjunctives, then the
singular terms will not be standardly referential.
Another way of describing this same point would be to think of structural
mathematics not as describing some actual state of affairs, but rather as investigating the
consequences of a supposition: were there to be objects arranged in such-and-such a
fashion, then the structure would have certain properties.
Nothing would depend upon which objects the supposed objects were — they
would be featureless save for the properties they acquire in virtue of being in a structure;
this is the gist of Benacerraf’s claim, that places in a structure cannot be particular objects,
because there is no way of telling which objects they are.
Treating places in a structure as suppositional objects captures all of the important 
“ Dummett (1973) Ch9
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insights discussed so far: it leaves the Fregean account of systems untouched while 
accomodating Benacerraf’s insight that in a structure, there can be no straightforward 
reference to paiticular objects, as there is no way of determining which objects they are.
However, there is indirect reference to these objects of supposition, which are 
suitably indeterminate in nature as to afford the terms referring to them the requisite 
generality. The major advantage that this approach has over the substitutional account of 
divided reference, or the resuscitated moderate account of abstract-structuralism, is that it 
offers an easy explanation for the lapse of the Fregean thesis in the structural case. 
Obviously, each of these ideas is trying to cash out the same intuitive notion: that the 
move from systems to structures leads to an increase in the levels of generality expressed 
by the items involved. This approach, based on considerations of context and 
supposition, seems to have all of the advantages of the above accounts, without any of 
the drawbacks.
Discussion of the exact differences between the status of objects of a system and 
places in a structure will be left until the next Chapter.
ii  Problems with pure-structuralism  overcome
There were two main sets of problems which were raised in discussion of the 
original pure-structuralist positions; those due to Hale and those due to Shapiro.
Bob Hale started his attack on the pure-structuralist by questioning whether there 
were any co-sequences, which led him to present an unpalatable dilemma for the pure- 
structuralist. However, if this account of the status of statements of structural 
mathematics is correct, then Hale is making a category mistake, confusing the 
(suppositional) objects of an co-sequence with genuine objects which are the referents of 
indicative statements. Rather than ask whether co-sequences exist, or the items which 
constitute them, the pertinent question concerns the type of existence which such entities 
enjoy. This shall be considered in more detail in the next chapter; it draws on material 
developed by Wright in connection with articulation of the distinction between differing 
levels of objectivity across various discourses.
Shapiro’s main criticism of pure-structuralism — and also Field’s irrealism — is 
that while it is motivated by arguments based on highly intuitive notions of quantifications 
and modality, by the time the accounts have been developed, these intuitive notions have
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been replaced by highly technical and formal concepts, far removed from the ideas which 
motivated the accounts in the first place. His attack is directly aimed at Heilman and Field, 
but his criticisms apply equally well to Benacerraf’s conditional quantification account.
These criticisms are directed not at the background strategy of Benacerraf and 
Heilman’s work, but at the means by which they choose to express this strategy. 
Shapiro’s criticisms of the use of complex reductive paradigms and the appeals made to 
intuitive modal notions, serve not only to rebut Benacerraf and Heilman’s positions, but 
also serve as criteria for what would count as a successful in re philosophy: the account 
given must not only explain why the Fregean thesis fails for the singular terms in 
question, it must do so without resort to mechanism more problematic or more 
complicated than the claim that the thesis holds.
As the framework for reference in subjunctive contexts is already (briefly) detailed 
in Frege’s work, no new mechanism is being added in order to articulate this in re modest 
structuralism, and so Shapiro’s desideratum is met.
iii Caesar
A  final problem — which any philosophy of mathematics must address — is the 
Caesar problem. The referents of subjunctive singular terms will be up for identification 
and discrimination based on the axioms of the structures in which they occur, with some 
basic resources drawn from set theory, as developed in §XXIV, v. Even if structural 
concepts are characterising — rather than sortai — by augmenting the individuating 
properties of the characterising concepts with that of the general individuating principles 
of set theory, the combination is sufficient to supply subjunctive singular terms with full 
identifying knowledge, which will be sufficient to solve the Caesar problem for structural 
singular terms.
Resnik has claimed that it is not only the Caesar-type questions that require 
explanation, but also the related questions of inter-structural identity.^ He claims that 
there is no fact of the matter as to whethere le3, or whether 2^N is equal to 2eR.
He argues that the typical identification of structures by way of isomorphism, fails to cash 
out an intuitive notion of ‘sameness of form’
Two structures are identical if they are isomorphic; basically if there is a one-to-
Resnik (1981), p533//
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one mapping which preserves structure. A map /:  preserves structure if, given
a, <A, > , the following two criteria hold:
i) f(a .^ )= f(a ).^ f(b );
ii) f(a-J)-f(a)-i.
The usual way to answer questions such as whether (2eN)=(2eR), is not to think of the
set of natural numbers (N) as a substructure of R (as it is not a field), but to show that
there is a substructure R, such that NsX.
In general, it is possible to identify (by fiat, as Shapiro would put it) the places in 
one structure with the places in another: this is done by finding structure preserving 
mappings which translate from one structure to another. Anomalies such as the 
occurrence of <N, j>  in the rational numbers <Q, + ,. >, but its nonoccurrence in other 
presentations of the rationals, such as DLO, suggest to Resnik that substructure 
isomorphism is not the best way to cash out this notion. He considers the two systems 
< N , :s > and < N , 5 > which he claims have the same form, although they are not 
isomorphic. Instead of looking at the mappings between these systems, he looks at the 
theories which generate them. He argues that they are definitionally equivalent. He 
introduces the following terminology: a theory S is inteipretable in a theory T just in case 
they share the same underlying logic, and there is a set of definitions of the primitives of 
S in T, which he calls DST; when added to T, this yields all of the theorems of S.
Two theories S and T are definitionally equivalent when
there is a set of definitions DST + DTS such that S + DTS yields both T and DST and 
T + DST yields both S and DTS, In other words, the theories together with their 
interpreting definitions, yield not only each other, but also each other’s interpreting 
definitions. *^*
Two things emerge from this. Firstly, it becomes a matter of the availability of 
definitions, whether two structural theories are equivalent, and hence, whether they pick 
out the same structure. Resnik’s view then makes sameness of structure relative to the
Resnik (1981), p535
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logic in which the theory is expressed: two structures might be definitionally equivalent 
relative to one logic (e.g. first order Classical logic) but not another (such as second order 
Classical logic).
The second point to note from Resnik’s discussion of definitional equivalence 
concerns the distinction between systems and structures, and the relationship of 
isomoiphic structures to definitionally equivalent theories. Resnik considers <N, 5 > and 
<N, ^  > are having the same form, without there being an isomorphism between these 
two systems. < N ,  j  > is what Dedekind would have called an induction system; <N, 
is a partially ordered set. In structural terms, there is no obvious reason why an induction 
system should be isomorphic to a poset: they are instances of quite different structures. 
What they have in common in this case, is that the same system instantiates both 
structures. It is Resnik’s lack of a coherent distinction between structures and systems 
which drives his search for an alternative notion of ‘sameness of form’.
Suppose that < N ,  and < N ,  do display the sort of sameness of form which 
Resnik attributes to them: write this as < N , j  > « < N ,  .^>. Let T i ,  T 2  be theories such
that < N ,  s >l=Ti, < N ,  ^>NT2. Then according to Resnik’s articulation of definitional 
equivalence, there are bridge principles D T1T2 and DT2T 1; without loss of generality 
suppose these bridge principles are statements or sets of statements: D TiT2= a ,
DT2Ti=|3, meeting Resnik’s requirements such that T 1&PHT2, Ti&pi-a; T2& afT i,
T2&al-p.
Then T ifp -^ a , and therefore T2l"Ct->p. If Ti and T2 are expressed in a logic L 
which has the Robinson Property, and if the theories are definitionally equivalent, it will 
always be possible to construct a common core,TiDT2 “
DEFINITION Let Li and L2  be two expansions o f the language Lq, with L o=L iriL 2 . Let 
To be a com plete theory in Lq, and let T i , T 2  be consistent extensions o f
“ The range of logic with the Robinson Property includes first and second order Classical logic, first order 
Modal logics, such as M and S4, but not first or second order S5.
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To in the languages L{ and L2. The the union T 1UT2 is consistent."®
Any logic with the Robinson Property, also has the Beth Property:
DEFINITION A logic L has the Beth Definability Property, when for predicates F and 
G 1, Gn, if F is implicitly definable*’' in terms of G 1, Gn, then F is
explicitly definable in ternis of G i , ..., Gn-'®
As T 1 and T2 are mutually consistent, there is a theory T 1UT2 which is consistent — 
provided the logic they are expressed in has the Robinson Property. Then, as T 1 Hp 
and T2ba-">P, from which it follows that T i U T 2b(p“^a)&(a'"»P), and so a  is
explicitly definable in terms of p, as TiUT2b(a ’^ P ) , .
If the two theories are mutually consistent, then they have a mutual core: assume 
that this is modelled by Aq. Let A 2 ^T2 . Hence, there are monomorphisms
9^ 1,9^ 2, ^ 1, 2^ such that:
“ For a fuller treatment of the Robinson Property, see Booios & Jeffrey (1987), p243-6, or Barwise 
(1978),pp7I-3
” F is implicitly defmible from G i , ..., Gn if any two models of a theory T with the same domain which 
agree in what they assign to G%,..., Gn, also agree in what they assign to F 
F is explicitly definable in from G i , G n  if a definition of F from G i , G n  is a theorem of T i.e. 
1-t (Vx)(P(F)<»Q( Gi , ..., Gn)), where P, Q are statements with F and G i ,  ..., Gn occuring in them.
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Referring back to the original systems, s€^s<N, s >, ^ > Now consider some
substructures of the joint theory; TiUT2t=f^ , so there are substructures such
that TiUT2>=^ I, T i U T 2f=(?2> and as the mappings <?2> > ^2 above  a re
monomorphisms
{i.e, they are injective), these substructures ^ 1, Bi of &, are such that
If any two theories are definitionally equivalent, then there will be structures 
A 2  which will be isomorphic to substructures of the model of the joint theory.
Therefore, two structures are the same if they are isomorphic, and two systems given by 
theories Ti, T2 — two instantiations of structures — display a more general degree of 
sameness of foim, if the systems are isomorphic to substructures of the model of the joint 
theory T 1UT2. Hence contra Resnik, isomorphism can be used to give a notion of
sameness of form — for models of theories expressed in a logic with the Robinson 
Property; moreover, in such cases, substructure-isomorphism and definitional 
equivalence are extensionally equivalent.
XXVI C onclusion
Full-blown structuralism — the idea that the burden of giving an account of 
mathematical objects can be replaced by the lighter burden of an account of mathematical 
structures, summed up in the slogan ‘all mathematics is structural’, is hopelessly flawed. 
Yet there are many reasons why an account of structure is of crucial importance in the 
philosophy of mathematics — not least because the notions of structure pervade modern 
mathematical practice. By focusing on the Extension Argument (§XIX), it becomes clear 
where the two major forms of philosophical structuralism — extreme and radical 
structuralism — go wrong. By stopping short of such positions, and arguing only for 
modest structuralism, allows much of the structuralist’s insights to be retained. A 
coherent philosophical presentation of the mathematical notion of structure therefore 
becomes a burden additional to, and not in place of, the burden of giving an account of 
mathematical objects featuring in systems.
It is clear that tlie Fregean enterprise does give an account of mathematical objects
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such as numbers and sets; if this is to carry the weight of philosophical investigation into 
mathematical objects, then any development of modest structuralism will have to cohere 
with this account.
Based on an early analysis of Russell’s, concerning the difference between ‘any’ 
and ‘a ir , one way of developing a modified presentation of structure is to take the 
reference to places in a structure as divided among its possible substitution instances. 
While this captures the required level of generality, it does not enable a mathematician to 
talk purely in terms of the structure, without having to consider whether there are any 
substitution instances.
The Fregean thesis about objects is that singular terms, in truth apt indicative 
statements, supported by full identifying knowledge, determinately refer to objects. A 
second way of developing an account of structures, coherent with Fregean thought, is to 
distinguish different grades or modes of reference for the objects of a system and the 
places in a structure. By reworking Dummett’s tolerant reductionism, it is possible to 
develop a notion of thin reference based on partial identifying knowledge. This gives rise 
to the claim that a thick singular reference relationship holds between singular terms and 
the elements of a system, because full identifying knowledge is available, and thin 
singular reference between the terms of a structural theory and the places in a structure, as 
only partial identifying knowledge is forthcoming. Although this captures many of the 
requisite features of structural mathematics, it turns out that given the nature of the 
concepts which give rise to the structures, there is no stable notion of partial identifying 
knowledge — it always collapses into full identifying knowledge, and so the distinction 
is lost.
By returning to Benacerraf’s influential paper, which inspired so many of the 
different structuralist positions now prevalent in the literature, a gap emerges between 
what he concludes in his paper, and what he is often taken to have shown. Rather than 
think of reference as being highly indeterminate, as for example, Shapiro and Azzouni 
interpret him, Benacerraf should be seen as arguing for a further way in which the 
Fregean dictum can break down. If the truth statements in question are not indicatives, 
then there will be no genuine singular reference.
The statements of structural mathematics are hypothetical; they articulate various 
suppositions, and enquiry into structures investigates the properties arising from the
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possibility of objects being arranged in particular ways. By treating the places in a 
structure as referring to suppositional a natural distinction arises between objects and 
places in a structure.
Unlike many of the structuralist accounts mentioned earlier, this modest position 
adheres to a conception of structure which most matliematicians have. Awodey laments:
The actual methods of mathematical structuralism seem to have been largely ignored;
philosophical accounts often proceed instead either from model theory or from scratch.^ ®
Not only does this account develop in a way much closer to the notion of structure which 
features in the taxonomy of category theory, it also gives an explanation of the 
mathematician’s ability to talk purely in terms of structures, to consider ways in which 
structures are essentially the same, and also provides a clean way of describing the 
relationship between structures and their instances.
Awodey (1996), p210
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In troduction
The eclectic position developed over the previous three Chapters — neo-Fregean 
logicism for systems coupled with modest in re structuralism for the structural areas of 
mathematics — rest on the idea that in different contexts, true mathematical statements 
have different referential commitments. For example, arithmetical statements — or at least 
statements of numerical identity — are indicative: singular teims in such (true) statements 
refer to objects; statements of group theory, by comparison, are subjunctive: they 
characterise what is true of a collection if it satisfies the group axioms. The reference of 
the ‘singular terms’ is not to objects, rather to something some like Fregean senses.
Although much has been said about reference, little has been said concerning truth 
— such as whether the statements of mathematics are realist in truth value, for example, 
or whether there is the possibility of evidence transcendence — nor has much been said 
about the ontology which will support the referential commitments of the mathematical 
statements. Hopefully, the reader will be persuaded by now that mathematics is not a 
single univocal discourse — rather it comprises at least two separate parts; the stiuctural 
and the systemic areas of mathematics. Once this move is made, it is natural to wonder 
whether truth has the same characteristic across the two areas, or whether there may be 
properties enjoyed by the truth predicate in one area but not the other. The different levels 
of generality expressed by the statements of systemic and stiuctural mathematics suggests 
at least this much.
That theme of this and the next Chapter is truth; usually discussions of truth in 
mathematics proceed on the assumption that truth will be uniform across the discourse: if 
the structure / system divide is coherent, the this cannot be the case.
i Realism in Ontology and Realism in Truth Value
Dummett’s discussion of realism leads to the development of two contrasting
ways in which realism may fail for a discourse: one way is for reference to fail to be
realist, because reference does not pick out something external, but merely plays a
semantic role. So this is failure on ontological grounds. Secondly, Dummett has offered
acceptance of Bivalence as an appropriate realist/ anti-realist watershed: the realist argues
for Bivalence and accepts the possible evidence transcendence of truth. Should Bivalence
fail, so too would realism: a failure of realism in truth value, as Shapiro has put it.*
' Shapiro (1997), Chi, pp2-3
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Wright has argued that rather than focus on separate aspects of ontology and truth 
value, both of these contrasts are better understood in terms of the properties of the truth 
predicate over the relevant discourse.
This Chapter (§§XXVII-XXXIII) focuses on the first of these contrasts, the 
realism relevant properties of the discourse which are central to disanalogies of realism in 
ontology; the next Chapter (§§XXXIII-XXXIX) looks at the second contrast, and 
focuses on response-dependence, evidence transcendence and revisionism.
Dummett’s first contrast — between thin and thick reference — has already been 
discussed in some length (§X) and an amended notion, based on epistemic rather than 
semantic considerations suggested (§XXIV). Wright’s interpretation of this contiast, and 
the varying levels of robustness of the associated ontology, begins with a reinteipretation 
of deflationism. He argues that adopting a form of minimalism about truth offers a neutral 
position independent of realist or anti-realist disputes; yet unlike standard minimalism, he 
argues that truth is a genuine property, as it potentially diverges from warranted assertion 
in extension, while coinciding in positive normative force.
Unlike others who have argued for deflationist accounts and the role they can play 
as common ground to realists and anti-realists (e.g. Fine’s NOA“ ), Wright holds that 
truth will inflate beyond the merely minimal where the truth value possesses certain 
realism relevant properties, which he styles cognitive command and width of 
cosmological role. A similar move is made by Azzouni, although he stops short of 
discussing his findings in terms of truth. He offers an elegant amendment to Quine’s 
doctrine of evidence: he argues that there are three distinct grades of object, or posit. The 
two traditional levels of theoretical entity and concrete, empirical object are styled as thin 
and thick posits respectively. Thin posits play merely an organisational role, and are 
essential to the codification and understanding of experience; thick posits on the other 
hand, face more of a burden, as they are called upon to provide explanations of empirical 
phenomena. Azzouni argues that mathematical objects are never required to meet either of 
these criteria — which leads him to describe mathematical items as ultrathin posits.
If there is such a difference between the levels of objectivity or reality attached to
the truth predicate in different mathematical discourses, then it looks as if Wright’s, rather
than Azzouni’s, analysis will provide the requisite framework for this comparison —
Azzouni already having placed mathematics singularly within one category. However, 
" See Fine (1986), (1986a)
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Azzouni’s work contains much which is worth retaining: in what follows, attempts are 
made to tie in points which are made in the course of Azzouni (1994).
ii  Outline
Wright’s discussion of realism in ontology has three parts — a discussion of 
minimalism, and discussions of his two realism relevant properties: this structure is 
adopted here. As the basic minimalist strategy has much in common with Hilbert’s 
formalism, the next section explores the issues Wright raises, by comparing his views 
with Hilbert's. §XXX concentrates on cognitive command and the nature of 
disagreements in mathematics. Much will be made of Lakatos’ work on the subject, 
which was mentioned in §IV. The discussion of cognitive command is followed in 
§XXXI by a similar treatment of width of cosmological role and issues surrounding the 
Indispensability Argument, application and the explanatory role mathematics plays. Some 
residual problems are dealt with in §XXXII.
XXIX Formalism and Deflationism
Before beginning to look at Hilbert’s formalism, it is worth sounding a note of 
caution. Hilbert has been quite successfully inteipreted as an instrumentalist by Detlefsen: 
in fact, von Neumann suggested just such an interpretation much earlier:
The leading idea of Hilbert’s theory of proof Is that, even if the statements of classical 
mathematics should turn out to be false as to content, nevertheless, classical 
mathematics involves an internally closed procedure which operates according to fixed 
rules known to all mathematicians, and which consists basically in constructing 
successfully certain combinations of primitive symbols which we consider ‘correct’ or 
‘proved’.^
However, as Hilbert’s writing developed in opposition to a fairly crude form of realism, 
and in competition to Brouwer’s intuitionism, it is unsurprising that it not be altogether 
clear what form of anti-realism he is espousing.** Instead of treating Hilbert as an 
instrumentalist, it is possible — and hopefully more fruitful — to interpret him as a
 ^ Benacenaf& Putnam (1983), pp61-2
* Although it is now common to take intuitionism as being supported by semantic anti-realism, when 
Brouwer developed his position initially, it was motivated more by idealist ideology than by reflection on 
language.
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deflationist about mathematical truth. As much of what Hilbert wrote is philosophically 
ambiguous, and as his views did evolve and change over the course of his life, various 
interpretations of his work are within the bounds of the textual evidence: not just the 
instrumentalist or irrealist interpretation which Detlefsen has developed, nor the 
deflationist approach I shall develop, but quasi-realist interpretations will also be 
possible. As there is so much leeway to interpret Hilbert’s work, emphasis will be put on 
the fruitfulness of the interpretation given, rather than trying to give textual support for 
the interpretation. In what follows, unqualified references to Hilbert’s thought are to be 
understand as the deflationist interpretation of his work — this will be clear in context. 
Other interpretations of Hilbert — notably Detlefsen’s, will always be flagged in some 
way.
i HilberFs Formalism
However appealing an instrumentalist inteipretation is, it neglects one important 
feature of Hilbert’s writings: he repeatedly mentions and discussed truth in his writings 
on mathematics, in such a way as to make it clear that he held that there is genuine truth in 
mathematics, although this may not be the same notion of truth that is at play in everyday 
life. It becomes clear that Hilbert rejects the realist conception of truth for mathematics, 
mostly on the grounds of the strong connection it tries to establish between a statement 
being true and ontology. Instead, he held that:
If ... arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict one another with all their consequences, 
then they are true and the things defined by the axioms exist ^
Truth in mathematics is, in general, a much more modest concern than it is in 
other discourses — which suggests that rather than being an irrealist, Hilbert is a 
deflationist. The realist’s heavyweight notion of truth, with all of the metaphysical 
baggage that accompanies it, is rejected as inappropriate for mathematics. It is not that 
mathematics is measured by this norm and fails (as the irrealist suggests) but that such a 
norm is an incorrect way to go about measuring correctness in mathematics.
Hilbert is well-known for denying that mathematics has a particular subject matter: 
“One must be able to say at all times — instead of points, lines, and planes — tables,
Hilbert — Letter to Frege 1898 in Frege (1976)
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chairs, and beer mugs.” he once said, in Berlin station, on the way back home to 
Konigsberg, from a lecture given by Hermann Wiener on the foundations and structure of 
geometry. Hilbert lectured on geometry in Gottingen during the course of the Winter 
Semester 1898-99, clarifying ideas developed by Pasch, Peano and Klein, on the 
relationship of Euclidean and non -Euclidean geometries.
With the sure economy of the straight line on the plane, he followed to its logical 
conclusion the remark he had made half a dozen years before in the Berlin station. He 
began by expiaining to his audience that Euclid’s definitions were realiy mathematically 
insignificant. They wouid come into focus only by their connection with whatever 
axioms were chosen. In other words, whether they were called points, straight lines, 
planes or were called tables, chairs, beer mugs, they would be those objects for which 
the relationships expressed by the axioms were true. In a way this was rather like saying 
that the meaning of an unknown word becomes increasingly clear as it appears in 
various contexts. Each additional statement in which it is used eliminates certain of the 
meanings which would have been true, or meaningful, for the previous statements.®
At different stages in his life, Hilbert worked on two different bipartite  
conceptions of mathematics. His early conception — separating formal mathematics from 
real mathematics — was based on his studies in geometry, and his realisation that 
mathematics need not have a predetermined subject matter. For example, if the parallel 
postulate can be negated and give rise to non-Euclidean geometries, then in a certain sense 
the other axioms of geometry can be changed too, to give a different family of structures. 
Which axioms are chosen for investigation is in some sense arbitrary. All that is required 
of a theory is formal:, the axioms are to be consistent (no contradictions), independent (so 
that removal of axioms leads to results being unprovable) and complete (“all the theorems 
can be derived from the axioms”). What distinguishes merely formal mathematics from 
the rest of mathematics is the lack of subject matter: consistency is the only constraint.
The later conception, which he based on epistemological differences, revolved 
around those areas that relied only on finite proof procedures (real mathematics) and those 
parasitic on such mathematics (ideal mathematics). On both accounts, arithmetic falls on 
the robust side of this distinction, while set theory is real rather than formal, but ideal 
rather than finitary.
The later Hilbert also identified the ideal with the formal part of mathematics. It 
® Reid (1970), p60
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seems clear that number theory is part of real mathematics; this suggests that Hilbert 
assimilated transfinite set theory under his notion of formal mathematics when he claimed 
that it was ideal. This would explain why latterly he put such a strong emphasis on 
consistency proofs. When discussing formal mathematics, the only constraint Hilbert 
imposed on such mathematics was consistency: if statements of a formal theory were 
consistent, then he held them to be true.
In developing his Program, Hilbert’s reinterpretation of the real part of 
mathematics as that which not only has a subject matter, but a finite one, is a key notion 
in the justification he sought for transfinite mathematics. If treated as part of real 
mathematics, the transfinite must bear up to a certain philosophical scrutiny such as 
Brouwer offered. However, if the transfinite were only part of ideal mathematics, its lack 
of subject matter would make such investigation pointless: the justification for its use 
would then be a purely technical matter. It is known that Zermelo had communicated the 
so-called Russell paradox to Hilbert in 1895, and that Hilbert, like Zeimelo, did not think 
that this was a serious problem for Cantorian set theory: it was no more than a curiosity. 
However, twenty years or so down the line, once Hilbert had begun to think of Cantor’s 
set theory in teims of ideal mathematics, he needed to be able to show consistency. It was 
at this point that his attitude to the set theoretic paradoxes changed completely: the reasons 
for relegating set theory from the real to the ideal are centred on these paradoxes and the 
lack of certainty in set theoretic methods: it is this lack of philosophical confidence in the 
techniques of set theory that led him to redefine his notions of real and formal 
mathematics. Before the paradoxes became important, having a determinate subject matter 
sufficed for inclusion in the canon of ‘real’ mathematics; after the paradoxes, Hilbert took 
knowledge the requirements for real mathematics to also include that the subject matter be 
finite.
According to Hilbert’s first contrast (between real and formal mathematics), 
consistency is the benchmark of mathematical existence. This is true so long as first order 
logic is concerned; Shapiro has pointed out that if a more appropriate second order logic 
is applied, then consistency will not guarantee the existence of a model, as the logic is 
incomplete. Something stronger is required. Although the technical details of finding 
some second order principle to perform this task will not be dealt with, finding a means 
of distinguishing where contentful mathematics begins will play an important
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philosophical role later on/
Hilbert’s later work — his Program — is an attempt to offer an epistemological 
foundation for mathematics, that explains how the finite capacities of the human mind are 
able to generate infinite mathematics. This appreciation of the finitude of human thought 
occurs in Brouwer’s writings too, but there it plays a negative, limiting factor, counting 
against the coherence of infinite mathematics, rather than accepting such knowledge as a 
going concern. In 1928, he suggested that real proofs should be restricted to the lower 
predicate calculus, what is now recognised as first order Classical logic. Arguably 
Gddel’s theorems put an end to the Program and the requirement that real mathematics be 
finitary; it certainly devastated the articulation of the Program by way of first order 
methods. I contend that whether these results have this significance or not, Hilbert’s 
earlier distinction between real and formal mathematics is untouched by Godel’s work.
The distinction drawn between systems and structures was fuelled by differences 
in the levels of generality expressed by statements of structural and systemic mathematics. 
Statements about mathematical systems concern particular objects — numbers and sets, 
for example — while those about structures concern places in a structure — elements of 
algebras or topologies — which are not objects in the ordinary sense.
It might be thought that this difference between those statements referring to 
particular objects and those that do not, might reflect the same distinction as Hilbert’s 
relating to areas of mathematics with a determinate subject matter and those without one - 
but this is not the case. Areas with a genuine subject matter include not only arithmetic 
and real analysis, but also group theory and topology: this will be a central part of the 
argument in §XXXI. The divide between formal and real mathematics therefore offers a 
third distinction between areas of mathematics.
ii  Formalism and M inimalism  compared
Hilbert’s formalism, like Wright’s minimalism, is an approach based on the
rejection of the metaphysical commitments attached to the realist construal of truth. Rather
than argue for some sort of nominalist reduction — whether executed in an irrealist or
quasi-realist style — or argue for a revision of mathematical practice, formalism retains a 
’ i.e. whether the mathematics must be representational in the narrowest sense, which admits theories of 
systems and structures, but not arbitrary sets of axioms, or whether there is a wider sense in which even 
these trivial theories are representational will be discussed.
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commitment to a face-value interpretation of mathematical language: most importantly, 
singular terms refer to objects.
Both the minimalist and the formalist contend that the statements of mathematics 
are true; both accept that the notion of truth at play in mathematics may fail to satisfy the 
realist’s picture of what a truth predicate should look like. Both argue that truth is not a 
philosophically deep matter — similarly, they do not take the facts which correspond to 
language always to be substantial. More importantly, both admit to degrees of inflation 
beyond the basic deflated conception of states of affairs.
All referential and epistemic access to the abstract objects of mathematics is 
linguistically mediated: according to Wright, the Fregean Platonist “quite rightly finds no 
reason in such reflections to doubt the reality of reference to abstract objects”. Frege takes 
these objects to exist — they are objectively real, but not actually real. Hilbert’s attitude is 
similar: provided the syntax displays sufficient discipline, then the objects referred to 
exist — yet they may nevertheless fail to exist in the same way that concrete objects exist. 
The discipline required to ground such existence claims is twofold: formal expressibility 
is the first, consistency the second. For a theory to be expressible in a formal language, it 
has to satisfy a number of logical features: negation must be supported, and the meaning 
must remain stable across asserted and unasserted contexts, i,e. conditionals have to be 
supported. As quantification is also a part of formal expressibility, the subject matter will 
also have to lend itself to the use of singular terms. These factors guarantee that 
statements of the discourse have genuine assertoric content, however minimal that content 
may be. This ensures that the statements are truth apt. The second criterion — 
consistency — Hilbert argued was sufficient to license the truth of the statements in a 
theory, and hence for the objects referred to by the theory to exist.
Wright claims that the Fregean is a minimalist about singular reference — perhaps 
she can do better than this, at least for some portions of mathematics — at any rate, this 
would appear to be the level that Hilbert was aiming at: that statements of mathematics are 
minimally truth apt, and correspond to minimally truth conferring states of affairs, which 
do exist, but fall short of the realist’s conception of the facts. Although he framed his 
real/ideal distinction in order to provide foundational stability, the epistemological burden 
which Hilbert places on real mathematics is not one that could be borne by merely 
minimal states of affairs: real mathematics must be more substantial, if it is to suit
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Hilbert’s intended explanatory purposes. This suggests that real mathematics will display 
one or more of Wright’s realism relevant properties.
Given any assertoric practice, Wright has shown that a truth predicate can be 
defined for that discourse, showing that the deflationist is right in thinking that truth does 
not pick out any deep features of a practice, that is, it does not necessarily show a 
substantial relationship between our language and ideas, and the world. For a predicate to 
qualify as a truth predicate over a given discourse, not only must the predicate have a 
certain shape, but the discourse must meet certain minimal standards of assertion. To 
assert is to present as true — so the discourse must be governed by a norm of assertion; a 
truth predicate on the discourse must at least coincide in (positive) normative force with 
this norm of assertion. This provides a guarantee that the discourse is supported by 
sufficient discipline to supply the appropriate semantic content; statements of the practice 
may also have to be able to be embedded in belief contexts — propositional attitudes, etc 
— to ensure this. The predicate must also be of the appropriate syntactic shape to qualify 
as a truth predicate: the Disquotational Schema has already been mentioned and this is 
central. The minimal constiaints on truth — the Platitudes, as Wright calls them ~  lead to 
the Negation Equivalence:
(NE) “It is not the case that P” is true if and only if it is not the case that ‘P’ is true.
So not only must truth meet certain standards of discipline — to ensure content — but 
certain syntactic characteristics must also be present. That the discourse supports negation 
is only one of these; consider the Frege/ Geach/ Hale point about unasserted contexts — 
truth must function in unasserted contexts (such as in the antecedent of a conditional) as 
well as in asserted ones; consequently, the discourse must support implications and 
conditionals.
There may be other features which a truth predicate will possess — a couple of 
obvious features are stability and absoluteness. A statement with a truth value will either 
be true or it will not: there are no half-truths. Truth is absolute in the sense that it does not 
admit of degrees. Truth is also stable — ‘once true, always true’: what is true today will 
be true tomorrow.
Any predicate meeting these features for a discourse will be a truth predicate; 
consequently truth is taken to be a surface feature of grammar, rather than as a deep
-  1 6 2  -
CHAPTER 5: MINIMALISM 
property. Wright’s twin constraints of internal discipline (to ensure genuine content) and 
surface syntax (to ensure content is assertoric) give a conception of assertoric content. 
While Hilbert only explicitly demands that a discourse display features of surface syntax, 
his tacit claim is that if this surface syntax is suitably constrained — by consistency 
requirements — then the introduction and elimination rules given by the axioms will be 
assertoric, and an appropriate truth predicate will be definable over the discourse. The 
claim that Wright makes, that a truth predicate is definable over any practice, so long as it 
is assertoric, is apparently equivalent to the Hilbertian notion that provided that the syntax 
is constrained (by consistency) to support a truth predicate, any collection of axioms can 
have sufficient internal discipline to guarantee assertoric content.
XXX Cognitive Command
Where tmth may be more than minimal will be where the coiTespondence between 
the statements o f a discourse and the facts is more than platitudinous, i.e. where either the 
correspondence relation or the facts them selves — or both — boost the reading o f  the 
correspondence platitude.
Based on an analogy with cameras. Xerox and fax machines, Wright produces the 
following Representation Platitude:
(RP) If two devices each function to produce representations, then if conditions are suitable, 
and they function properly, they will produce divergent output if and only if presented 
with divergent input.
Focusing on the correspondence relation, Wright picks up on Wiggins’ comments about 
convergence. He shows that where a discourse does function in a properly 
representational fashion, divergence is due only to differing input, i.e, through 
vagueness, or differing tolerance to stimuli; else cognitive shortcomings are to blame. 
This demand for convergence, Wright calls rational or cognitive command. A discourse 
displays such command if and only if:
(CC) It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable 
as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards of acceptability, or 
variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will involve something which 
may properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming.
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Rather than pick on particular disputed statements of a discourse, cognitive command is 
aimed at the properties of an entire discourse. How discourses are individuated and 
separated is not apparent from Truth and Objectivity', comedy, ethics and science are 
offered as discourses, and Wright has something to say about the overlap of one 
discourse on another — what he does not do is pick out any criteria to delineate 
discourses: which will affect the cognitive command constraint, as it is supposed to be a 
function of an entire discourse. It is usually assumed that mathematics counts as a single 
discourse — certainly, this is the prevailing trend in the literature. Already the modified 
structuralist position contends that things are different in the mathematical case; that 
certain properties are possessed by parts of the subject, and not by other parts. What is 
important is that these subdiscourses are individuated in terms of general features of the 
statements occurring in them: subdiscourses will pick out a general type of mathematical 
statement.
Cognitive command is a mark of appropriateness of realism for a discourse; a 
discourse may have cognitive command and yet fail to display any other realist 
characteristics. Any discourse with sufficient discipline to qualify as assertoric, will have 
standards of correctness and incorrectness. What does cognitive command add to this? 
Essentially, unless excusable by way of vagueness, ambiguity etc., differences of 
opinion result only from cognitive shortcomings. A discourse which does tolerate such 
disagreement, must allow for there to be means, aside from cognitive ones, for this 
divergence. Usually, the introduction of such non-cognitive features is thought to imply 
that non-cognitive grounds for opinion are acceptable as genuine warrant for belief, and 
that there will be an underlying non-cognitive epistemology.
However, Wright has argued that due to the theory ladenness of observation, it 
would seem that there are ways for scientists to disagree without there necessarily being 
cognitive shortcomings involved. As there are good grounds for arguing that the 
epistemology of scientific practice is essentially cognitive, scientific truth may fail to 
display cognitive command because of biasing factors, rather than because the overall 
epistemology is non-cognitive. These biasing factors are well known in the literature: the 
underdetermination of theory by data; Duhem’s point about the unrefutable nature of 
isolated theories; Kuhn’s discussion of scientific traditions and paradigms, etc. While
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none of these factors directly complicate the mathematical case, Lakatos’ comments about 
methodology are similar. It will be argued in the following section that rather than having 
a negative effect, certain areas of mathematics can be shown to have cognitive command 
because of Lakatos’ notion of a heuristic falsifier, rather than despite his analysis of such 
notions.
Of course, intolerance to differences of opinion is not sufficient to mark a 
discourse as displaying realist features — for the discourse may simply ape these 
characteristics, or by enforced adherence to particular procedures or stipulations. So 
cognitive command is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for a discourse (or 
subdiscourse) to be apt for realist interpretation: it is only where the statements of the 
discourse make an attempt to represent some external state of affairs that cognitive 
command becomes a realism relevant property. However, there is no separate means of 
establishing that a discourse is representational, other than by some means involving 
cognitive command.
In the mathematical case, it looks as if there are good grounds for claiming that 
cognitive command prevails; however, before such a conclusion can be drawn, it is 
necessary to consider whether an a priori discourse could be representational at all. The 
task of the first subsection is to examine this possibility, and to examine whether it is 
appropriate to appraise mathematics it terms of cognitive command; the second subsection 
argues that certain areas of mathematics do indeed possess cognitive command, while the 
third subsection draws these conclusions together.
i Cognitivism, Representation and the A Priori
Cognitive command is a mark of the degree of divergence allowed in a discourse; 
it measures the tolerance for disagreement. Behind the formulation is the notion of 
correspondence: if the states of affairs of a discourse are such that the correspondence 
relation does act representationally, then by the Representation Platitude, the same input 
should always give the same output, across all able participants in the discourse.
When it comes to discussing a priori discourses, the problem of representation 
becomes more problematic; after all, if mathematical statements are simply taken to be 
representational, then this would seem to have realist implications for the reference of 
mathematical statements. It is worthwhile considering the possibility of the
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representational capacity of an a priori discourse. In many respects, moral knowledge is 
like mathematical Icnowledge; for example, it is not arrived at by empirical means but by 
reflection. In metaethics, one of the main questions concerns whether morality is the 
subject of genuine knowledge. Cognitivism holds that moral knowledge is to be had; 
non-cognitivism on the other hand, proposes that factors such as beliefs and desires make 
important contributions to the formation of moral thought. Were moral discourse to 
display cognitive command and were the discourse to be shown to be representational, 
then this would seem to be a fairly quick argument for moral cognitivism. The reverse 
need not hold — for moral thought to be the subject of genuine knowledge need not 
imply that no disagreements are tolerated, for as with science, certain biasing factors may 
cause cognitive command to lapse, without derailing the entire cognitive epistemology. 
(E.g as with science, morality develops in various traditions and under various 
paradigms; no set of rules can ever fully capture all features of morality, and so moral 
theory will be underdetermined with respect to the data available, etc.) Nor need there be 
any representational commitment to some (queer) realm of moral facts.
The case for mathematical cognitivism is much stronger than that for morals — 
but the pursuit of mathematical knowledge alone is not sufficient to guarantee that 
cognitive command will hold. But this need not be the end of the road for this line of 
argument. The nature of mathematical knowledge also has a part to play. Although it falls 
short of a genuine argument for the representational nature of mathematical statements, 
the following quotations suggest one way in which that representational nature might be 
exhibited, and how this would take mathematical reasoning to be more than merely 
logical.
According to Detlefsen, Poincaré, in his debate with Russell, argued that
the inferences of the mathematical reasoner reflect a topic-specific penetration of the 
subject being reasoned about that is not reflected in the topic-neutral inferences of the 
logical reasoner.®
Brouwer argued that mathematical reasoning could never be fully formalised — that the
connection between one step of a proof and another was not a linguistic connection
between propositions, but rather concerns an epistemic connection between judgments.
Detlefsen sums up the difference in the following way:
® Detlefsen (1993), p31
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Logical mastery of a set of axioms ... does not bespeak any significant mathematical 
insight into the subject thus axiomatized. To use Poincare's own figure, the logical 
reasoner is like a writer who is well-versed in grammar but has no ideas for a story. The 
mathematical reasoner, on the other hand, is guided by his grasp of the ‘architecture’ of a 
subject, and his inferences thus move according to a metric determined by this distinctive 
‘local’ design. Sensitivity to this grasp of local architecture is, in Poincaré’s view, the 
key factor separating the mathematician’s epistemic condition from that of the logician.®
It would thus seem that at least some parts of mathematics with a determinate subject 
matter — e.g. structures and systems — make attempts to be representational, and are 
therefore in the market for appraisal in terms of cognitive command.
ii  Proofs, refutations and cognitive command
The conclusion reached in the previous part, that discourse about mathematical 
structures and mathematical systems, display cognitive command, is not without 
problems. The appealing and intuitive picture of mathematics is that once a statement has 
been proven (and the proof shown to be free of errors) then the result stands — and will 
continue to be accepted. Anyone reaching a different conclusion will be taken to have 
made a mistake, i.e. it is recognised that some cognitive shortcoming is involved.
This is part of the picture which Lakatos challenges, specifically in Proofs and 
Refutations y but also in other shorter papers.'” Recall from §IV that his discussion 
concentrates upon a case study of a theorem by Descartes and Euler, that the number of 
faces (F) of a polyhedron plus the number of vertices (V), minus the edges (E), is equal 
to two:
(DBF) V-E+F=2
The proof relies on a method of biangulation: by removing one face of the polyhedron, it 
can be embedded in the plane; then by simply dividing up the faces into triangles in such a 
way that when an edge is added to form a triangle, a new face is created, the number of 
faces and edges increases in tandem. The triangles may then be removed from the 
complex (starting at the outside of the shape) until only a triangle remains: again, this
® Detlefsen (1993), p31 
Lakatos (1976); see also for example, Lakatos (1985)
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removal preserves the relative differences of edges, faces and vertices. Finally, there will 
be one triangle left, so that V-E+F=l; by adding the original face that was removed to 
embed, this gives the Polyhedra Formula as required.
For example, a cube with one face removed can be flattened out onto (embedded 
in the plane) as follows:
triangulating increases edges and faces in tandem, so V-E+F remains constant through 
this process:
triangles are removed one by one from the outside of the shape, so that for every vertex 
and face, two edges are removed, again keeping V-E+F constant. Finally, one triangle 
remains, such that V -E +F-1, and adding the original face of the cube which was 
removed leads to the Descartes-Buler formula, V-E+F=2.
Lakatos has a complicated and unsystematic terminology for the classification of 
the ways in which this conclusion can be refused, which include the famous notions of 
monster-barring and exception embracing. He suggests various types of counter-
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examples to DBF, such as those which are counter to the embeddability claim, or counter 
to the overall result, or both. A square tube — known as the picture frame polyhedron is 
just such an example:
It is neither plane embeddable, nor is V-B+F=2.
But the dispute over the tiuth of the formula does not seem to turn on error — 
there are no obvious gaps in the proof, but there are nevertheless counter-examples, such 
as the picture frame. Lakatos argues that there are two distinct classes of such counter­
examples, or falsifiers as he calls them: there are logical falsifiers — contradictions — 
and heuristic falsifiers. His interest lies primarily with the heuristic rather than the logical 
falsifiers, as he takes these to be responsible for the growth of mathematical knowledge.
The picture frame polyhedron is a heuristic falsifier to the Descartes-Buler 
Formula: it suggests that the heuristic or paradigm which guides the proof is not as 
general as the statement of the proof claims. In §IV it was suggested that there are three 
possible lines of response to such falsifiers:
i the falsifier can be accepted with good grace; it shows that the paradigms upon 
which the proof was based, are not representative of all possible cases. The proof 
contains a hidden lemma which the paradigms satisfy, but other cases do not: the 
response is to amend the proof, making the lemma explicit, and showing how it 
can be extended to cover the new case
ii the proof is fine; the paradigms are also fine as they are: what is at fault is the 
definition of the paradigm cases. By giving a new more restricted scope to the 
result, the proof and the theorem stand, but are no longer general; rather they 
concern a restricted or special case.
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Hi bar the counter-example; it deviates too far from the central paradigms even to
count as an example in the relevant sense.
In the case of the picture frame polyhedron, the responses are therefore:
/ the falsifier can be accepted with good grace; it shows that the heuristic upon 
which the proof was based — polyhedra such as cubes and pyramids — are not 
representative of all polyhedra. The proof contains a hidden lemma concerning 
plane embeddability which cubes and pyramids satisfy, but other polyhedra, such 
as the picture frame, do not. The response is to amend the proof, making the 
lemma explicit, and showing how it can be extended to cover the new case 
ii the proof is fine; the paradigms are also fine as they are: what is at fault is the
definition of the paradigm cases of polyhedra, which are plane embeddable. By 
giving a new more restricted scope to the result, the proof and the theorem stand, 
but they concern not all polyhedra, but the plane-embeddable or regular ones. 
in ignore the ‘picture frame’ type of counter-example; it deviates too far from the
central paradigms even to count as a polyhedron: it is not properly ‘solid’.
In this case, the most fruitful line of response turns out to be z; the result is generalised 
beyond plane embeddable polyhedra to all polyhedra in three dimensions. This is 
achieved by considering which surfaces — if not planes such counter examples are 
embeddable in. For example, the picture frame is embeddable in the torus. Once the 
problems is viewed in this way, it reduces to the problem of how to transform surfaces 
such as tori into planes by way of cross-caps or bridges. A generalised form of the 
theorem is generated, as follows
(GPF) V-E+F=2-2x
Where % is the characteristic number of the surface in which the polyhedron in question is 
embedded: essentially, this is the number of cross-caps, or bridges required, in order for 
the polyhedron to be plane embeddable. For example, a torus is topologically equivalent 
to a plane with a bridge on it: therefore the picture frame polyhedron can be embeddable
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in a plane by adding one bridge: %=1, which gives the correct answer for the picture 
frame: V-E+F=0.
Notice that although this is just one case, the way in which the falsifier is 
developed is completely general — and does not rely on any empirical investigation. The 
presentation of the falsifier is every bit as a priori as the initial conjecture, which makes it 
worth describing such defeaters as a priori falsifiers. Lakatos’ reason for investigating 
such falsifiers is to argue against the foundationalist or Euclidean conception of 
mathematical proof; that the proof begins with true premises describing some clear and 
predetermined mathematical notion, about which a conclusion is drawn by way of truth 
preserving laws of inference. The alternative methodology — which I label the Stratoan 
methodology — does not presuppose a determinate or sharp notion of the mathematics 
under scrutiny. Starting with some basic assumptions, conjectures are made as to the 
behaviour of the system or structure under consideration; a proof develops on the basis of 
that conception of the subject matter. Counter-examples or falsifiers are used to clarify the 
area under investigation, and to sharpen the concepts involved in describing the area in 
question.
One woiTy about Lakatos’ work is that it focuses only on one or two examples, 
and that it is difficult to draw general conclusions from his work. The obvious conclusion 
to draw is that if there is any generality in his work, his findings will nevertheless be 
restricted to that stage in the development of a mathematical theory when the theory is 
axiomatized and the subject matter fixed. The heuristic falsifiers play a role in determining 
how faithful the axiomatic description is to tlie original heuristic.
However, the Stmtoan method is not only used at this stage in the development of 
mathematical theories: it is used repeatedly throughout each stage of the growth of 
mathematical knowledge. Often, ideas from one are of mathematics are applied by 
analogy in another area. For example, the integers form a ring, and much of the early 
work on Fermat’s Last Theorem revolved around treating the integers as a ring. Unlike 
the natural numbers — and by extension, the integers — which can be represented 
uniquely as the product of prime numbers, there is in general no unique representation of 
the subrings of a ring. This caused numerous errors in various early ‘proofs’ of Fermat’s 
Last Theorem: these falsifiers led to the development of the notion of an Ideal: a subring g  
of a ring R  such that for any element of the ring, r.9=9.r ( an example of strategy ii).
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Where an ideal is generated by a single element, the ideal is said to be prime: prime ideals 
can be used to give a unique decomposition of a ring into subrings in the same way that 
integers can be decomposed uniquely into the product of primes.
Any time that a well-established notion — such as unique decomposition — is 
transferred to a different area of mathematics, then the notions of heuristic falsifier and the 
Stratoan methodology are apt descriptions of the process used.
How does cognitive command fit into this? Any discourse displaying sufficient 
discipline to qualify as truth apt, will have to support the negation equivalence and 
standards of correct and incorrect assertion. To show that mathematics does indeed 
display cognitive command, it is not enough to show that disagreements are not tolerated: 
they have to be the result of error or cognitive shortcoming, and it ought to be a priori that 
these are the sources of the disagreement. The counter-examples that Lakatos considers 
may suggest that the response to the contradiction is licensed rather than mandated by the 
facts, and hence appear poorly fitted to meet the cognitive command constraint. By 
looking at the possible lines of response to such falsifiers, it will be shown that this is not 
the case: cognitive command does hold for certain areas of mathematics.
Looking again at the three possible responses to a heuristic falsifier:"
i If the counter-example is taken as genuine, it shows that the original result was 
erroneous. Correcting the mistake consists in finding why the heuristic which suggested 
the proof is not sufficiently general, and then supplying the necessary steps to reach the 
proper levels of generality. In the case of the Descartes-Euler Formula, this involved 
amending the lemma concerning the plane embeddability of polyhedra, and focusing 
instead on surface embeddability: once a polyhedron is embedded in a surface, that 
surface can be deformed into a plane with a number of bridges or cross-caps.'" So the 
first type of response is to find the mistake in the proof and correct it, which leads to a 
generalisation of the original result.
ii If the counter-example is taken as showing that the proof only works for a 
restricted class of cases, this shows that the definition of the items in question is
ambiguous between the intended narrow interpretation and a broader class of readings
" Lakatos (1976) considers further subresponses, depending on whether the falsifiers satisfy the result but 
defeat one or more steps of the proof of that result, whether they defeat both the result and the proof, etc.. 
Without loss of generality, it is possible to consider the three main types of response.
Every three-dimensional manifold can be represented as a concatenation of tori and projective planes. A 
3-manifold is a smooth continuous surface such as a sphere, torus, cylinder, projective plane, or Klein 
bottle.
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which would allow various ‘counter-examples’ to qualify. In the case study above, 
‘polyhedron’ is vague: it may denote all connected figures with straight edges, or it may 
pick out solid figures with straight edges. The counter-examples highlight this vagueness, 
and reformulating the definition of the class of objects which the proof applies to is a 
means of removing that vagueness.
iii The option of ignoring the counter-example is harder to analyse. This is not a 
matter of disregarding the defeater, but disqualifying it as evidence against the result in 
question. If something does not count as a proper example, it cannot stand as a counter- 
example. This could be caused either by an error on the part of someone proposing the 
‘counter-example’, or it might possibly be attributed to differences in personal evidential 
thresholds: what one person counts as relevant evidence may not be what another counts 
as evidence. (This maybe also suggests that there is some underlying vagueness.) In the 
polyhedron case, the picture frame could be excluded on the grounds tliat despite being a 
figure with straight-edges, it is not a solid figure: whether it counts as a polyhedron or not 
seems in pait to be a matter of personal judgment.
This analysis also quite clearly shows that mathematical enors need not be the 
easily spotted calculational errors which resulted in so much red ink when at school: that 
discovering that an error has been made may be an extensive process, and it may not 
appear obvious on which side of the debate the mistake has been made. A similar lesson 
can be learned about he role of vague concepts in mathematics: it is often thought that 
mathematical concepts are among the sharpest and least vague — the discussion of 
Descartes polyhedra formula suggests that this is not always the case. ‘Polyhedron’ is 
ambiguous, or at best vague. Polyhedra are those solid body shapes (in three dimensions) 
of points, line and edges, in the most general case, and are plane embeddable without 
cross caps or bridges in the more specific case. The vagueness arises from taking a 
collection of paradigms or heuristics to be overly general — but this can be eliminated by 
either considering a wide enough class of paradigms or narrowing the focus to only those 
heuristics that are employed in the proof.
The only response which is not admissible is to tolerate the falsifier — it is a 
priori that any disagreement in truth value must be due either to vagueness (strategy »), 
possibly differences in personal evidential threshold (strategy iiil) or due to cognitive
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shortcoming (strategy 0-
iii D istinguishing fea tures o f  cognitive command.
The conclusion reached in §XXIX was that there are three distinct areas of 
mathematics, or mathematical subdiscourses: formal mathematics, structures and 
systems. Unlike theories pertaining to structures and systems, formal mathematical 
theories were characterised as having no predetermined subject matter, and hence were 
truth apt only in respect to the discipline of the syntax and the consistency of the theory. 
In contrast, the areas of structural mathematics and mathematical systems were taken to 
have a determinate subject matter.
At this point, the natural thought is to identify possession of a subject matter with 
the availability of heuristic falsification; lack of heuristic falsification with lack of subject 
matter. The second half of this seems obvious: formal mathematics is only subject to 
logical falsifiers: it should be uncontentious that the only counter-examples to formal 
theories will be logical ones. Recall Hilbert’s sole criterion for such theories was logical 
consistency, and logical falsifiers pick out discrepancies on precisely this level. As 
axioms are chosen in an arbitrary fashion, there is no heuristic fixed by these axioms, nor 
a stiiicture which the axioms seek to characterise.
Less obviously, the presence of both logical and heuristic falsifiers does show 
that certain areas of mathematics display cognitive command, and therefore that they 
functions representationally. Before concluding that both structural mathematics and 
mathematical systems fall into this category, a minor wrinkle must be smoothed out. The 
Stratoan method proceeds from a set of basic assumptions, with no fixed conception of 
the subject matter at hand. Falsifiers are offered to clarify and shaipen distinctions, and to 
bring forth the nature of the subject matter: it therefore appears that applying the Stratoan 
methodology requires there to be no predetermined subject matter — which was how 
formal theories were characterised. Smoothing this wrinkle requires that a distinction be 
drawn between possessing a subject matter, and that subject matter being sharp and 
determinate. When a formal theory is established, there is no antecedent subject matter 
with which the axioms must conform; the establishment of axiom schemes for structural 
theories or for mathematical systems must on the other hand, remain faithful to the 
heuristics already in place. The Stratoan method works on these heuristics: to remove
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indetenninacy and vagueness, and to complete heuristics where they have only a partial 
grasp of generality.
In sum: truth in formal mathematical theories is minimal. There are logical 
falsifiers but no heuristic falsification, and mathematical knowledge will progress by 
Euclidean means alone. Statements about mathematical structures and systems are apt for 
a more substantial notion of truth: such areas of mathematics are open not only for logical 
falsification but also for heuristic falsification. The analysis of the Stratoan method shows 
that any mathematical discourse or subdiscourse supporting this methodology will have 
cognitive command.'^
XXXI Width o f  Cosmological Role
The second realism relevant property concerns the other component of the 
correspondence platitude: cognitive command points to the robustness of the 
correspondence relation, width of cosmological role points towards a robustness in the 
nature of the facts.
The discussion in Truth and Objectivity focuses on the notion of best explanation, 
along the lines developed by Harman. The following is suggested:
(BE) A discourse is more than minimally truth apt, only if mention must be made of the
states of affairs which they concern in any best explanation of those of our beliefs 
within it which are true.
Harman’s discussion of morality seems to imply that moral explanations have a narrow 
scope, and are not suited for the explanation of anything non-moral. Sturgeon’s objection 
to this — that, for example, a rebellion may be partially explained by the injustice of the 
prevailing social order — leads to the conclusion that:
the citation of moral facts does play a part in a variety of ordinary explanatory contexts, 
including some in which the explananda are subjects’ holding particular moral beliefs.''*
Taking this thought seriously leads Wright to abandon the focus on best explanation, and 
It might seem that this should give a simple argument for cognitive command for scientific discourse: 
the simple argument fails as in the mathematical case there is an obvious link from the a priority of the 
Stratoan methodology to the a priority required in the cognitive command constraint — while any use of 
the Stratoan methodology in science would seem to be a posteriori.
‘•‘ Wright (1992), p 193
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instead to consider what features the states of affairs must have in order that appeal to 
such facts should count as explanatory. This shift is accompanied by a second change: 
rather than consider the depth of explanation (whether something can be considered as a 
best explanation) the width or range of explanatory purposes becomes important.
(WCR) Let the width of cosmological role of the subject matter of a discourse be measured by 
the extent to which citing these kinds of states of affairs with which it deals is 
potentially contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, our 
being in attitudinal states which takes such states of affairs as object
The critical question, according to Wright, “is not whether a class of states of 
affairs features in the best explanation of our beliefs about them, but of what else there is, 
other than our beliefs, of which the situation of such states of affairs can feature in good 
enough explanation.”'^
In his discussion of width of cosmological role, Wright refers back to Dummett’s 
thin/thick distinction. Rather than see thick — realist — reference contrasted with anti­
realism or nominalism he suggests that the appropriate contrast is minimalism. There is 
one type of reference, but the facts so refeiTed to, fail to meet the realist’s expectations: 
where these expectations are met, then reference will indeed be to facts as external end 
points. Already comments have been made concerning the links between identifying 
Icnowledge and thin reference, and how these issues connect with the Caesar problem. 
The final part of this section deal with this aspect of cosmological role.
The first few subsections deal with the two ways which seem open for 
mathematics to display a width of cosmological role: through application and through 
direct explanations. The obvious path to explanation through application is examined 
first, and explores the claim that it is the applicability of mathematics which will yield 
cosmological role. This is developed by consideration of the Indispensability Argument, 
with objections to Indispensability briefly examined. The subsection ii deals with the 
weaknesses in the Indispensability Argument, and comments of Frege’s which can be 
taken as arguments for the width of cosmological role of arithmetic. The third subsection 
looks at the strategy involved in Hilbert’s Program, which also supplies an argument for 
wide cosmological role for real mathematics, on account of its explanatory and 
justificatoi-y contribution to ideal mathematics. The final subsection of this section returns 
f6W.,pl97
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to the Caesar problem.
i Application and Indispensability
Cosmological role is a measure of the involvement of the facts from one discourse 
in explanatory roles in other distinct discourses. At first sight, it might seem that much of 
mathematics does play such a role: after all, mathematics is involved in engineering, 
physics, computing, etc. Surely this must be a wide cosmological role which mathematics 
is playing?
This sort of argument is not new — it is very similar to the Quine-Putnam 
Indispensability Argument: that just as adoption of a scientific theory entails ontological 
commitment to the theoretical entities posited by the theory, so too is there a commitment 
to the mathematical entities used in formulating the theory.'” There are a number of 
objections to the Indispensability Argument — for example, Azzouni’s arguments that 
there are profound disanalogies between theoretical and mathematical entities, as well as 
Field’s arguments to the effect that it is possible to refoimulate much of the mathematics 
used in science, so that it appears inside the physical theory, thus avoiding reference to 
mathematical objects — which leads him to claim that tlie only role that mathematics plays 
in science is to speed up calculations and is ultimately dispensable. Thirdly, and more 
traditionally, it is objected that not all parts of mathematics are applied, which has 
sometimes led to the proponents of the argument, recasting it in terms of the potential 
application of mathematics.
It seems fair to say that these considerations lead to the demise of the
Indispensability Argument. Given the similarity between it and the arguments for the
width of cosmological role of mathematics, it might seem that the demise of one would
lead to the demise of the other. But this is not so — the two are sufficiently different that
the criticism raised against Indispensability will not touch arguments for width of
cosmological role. Whether mathematics has or does not have width of cosmological role
is not parasitic upon a realist construal of the theoretical entities of science, and so
Azzouni’s disanalogy does no damage. Field’s arguments can also be sidestepped: he
claims that paraphrasing out the linguistic occurrence of mathematical expressions allows
the conclusion of Frege’s Thesis (that singular terms in true statements refer to objects;
and hence that numerical singular terms refer to objects) to be by-passed. However, while 
" See §111, i and §V, ni-iv
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he may avoid explicit mention of mathematical entities, his ‘nominalistic science’ 
nevertheless continues to use mathematics:width of cosmological role concerns the 
subject matter of a discourse and not just the terms used in that discourse, and the subject 
matter of mathematics is left untouched by reductionist paraphrasing. Thirdly, the claim 
that not all mathematics is applied does not run contrary to the eclectic approach to 
mathematics. Not all mathematics has cognitive command; similarly not all mathematics 
will display width of cosmological role.
Cosmological role deals with the involvement of one type of fact in explanations 
of facts of a different type. Good examples of wide cosmological role include quantum 
theoretic explanations of the behaviour of chemicals, especially the formation of 
complexes such as copper sulphate in water, or the biochemical investigation of DNA 
explaining intuitive notions of genes and natural selection.
It is not clear that mere application of a mathematical theory is sufficiently 
connected with the subjects involved to count as genuinely explanatory. Duhem has 
pointed out that it is never isolated theories which are tested and thereby to whatever 
extent, confirmed or disconfirmed; rather it is amalgams of theories and auxiliary 
hypotheses which are tested. Suppose that some mathematical theory T, under a suitable 
interpretation J i ,  models a physical phenomenon; for example, the theory might be the 
theory of Hilbert spaces and the interpretation that one dimensional rays represent the 
phase space of quantum particles. Where the physics P, plus the theory and the 
interpretation, yield some prediction p, as a function of P, T and 2 i, it will be possible to 
determine whether this fits with the data d, i.e. if
y(P, T, 2i)=p, then it can be tested whether p=d
If p^d , then various components of this complex might be removed. Where another 
mathematical theory T ’ can replace the original theoiy T, with similar empirical adequacy, 
but also such that accommodates the data in question (i.e p ’=d) then the new complex 
<P, T ’, > will be adopted, with no change to the physical theory. While there are no
hard and fast rules as to which pieces are to be removed, when a physical theory and its 
supporting auxiliary hypotheses are threatened by falsification, changing the features of 
the mathematical model would appear to be the least painful option. This suggests that the
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explanatory power of such applications is quite weak; if an argument for width of 
cosmological role is to be sustained for mathematics, or parts of mathematics, something 
stronger than simple application will be required.
i i  Application and Explanation
If application alone is too simple a criterion for width of cosmological role, 
perhaps there is some amended notion which will provide the requisite demarcation. 
Based on Azzouni’s watershed distinction between thin and thick posits, the aim will be 
to single out those contexts where the application of mathematical theories does indeed 
contribute to explanation, rather than the mere organisation of data.
In §XXX, it was argued that formal mathematics has no specific subject matter, 
and that it is apt only for logical falsification. Minimalism about truth suggests 
minimalism about content or meaning; formal mathematics possesses minimal or formal 
content, and the statements of formal mathematics might be suitably described as having 
formal meaning. The areas of mathematics which are more substantially truth apt have 
associated with them a stronger notion of content, and the statements of mathematics 
concerning structures and systems might be said to have heuristic meaning.
Two features of ‘real’ mathematics now become important: the way mathematics 
is inteipreted in application, and the different levels of generality expressed by statements 
of structural and systemic mathematics. The first feature concerns the notions discussed 
above: a mathematical theory T models a physical theory P when T is given a particular 
interpretation The meaning of the statements of T+2i will go beyond the heuristic 
meaning of statements of T; call the new meaning the application meaning of the 
mathematics involved. Logical falsifiers are aimed at defeating the formal or logical 
meaning of statements, heuristic falsifiers those with heuristic meaning. By analogy, an 
application falsifier will be a defeater aimed at the application meaning of a statement. The 
observations made during the 1919 eclipse confirmed Einstein’s theory of gravity, and 
resulted in the replacement of Newton’s Euclidean conception of space by the non- 
Euclidean notion of ‘space-time’. Eddinton’s experiment can be seen as an application 
falsifier to the then standard interpretation (application meaning) of a Euclidean straight 
line as a ray of light. The introduction of constants into a mathematical theoiy, which 
augments the heuristic meaning, can be described in terms of an interpretation, or by the
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use of a bridge theory V The bridge theory supports a map from elements of the 
mathematical structure onto elements of the physical structure, for example, from straight 
lines onto rays of light. This suggest the following hypothesis: application falsifiers lead 
not to a modification of mathematical theories, but rather lead to the replacement of one 
theory by another — in the terminology introduced above, <P, T, 2 i  > is replaced by 
<P, T ’, > The bridge, as it were, is built in a different place. The ease and frequency
by which this construction is carried out in the physical sciences suggests that the bridges 
are temporary and none too substantial. Where the bridge between the mathematical 
model and the physical interpretation becomes solid, this might suggest that a genuine 
explanatory link has been established.
Perhaps it is easiest to see what it would be for there to be successful applications 
of mathematics such that this explanatory connection was not supported. There is a 
wealth of examples from structural mathematics: take group theory for example. It is 
possible to interpret groups so that they represent the interaction of fundamental particles, 
and the properties of animal gaits.
There are 12 types of quark: up, down, charm, strange, top and bottom, plus their 
anti-particles. This can be modelled by a 12 element group, assigning to each place in the 
group structure to a different quark. Every 12 element group has a four element 
subgroup: take for example the group, call it Ç4 , with the instantiation {up, up-i, down,
down-1}. Accurate modelling of fundamental particles by group-theoretic means is 
important, for example, as it enables prediction of interactions which are not achievable in 
quantum accelerators.
Gait analysis also uses group theoretic techniques. Take a simple example: 
suppose a horse starts its step with its front left leg, places its front right and rear left leg 
together, and finishes the step with the rear right leg. Suppose that the two legs which 
move together also land halfway through the duration of the entire step: this can then be 
represented as:
See §XXV, iii and §XVIII, i for a discussion of the use of bridge theories between different 
mathematical theories; the use of such methods to link mathematical and physical theory is entirely 
similar.
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All of the various possibilities — walk, canter, gallop, etc. — are determined by the 
different structures of four element groups. Notice that the gait above: {0,1, /^2, has
the same structure as Ç4 , i.e. {a, a-^,b, b-^}.
So Ç4  has at least two application meanings: one assigns quarks to places in the 
sti'ucture, the other it is the timing of animal leg-movements which take up these places. 
Were each application meaning connected to the heuristic meaning of 0 4 , then it would
be possible to interpret fundamental particle interaction in terms of running horses. As 
there is no such connection, the link between the application meanings and the heuristic 
meaning of group theory must be ad hoc', the same will apply for any structural theory. 
Arithmetic on the other hand, is applied in all cases with the same meaning, as Frege so 
carefully pointed out to the fonnalists.'^
For arithmetic, the heuristic meaning just is the application meaning, and so there 
is no gap between the mathematics and its application. As such, any use of the 
mathematics will contribute directly to explanations, rather than mediated by a set of 
bridge principles. This shows that arithmetic has a cosmological role; what about its 
width? Of key importance here, is the range of discourses in which appeal to arithmetical 
facts is considered good enough grounds for explanation. Frege has an argument to 
suggest that arithmetic not only has a cosmological role, but a very wide one:
the truths of arithmetic govern all that is numerable. This is the widest domain of all; 
for it belongs not only to the actual, not only to the intuitabie, but everything 
thinkable.
Frege (1893), §§91-2 
' Frege (1879), §14; my italics
-  181  -
CHAPTER 5: MINIMALISM 
If Frege is right — and there are no obvious reasons why he is not — then not only does 
arithmetic have an undeniable cosmological role, but the role it plays is of the widest 
scope.
iii Ideal Mathematics and Real Explanations
Rather than think of explanatory role as a constrained type of application, Hilbert 
— at least, Detlefsen’s Hilbert — has another strategy for showing which areas of 
mathematics display wide cosmological role. This is central to Detlefsen’s interpretation 
of Hilbert’s Program, which is usually taken to have purely epistemological goals.
The standard articulation of the Program is that ideal mathematics, such as 
transfinite set theory, is to be justified in its use by way of real mathematics. Using real 
mathematics — such as finite arithmetic — and principles of logic which are at least as 
evident as the rules of arithmetic, the theories of ideal mathematics are to be 
reconstructed. Detlefsen suggests that rather than see this as a purely epistemic 
endeavour, the strategy of taking real mathematics to account for the ideal can be seen as 
bearing an explanatory burden, and hence have consequences for the ontological status of 
the mathematical items involved:
The [substantial] ontological commitments are located not in those parts of mathematics 
which we use to acquire knowledge, but rather in those propositions which are used to 
establish the reliability of the mathematics thus used.™
Putting Detlefsen’s comments into the current context, he can be seen as proposing a 
width of cosmological role (and hence a robustness of ontology) for those areas of 
mathematics which explain the correctness of other areas of mathematics. Those parts of 
mathematics which do not play such a role, will be less than robust. As with the previous 
suggestion that explanation be conceived in terms of a particular quality of application, 
arithmetic is taken to have width of cosmological role.
There are two main factors which complicate this approach. Firstly, Hilbert’s 
Program is generally considered to have been discredited, because it is not possible to 
show even the consistency of arithmetic with the meagre starting resources which Hilbert 
advocated, let alone the consistency of more ambitious areas of ideal mathematics.
Detlefsen (1986), p3
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Hilbert’s initial proposal was quite vague — to explain ideal mathematics in terms 
of the real. Only in 1928 did he propose that real mathematics be confined to the first 
order theory of arithmetic; three years later, Godel showed that Hilbert’s goal could not 
be achieved using such modest foundations. This has suggested to some that stronger 
foundational resources might be appropriate; for example, Takeuti has shown that the 
consistency of second order arithmetic can be demonstrated using real mathematics, if real 
mathematics is taken to include the principles of second order logic." This suggests the 
possibility of a revival of Hilbert’s Program, using a wider conception of real 
mathematics.
Secondly, there are other accounts which have become available since Hilbert’s 
day, which highlight slightly different areas of mathematics as having an explanatory role; 
for example, category theory offers an explanatory account of the success and reliability 
of group and ring theory, based on the notions of category and topos. One way forward 
would be to embrace such thoughts, and take topoi as having width of cosmological role. 
However, this threatens to make explanation relative to the framework in which the 
explanation is cast, e.g, arithmetic has width of cosmological role in the Program, or in 
some modification of the Program; topoi have width of cosmological role in category 
theory, and so on. This threatens to make width of cosmological role available to any 
mathematical theory, given sufficient adjustment in the explanatory framework, a Quinean 
move not in keeping with the rest of the discussion.
Perhaps something of this notion of explanation can be salvaged; meanwhile, the 
account will develop using the notion of explanation given above in §XXX, ii, that 
mathematics has explanatory role just in case heuristic meaning and application meaning 
coincide.
iv  Render unto Caesar what is Caesuras
In his discussion of width of cosmological role, Wright contrasts Dummett’s 
notion of thin reference in connection with abstract mathematical objects, to the realist’s 
notion of reference; he suggests that a happier contrast to realism is minimalism about
Takeuti has shown that provided that cut elimination holds for second order logic, then second order 
arithmetic (2PA) is consistent; see Takeuti (1975) Ch3 §17. The proof he gives is constructive in the 
classical sense. He conjectured that cut could indeed be eliminated from second order logic; his conjecture 
was proven by various non-constructive methods in Tait (1966), Prawitz (1967), (1968) and Takahashi 
(1967).
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mathematics. He claims that what is accomplished in Wright (1983) is the establishment 
of the tenability of minimalism about singular reference:
The irresistible metaphor is that pure abstract objects, conceived as by the Fregean 
piatonist, and the states of affairs, to which, in accordance with the Correspondence 
Platitude, merely minimal true sentences correspond, are no more than shadows cast by 
the syntax of our discourse. And the aptness of the metaphor is merely enhanced by the 
reflection that shadows are, after their own fashion, real.“
Given that Wright takes truth in arithmetic to be minimal, it may seem that he is 
unduly concerned with the Caesar problem: it would seem that in any discourse which 
does not have width of cosmological role — i.e. any minimal discourse — explanations 
could not play a central role, and so Caesar type questions would never lead to 
explanatory confusion. Likewise, in a discourse without cognitive command, there are no 
final answers: settling the Caesar problem one way would to have any priority over 
settling it another way.
Cast in these terms, the Caesar problem marks a scope distinction, similar to that 
drawn in §XXIV between wide and narrow scope. Some structuralists {e.g. Shapiro) 
tend to think of the terms of a structure as only having reference within the local 
discourse, and not fully referential across all of mathematics. That is — adapting 
W right’s terminology — structural discourses have a narrow cosmological role. 
However, this cannot be Wright’s interpretation of the Caesar problem — for he is 
concerned with solutions of the Caesar problem even where the discourse is minimally 
truth apt. His reasons for placing such importance on the questions comes from his 
logicism: numbers are objects provided that Number is a genuine sortal concept, equipped 
with criteria for determining which objects fall under the concept, and those which do 
not.
Wright contends that solving the Caesar problem is a burden for any philosophy 
of mathematics which admits any sort of mathematical item into its ontology; the 
structuralists usual reluctance to solve Caesar-type problems, by contrast, stems from 
their interpretation of the problem as being a matter of scope. This confusion is cleared up 
quickly once it is recognised that there are cogent arguments for the width of 
cosmological role of arithmetic and other mathematical systems, based on the preservation
Wright (1992), pl82
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of their heuristic meaning in application contexts. If Wright’s strategy for solving the 
Caesar problem for arithmetic is correct, then the use of sortal concepts will be applicable 
across the board — that identifying knowledge of any item will be composed of a 
criterion of identity and distinctness among objects of the same sort, and a criterion for 
distinguishing objects of that sort from objects of any other sort. This can be extended — 
although not very far — to include a range of characterising concepts, backed up by some 
fairly general individuating principles.
The items of formal and structural mathematics are suppositions — to ask 
questions as to whether Caesar were identical to one of those supposed objects is to 
misunderstand the nature of the supposition. These items of supposition are a different 
kind of object than Emperors, tables, chairs, beer mugs, perhaps even than numbers. To 
fail to grasp such a distinction would be to make a Rylian categoiy mistake; as Wright’s 
strategy for solving the Caesar problem rests on a sortal inclusion principle, and the 
thought that the possession of identifying knowledge for a range of objects amounts to 
the ability to grasp their ontological category and distinguish them from objects of other 
categories, making such category mistakes would seem a clear indication of a lack of 
identifying knowledge.
This suggests that for formal and structural mathematics, solving the Caesar 
problem is accomplished by the procedures that Wright suggests, but that this 
accomplishment is straightforward. The Caesar problem for arithmetic, on the other hand, 
appears a more pressing worry — because number talk is maximal: Le. it covers all 
discourses. Arithmetical facts appealed to in the course of explanations in all other 
discourses; including history, and in particular, discussion of Roman Emperors. What 
differs across the three distinct types of mathematics — formal, structural and systemic 
— is not the nature of the Caesar problem, nor the resources available to answer it, but 
with the urgency with which an answer is required. While in the structural case, the 
solution is trivial, the method of identifying or discriminating objects is just as with 
numbers; the differences lie in the width of the domain of possible identification. In the 
structural case, the domain is restricted to the items of the discourse, i.e. to other places in 
the same structure. In the arithmetical case, the domain of possible identification is the 
union of the domains of the discourses over which arithmetic displays a cosmological 
role, that is, all genuine objects are apt for identification with numbers. It is this feature of
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arithmetic that makes the Caesar Pioblem so important.
XXXII Problems and Objections
Although Field’s argument, to the effect that the referential commitments of 
scientific theories can be shuffled around so as to exclude commitment to mathematical 
abstracta, may do damage to the claim that mathematics is indispensable in science, it 
does not engage with the thought that although mathematics need not be applied, there are 
cases where, when it is applied, that application is robust enough to allow the citing of 
mathematical facts to explanatory ends.
It would be advantageous if the characterisation of arithmetic as being applied in 
such a fashion that it has explanatory status could be used to undercut Field’s account, 
while accommodating his intuition that, in most cases, mathematical modelling is not 
indispensable to scientific theories. This is the gist of the first section; the second section 
picks up on some of the loose threads that have been left concerning the status of real and 
complex analysis.
i Indispensability and M athematical Explanations
In the light of the discussion of width of cosmological role, it seems that Field is 
at least partly correct in his criticisms of the Indispensability Argument. Where 
mathematical theories are applied in science to model physical phenomena, acceptance of 
the physical theory does not lead to ontological commitment to the mathematical items 
referred to, because that use of the mathematics can be sidestepped by rephrasing the 
theory so that the mathematics appears inside the scientific theory.
However, in cases where the application meaning and the heuristic meaning of a 
mathematical theory coincide, then the mathematics will feature in an explanatory role in 
physical theory. There will be no way to rephrase the physical theory so as to avoid 
commitment to the reference of the mathematical terms, as the explanatory role of 
mathematics is not mediated by the physical theory in the same way that applications are: 
the mathematics plays a role in the explanations independently of the physical theory in 
place.
To show that the heuristic meaning of the theories pertaining to mathematical 
systems is preserved in the application meaning, and is not affected by the interpretation
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of physical theory, two cases deserve closer inspection: firstly, where there is application 
without physical theory and secondly where application does occur via physical theory.
In the first case, it may help to distinguish two kinds of a posteriori knowledge. 
There is, of course, genuine scientific knowledge, with its use of background theories 
and experiments; on the other hand, there is a much more mundane sense of empirical 
knowledge which does not fit into this category. Azzouni, for example, suggests this 
latter kind of empirical knowledge is required for mathematics — one example he gives: 
we write out our computations on paper, and we need to know that the symbols we write 
will not change their shape once we have written them. We might call this sort of 
Icnowledge/o/Æ science.
In the case of arithmetic, a very strong case can be made for it having an 
explanatory role distinct from any physical theory. Simple examples are available which 
suggest that arithmetical explanations are possible when there is no background scientific 
theory. Wright gives the following example of someone tiling their rectangular bathroom 
floor, and finding that they are not able to use a prime number of tiles. A mathematical 
explanation seems in order — the number of tiles required is the product of the number of 
tiles required to tile the length and the breadth of the room, which must be composite 
rather than prime. This explanation is convincing only with a background folk science, 
e.g. the knowledge that tiles do not change shape, nor rearrange themselves when no-one 
is looking.
Secondly, the heuristic meaning of arithmetic is preserved in application where 
there is a background physical theory. The same goes for other mathematical systems, 
although it is harder to demonstrate this. In the case of arithmetic, a very strong proof is 
available: it is possible to show that, based on N=, numerically definite quantifiers can be 
introduced into the original account, or into a nominalist paraphrase such as Field would 
insist upon. As such quantifiers are a logical feature of the language used, they will be left 
uninterpreted by the move to physical theory: they will therefore retain their original 
meaning.
The following translation scheme from numbers to numerically definite quantifiers 
is standard:
If we use the notation ‘3nX to mean ‘there are just n x ’s such that’ and similarly for
other indices, we may write these as follows:
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‘3oxFx’ means that V x~F x;
‘3 ix F x ’ means that ~ V x~F x & VxVy(Fx &Fy x=y);
‘3nxFx’ means that 3x(Fx & 3ny(Fy & y^x))P
Translating number talk into purely logical expressions will leave the meaning unchanged 
by both the interpretation of the physical theory, and the paraphrasing of that theory into a 
‘nominalistically acceptable theory’; this could then be reinterpreted or left as implicit: 
nevertheless the original meaning of the arithmetical terms will be preserved across 
interpretation by physical theoiy.
Therefore, in both the cases where there is a background physical theory — 
which in general has the effect of reinterpreting the heuristic meaning of mathematical 
theories — and where there is no background theory other than some folk science, the 
heuristic meaning of arithmetical statements is preserved across application. As it plays an 
explanatory role in all of these applications, this is evidence of the width of cosmological 
role of arithmetic.
ii  Real and Complex Analysis
In §XX, ii it was argued, following Wright, that ‘equinumerosity’ is conceptually 
prior to notions of ‘progression’, and that grasp of individual natural numbers could be 
achieved without prior knowledge of the structure in which they occur. This was 
contrasted with the case of real (and complex) numbers, where grasp of a number qua 
real number does indeed require structural knowledge. This might suggest that real and 
complex analysis belong in that area of mathematics which has been described as broadly 
structural, i.e. typified by the subjunctive nature of statements and governed by a truth 
predicate satisfying cognitive command but not width of cosmological role.
However, the statements of real and complex analysis appear to be indicative, and 
real and complex numbers seem to be bona fide objects, rather than places in structures. 
This suggests that there may be two structural /non-structural distinctions, which do not 
necessarily coincide. The first distinction is epistemological: it concerns the grasp of an 
individual item as an item of a certain sort. The second is metaphysical: the distinction is 
between terms which refer to objects and those which behave like proper names but rather 
than refer to objects, are devices of generality as a result of the subjunctive contexts in
Dummett (1991), plOO
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which they occur.
It seems fairly uncontentious that the statements of real and complex analysis are 
indicative, and that the singular terms occurring is such statements purport to refer to 
genuine objects. More contentiously, such statements are true; they are apt for heuristic 
falsification,'" and they retain their original heuristic meaning even in application: i.e. the 
truth predicate for such statements, as with arithmetical statements, has cognitive 
command and width of cosmological role. For this reason, and inline with mathematical 
practice — it is worth talking about the real number system R and the complex number 
system C.
The first contrast, however, suggests that there may be two types of system — 
those whose individuating conditions are essentially structural and those whose 
conditions are not. Number is a sortal concept — there are criteria which suffice to 
identify or distinguish objects falling under the concept, and to pick out which objects fall 
under a concept, and those which do not — moreover, satisfaction of these criteria does 
not depend on structural information. Just how much of the concept (Natural) Number is 
available without structure becoming important is worth considering. As shown in 
§XX, ii grasp of individual numbers can be achieved without appeal to structure; it is 
also possible — on the same basis — to conclude that there is an infinity of numbers.
Suppose that NxFx=n; then in order to show that this has an immediate successor 
(i.e. n+ l) it suffices to show that there is some object which does not fall under the
concept F: let this be z. Then Nx(Fx v x=z)=n+l. So if NxFx is a Natural Number, then 
3z~Fz. Moreover, NxFx is a Natural Number if and only if F is finîîéTherefore if 
NxFx has no successor, there is no object z such that ~Fz, so F would be true of
everything. Suppose this is the case: then F is finite and is true of everything; then the 
universe is finite. In a finite universe, all the objects in that universe can be ordered in a 
(finite) sequence. Comparing two distinct objects in that sequence, the objects preceding 
them cannot be put into a one-to-one correspondence, i.e. any two distinct initial
Good examples of such falsifiers might derive from considerations of the development of 
representations of the reals in various branches of mathematics, such as in topology, algebra and set 
theory: e.g. Hausdorff (1914)
“ A concept is finite in Frege’s sense just in case its number is a Natural Number. More formally, where 
N xFx=!/z, and s* is the weak ancestral of the successor relationship:
Finite(F) ** s*(0, n)
See Heck (1997), pp590-l
-** 1 8 9  —
CHAPTER 5: MINIMALISM 
segments will be incompatible: hence their numbers are different. This sets up a bijection 
/  (one-to-one correspondence) between objects in the sequence and the objects preceding 
them, i.e.
(BIJ) /: a Nx (x precedes a in the sequence)
However, included in the domain of /  — but not in its range — is the number of all 
objects in the sequence: so there are more numbers than there are objects. If there are n 
objects, there will be n+1 numbers, and so, as there is no finite number such that n=n-\-l, 
then the domain must be m.
Similarly, it is possible to grasp the concept ‘set’ and to identify and discriminate 
sets witliout first appealing to the structure of the cumulative hierachy; simple paradoxes 
also reveal that there is no cardinality of all the sets.
It seems plausible that the rational and algebraic numbers are also in this class: 
grasp of rational number qua rational number requires only a grasp of the notion of a ratio 
between magnitudes, while recognition of a number as algebraic number requires only 
that there be a polynomial taking that number as a root, and so does not depend upon any 
arrangement of the other algebraic numbers in a structure.
Appreciation of a number as a real number can go through one of two routes: 
i any integer or rational number can be considered as a real number by first
recognising that the integers or rationals are isomorphic to a subset of the reals — but this 
relies not only on structural concepts such as isomorphism, but also on an appreciation of 
the reals taken as as a structure.
a proof that a number is transcendental: for example, Lambert’s proof (1761) that 3t
is transcendental {i.e. not algebraic). Even the simple characterisation of the reals as the 
union of the algebraic and transcendental numbers belies a prior awareness of the 
structure of the reals.
‘Real Number’ is a sortal concept, and provided certain problems with the 
identification of complex numbers can be resolved, ‘Complex Number’ will be one too. 
Yet the information required in order to distinguish those items which fall under the 
concept from those which do not bears more of a resemblance to the structural case ~  
involving characterising concepts plus the underlying individuating properties of set
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theory — than it does to the arithmetical case.
In sum: there seems to be a distinction to be drawn in addition to those already 
mentioned: i.e. between formal, structural and systemic mathematics. This additional 
division is between those systems with a structure based epistemology and those with an 
object dominant epistemology.
XXXIII C onclusions
The central theme of this Chapter has been truth, and the distinction in various 
levels of robustness possessed by the truth predicate over different areas of mathematics. 
Following Wright’s framework, the realism relevant properties of mathematics were 
considered.
The first section (§XXIX) argued for minimalism in mathematics, via Hilbert’s 
arguments for formalism. The central thought here was that where a theory sustains the 
logical syntax, and is suitably disciplined (as is shown, for example, by consistency) then 
this is sufficient to guarantee content for the statements of the theory.
The logical or form al meaning of such statements is augmented in areas of 
mathematics which represent some preconceived heuristic, regardless of whether this 
heuristic be sharp and determinate or not. Characterising statements in terms of heuristic 
meaning picks out a broad type or category of statement, worth describing as a 
subdiscourse of mathematics: this subdiscourse displays cognitive command. The type of 
statements of mathematics which display cognitive command but no other realism relevant 
properties — such as width of cosmological role — belong to structural mathematics. The 
statements of both formal and structural mathematics are subjunctive: they are 
suppositions concerning the possible arrangements of objects. The statements of 
mathematics which pertain to mathematical systems, on the other hand, are governed by a 
robust truth predicate: the subdiscourse has both cognitive command and width of 
cosmological role, as a result of the retention of heuristic meaning across application in 
various non-mathematical discourses.
In addition to this threefold distinction based on Wright’s three levels of 
objectivity, a fourth distinction is to be drawn between mathematical systems grasp of 
whose members requires structural knowledge, and those where prior structural 
knowledge is not required to grasp objects of the system.
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XKXW In troduction
Applying Wright’s realism relevant characteristics — cognitive command and 
width of cosmological role — in the previous Chapter, was relatively straightforward. 
Although the arguments brought in features of Lakatos’ quasi-empiricism (in arguing for 
cognitive command), Hilbert’s formalism (in arguing for minimalism). Field’s 
nominalism (in showing that structures lack cosmological role) and Putnam’s Quinean 
realism (in connection with arguments for width of cosmological role for mathematical 
systems) neither of the realism relevant properties, nor the overall pluralist strategy, has 
been the focus of serious debate in the philosophy of mathematics.
The second set of contrasts which Wright has offered — between truth 
constrained by the evidence or not, and concerning whether truth or provability is prior if 
truth is under epistemic constraint — have long been a major point of contention in 
realist/ anti-realist debates in the philosophy of mathematics. If the realist is coiTect, and 
mathematical objects do enjoy a mind-independent existence, then this might seem to 
support the claim that statements of mathematics are either true or false, so Bivalence 
would hold. If the anti-realist can make her case, then this would seem to require the 
revision of the very principles of logic which underpin mathematics — an unattractive 
option which has led to numerous alternative anti-realist strategies which, while denying 
the existence of abstract objects, accept mathematical practice as is; e.g. Field’s 
nominalism.
Generally the debate between realists and revisionists has consisted in a number 
of philosophical challenges, such as Dummett’s Manifestation, Acquisition and 
Communication Arguments, as well as numerous attacks on the sufficiency of various 
principles of Classical Logic: whether more is required of an understanding of classical 
logic than is given by the introduction and elimination rules alone; the coherency of 
classical quantification, and the lack of harmony between the negation-free fragment of 
the logic and the fragment containing negation. It is difficult to see what would count as 
success in any of these debates — much of the content seems like so much civilised mud- 
slinging.
Rather than concentrate on the traditional approach to these arguments, Wright has 
offered an alternative. He suggests that one way that the contrast might be marked is by 
considering the characteristics of the central concepts of a discourse. If the extension of
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the central concepts of the discourse are determined by best opinion, rather than being 
reflected by it, and providing that not too many of the other concepts involved in the 
discourse introduce complicating factors such as tense, then the statements of the 
discourse will be decidable: the discourse will fall on the Euthyphronic side of the 
contrast. In the mathematical case, this would mean that statements would be true because 
they were provable.
Wright’s Euthyphro is considered in the first two sections, and then after that, 
arguments are put forward to verify that truth in mathematics is indeed evidentially 
constrained. The fourth section looks at the arguments for revisionism; an argument is put 
forward to the effect that it is possible to accept that mathematical discourse is 
Euthyphronic, without embracing any revision of mathematical practice.
XXXV Response Dependence
The main thrust of Dummett’s argument for semantic anti-realism comes from the 
thesis ‘Meaning is use’. By consideration of how language is learned, he produces three 
constraints on language, which do damage to the realist conceptions of truth and 
meaning. Starting from the notion that grasp of meaning is grasp of truth conditions for a 
sentence, Dummett asks what is required to acquire knowledge of such meaning, and 
what it would be to communicate such information. More importantly, he argues that any 
user of the language must be able to show that they have mastered the concepts in 
question, that is, their grasp of the meaning must be manifestable.
The target is the realist’s notion of truth. If there are, as the realist claims, truths 
which are not knowable, or even if it is just that some are not presently known, then it 
may be asked how such statements are understood. The anti-realist bases her theory of 
meaning on warranted assertability rather than on realist truth, following the slogan that 
“meaning is use” , and the principle that all truths are knowable. Wright has suggested that 
based on this principle of truths being knowable, superassertibility is a better contender 
than warranted assertability.
Superassertibility is warranted assertability which is stable and absolute: it is a 
truth predicate only in discourses where truth is constrained by the availability of the 
evidence. Wright’s account proceeds as follows:
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(SA) A statement is superassertible if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant 
for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive 
increments - or other forms of improvement of - our information.*
Wright does not explicitly draw a connection between superassertibility and 
Dummett’s notion of canonical verification, but it is clear that there is some interplay 
between these two ideas." The thought is that a proposition is superassertible if there is a 
warrant for the statement, and there is some — possibly distinct — warrant, which would 
survive any improvement in the state of information. What sort of warrant would survive 
arbitrary improvement? Canonical warrants would meet this requirement, though there 
need be no exclusivity to this. Suppose that the statement in question were ‘NOT P’; then 
this would be superassertible just in case some warrant for ‘NOT P’ would be preserved 
under arbitrary improvement, i.e. that no warrant for P be available given arbitrary 
improvements in the state of information. This accords with the principle of negation in 
intuitionistic logic:
(N) A state of information justifies the assertion of ‘NOT P’ just in case it justifies the 
assertion that no state of information justifying the assertion of P can be available.
This makes the assertion of the negation of a statement P such that there is no 
enlargement of the states of information that would lead to P being assertible. Looking at 
mathematics, statements are superassertible if and only if they are provable; the two 
notions coincide.
The contrast between truth as epistemically constrained or unconstrained is not the
only divide possible. In addition to Dummett’s contrast, one further distinction is
possible. Even if truth is a discourse is constrained by the ability to know, this need not
entail that truth is a matter of projection of that it is determined by best opinion — one
alternative would be to see truth tracked by best opinion: to see truth under epistemic
constraint as a matter of detection, as Wright sometimes puts it. Wright calls this contrast,
between projection and detection, the Euthyphro contrast — after Plato’s dialogue
between Socrates and Euthyphro, over holiness and being loved by the gods. In true
chicken and egg fashion, the argument is whether 
' Wright (1992), p48
 ^ Dummett introduces the idea of canonical verification in Dummett (1977), C h 3//, and connects the 
canonical nature of verifications to proofs normalised by way of Prawitz’ procedure.
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(SOC) It is because certain acts are pious that they are loved by the gods 
or
(EUT) It is because they are loved by the gods that certain acts are pious
In the mathematical case, this suggests the following parallel between proof and truth:
(SOC) It is because certain statements are true that they are provable 
compared with
(EUT) It is because they are provable that certain statements are true.
If truth and provability coincide, the Euthyphro Contrast considers which of the
coextensive concepts has priority over the other. Wright has offered the Lockian
distinction between primary and secondary qualities as an example of different priorities;
he has argued that if the central concepts of a discourse have their extensions determined
by best opinion, then the discourse will be response dependent, and the discourse will be
governed by a Euthyphronic rather than a Socratic truth predicate.
Rather than talk of concepts whose extensions are determined or reflected by best
opinion, it is simpler to introduce some neater terminology. Call concepts extension
determining concepts if their extension is constituted by best opinion; ed-concepts for
short.^ Extension reflecting concepts are those whose extension is reflected by best
opinion; call them er-concepts.
If the central concepts of a discourse are ed-concepts, then there is a natural
tendency to think that the truth predicate for the discourse will be Euthyphronic — if the
extension of a concept is determined by best opinion, then where something is true, there
will be evidence for it, and moreover, it is because of the practices laid down by best
opinion that the concept has the extension it has, rather than vice versa. However, there
may be factors, such as the introduction of tense, or perhaps in the mathematical case, the
degree of logical complexity, even the difficulty in achieving the C-conditions, which 
 ^Holton (1993), p298-9 introduces the term ‘extension determining concept’
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prevent the neat fit between tracking or even projection, so that even though the central 
concepts are ed-concepts, the truth predicate for the discourse fails to be EC. Call as 
discourse where the central concepts are ed-concepts, a response dependent discourse.^ 
Where a discourse is response dependent, and there are no extra complications, then the 
discourse will be Euthyphronic.^
Not everyone accepts Wrights analysis; Pettit for example, holds that response 
dependence is no bar to discourse realism. The first subsection expounds Wright’s 
account of response dependence; while the second looks at the various alternative 
accounts, and considers whether response dependence really is incompatible with realism 
for a discourse.
i W right on Response Dependence
Concepts whose extension is determined by best opinion — ed-concepts — are 
used to generalise some of the intuitions behind the distinction between primary quality 
and secondary quality concepts. Pettit comments that
There are many different account of the distinction between primary quality and 
secondary quality concepts. But one thing is generally agreed. Secondary quality 
concepts implicate subjects in a way primary quality concepts do not. ... [Secondary 
quality concepts] are fashioned for beings with a capacity for certain responses and it is 
hard to see how creatures which lacked that capacity could get a proper first hand grasp 
of the concepts.®
For Wright, the crucial distinction is to be drawn in terms of the response of judgment: 
‘of endorsing what is affirmed by a tokening of an asserted sentence of the discourse’”'. 
Where such judgments — under suitably ideal conditions — determine the extension of 
concepts, then their concepts are said to be ed-concepts. He develops an ‘order of 
determination’ test for the predicates of a discourse. The test centres around provisional 
equation of the following form:
■* In particular, in the mathematical case, the response in question is one of judgement, which leads to the 
occasional use of the term ‘judgement dependence’.
® Response dependence is general description of a way in which a discourse may fail to be apt for realist 
construal; Wright’s suggestion is that the Euthyphro Contrast is one way of arguing for response 
dependence. Every effort has been made to reserve the term response dependence for discourses; however, 
Pettit applies the term to concepts, and some of his use inevitably wears off.
® Pettit (1991), p587 
’ Wright (1992), p i l l
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(PE) (Va-)(C-^((A suitable subject s judges that ipA:)**(p%)
Best opinion depends on the availability of cognitively ideal conditions (else it is not best 
opinion), which are referred to as C-conditions. Where these conditions are met, the 
extension of secondary quality type concepts are determined by best opinion (provided 
that the other features of the ‘order of determination’ test match up).
These C-conditions restrict the cases in point, to normal observers under normal 
circumstances, so that no abnormal factors interfere with the judgment. Colour concepts 
provide suitable examples — take the concept ‘red’. The appropriate provisional equation 
is:
(RED) (Va-)(C“>((A suitable subject s judges that a* is red)*»A is red) 
and the C-conditions are roughly:
j knows which object x  is, and knowingly observes it in plain view in normal 
perceptual conditions; and is fully attentive to this observation, and is perceptually 
normal and prey to no other cognitive dysfunction; and is free from doubt about the 
satisfaction of any of these conditions.®
The order of determination test involves four conditions or criteria: Substantiality, 
A priority. Independence and Extremal conditions. Wright argues that claims about 
conceptual grounding ought to have implications for modality; if the Euthyphronist is 
coiTect, then the provisional equations will not just be true, but must be necessarily true.
But suppose the C-conditions for some primary quality concept — such as 
‘square’ — are given as those conditions which supply everything necessary for a 
standard observer to grasp shapes correctly. This would then let this fit into the ed/er 
classification. But the purpose behind the order of determination test is to give some way 
of policing the intuition behind the primary/secondary divide; therefore C-conditions 
cannot simply be given in this ‘whatever-it-takes’ fashion. This is the Substantiality 
condition:
Wright (1988a), pl5
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C-conditions must be specified in sufficient detail to incorporate a constructive account 
of the epistemology of the judgments in question, so that not merely does a subject’s 
satisfaction of them ensure that the conditions under which she is operating have 
‘whatever-it-takes’ to bring it about that her opinion is time, but a concrete conception is 
conveyed of what it actually does take.
The second condition in the order of determination test requires that the 
provisional equation be knowable a priori. Pettit also takes the a priori status of 
provisional equations to be characteristic of response dependent concepts:
with secondary quality concepts, as traditionally conceived, it is a priori that the 
responses which correspond to them leave no room for ignorance and eiTor, at least under 
appropriate conditions.’
Wright follows a more circuitous route. The status of provisional equations as necessary 
truths would seem to be at odds with the intuition that had the world been different, or 
had humans had different perceptual apparatus, the actual extensions of ‘red’ or ‘green’ 
would be unchanged. (See footnote for an explanation why rigidification will not solve 
this problem).W right turns to a priority to provide the requisite watershed criterion: that 
the extensions of colour concepts are constituted by best opinion ought to be knowable 
purely by analytic reflection of the concepts involved, and hence knowable a priori. The 
following condition is put forward:
it will suffice to classify a class of judgments on the detectivist side of the Euthyphro 
contrast if, while they do sustain true basic equations, complying with the 
Substantiality condition, none of these basic equations can be known to be true a priori.
It is clear that the provisional equations do not provide a reductive-analysis of the 
concepts involved, as the target concepts appear both on the left and right hand sides of 
the biconditional. According to Pettit, this circularity is in need of some explanation; he 
contrasts analytic biconditionals with the sort of biconditional found in the provisional
’ Pettit (1991), p597
We are interested in the extensions of the concepts as they actually are, and not how they might 
otherwise have been. One attractive solution to this problem would be to rigidify on these considerations 
— to phrase the criteria in terms of those who are actually standard observers under what are actually 
standard conditions. However, this route is not available, as rigidification is apt to change the modal 
characteristics of too broad a class of concepts, so that the provisional equations for concepts more 
preferably construed under the primary quality model, turn out to be necessary too.
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equations, what he calls a genealogical biconditional:
With an analytic conditional — with a biconditional taken as providing a reductive 
analysis — we are presented with concepts on the right hand side such that a grasp of 
them yields all that is required for a proper grasp of the concept on which the 
biconditional is targeted: the concept, like that of redness, involved on the left hand side.
With a genealogical biconditional — with a biconditional understood in the light of our 
ethocentric story — we are presented with concepts on the right hand side such that it is 
not so much a grasp of those concepts, but rather a capacity to display the responses and 
follow the practices to which the concepts refer us, that yields all that is required for a 
proper grasp of the target concept.''
On the other hand, Wright has presented concerns that, although there is nothing 
vicious in this sort of circularity — where the same concepts appear on the left and right 
hand sides of the biconditional, there is a problem if unrestricted use is made of these 
concepts in the specifications of the C-conditions and the appropriate response. If it is 
presumed that there are determinate facts about the actual extension of colour concepts 
under standard/ideal conditions, due to using colour concepts in the specification of C- 
conditions for example, then this prejudices the reading of the biconditional, suggesting 
that colour facts are constituted independently of any response, contra Euthyphronism.
To avoid begging the question in this manner, Wright proposes the Independence 
condition:
the relevant concepts are to be involved in the formulation of C-conditions only in ways 
which allow the satisfaction of those conditions to be logically independent of the 
details of the extensions of those concepts.
These three conditions — Substantiality, A priority and Independence, are alone 
not sufficient for the order of determination test to pick out all and only response 
dependent concepts. Consider the case of pain:
(PAIN) (Va)(C ^ ((a judges that she herself is in pain)*»A is in pain)
There is nothing incompatible here with the thought that subjects track (infallibly) their
independently constituted pain states — that is, there is nothing here to rule out the 
" Pettit (1991) p604-5; my italics.
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response independent case. To do so requires a further condition:
it shall not be possible, without reference to human judgment, or the conditions under 
which these will be best, either fully to analyse or at least draw attention to general 
characteristics of the truth conferring states of affairs in such a way that the obtaining of 
an appropriate provisoed biconditional (meeting the conditions of prioricity, 
substantiality and Independence) is a consequence of this analysis or characterisation”
This extremal condition can be summarised in the following way:
There must be no better way of accounting for the a priori covariance: no better account, 
other than according best opinion an extension determining role, of which the 
satisfaction of the foregoing three conditions is a consequence.*®
Looking back at (RED), these requirements can be shown to hold,*'  ^so it is an ed-concept 
concept: subjects’ best opinion serves to determine the extension of the concept ‘red’.
i i  Realism  or Response Dependence
Wright’s conception of the concepts of a response dependent discourse certainly 
undermines realism for the relevant discourse. Pettit on the other hand, does not see any 
such tension, as he presents response dependence in a way that it can be taken to be 
compatible at least, with certain realist motivations, if not with realism per se. It might be 
tempting to think that this stems partly from the lack of Independence or Extremal 
restrictions on the C-conditions in his account, but this is a red herring — the problems 
lie elsewhere.
Realism, according to Pettit, is supported by three interwoven threads: 
descriptivism, objectivism and cosmocentricism;
Realism about any area of discourse involves three distinct theses: the descriptivist 
claim that participants in the discourse necessarily posit certain distinctive entities, the 
objectivist claim that those entities exist, and exist independently of recognition in the
” Wright (1992), pI23-4
*® Miller & Divers (forthcoming), pl2
*•* ‘Red’ passes the order of determination test. Given the C-conditions given above (p7), the provisional 
equation holds a priori; certainly knowledge of the conditions for the optimal appraisal of colour concepts 
is not a posteriori; the specifications are non-trivial and do not rely on the extension of the concept ‘red’, 
hence the Substantiality and Independence conditions are satisfied. The absence of a better account of the 
co-variation of truth and best opinion ensures that the Extremal condition is met.
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discourse, and the cosmocentric claim that learning about those entities is a matter of 
discovery, not invention, so that we may be in ignorance or error about all and any of 
the substantive propositions of the discourse'®.
Pettit puts forward detailed arguments to show that the descriptivist and objectivist claims 
are not damaged by conceptual response dependence; he admits however that the 
cosmocentric thesis is challenged by response dependence. His strategy is to show that 
while response dependent concepts introduce a degree of anthropocenticism, this is not 
out of tune with a more general realist interpretation of any paiticular discourse. He does 
this by considering epistemic servility and ontic neutrality.'® The argument that response 
dependent concepts preserve epistemic servility, comes by comparing secondary quality 
concepts such as colour with an obviously man made concept — Pettit picks the fashion 
of the Sloane Square set.
There certainly is a difference between concepts such as ‘red’ and concepts, such 
as the Sloane’s notion of ‘U-ness’; it is harder to see how the distinction can be used to 
achieve Pettit’s desired effect. He reaches the following conclusion about ed-concepts:
Still, realists can be reassured, for the anthropocentrism involved is of a moderate kind.
It allows realists to think of learning about the entities posited in the discourse as a 
matter of discovery, not invention. In particular, it allows them to acknowledge 
epistemic servility and ontic neutrality, they can think of subjects, even subjects in 
normal and ideal conditions, as having to bow to the authority of an independent reality 
in determining what is what.”
But what is the status of the Sloane’s fashion concepts? Pettit argues that as Sloanes
impose, rather than track, the extension of U-ness, this dictatorial establishment of the
appropriate use of the concept violates epistemic servility: there just is nothing for the
judging subjects to become attuned to. Equivalently, in Wright’s framework, the
Substantiality and Independence conditions can be seen to fail for U-ness, as they do in
the moral case: Sloanes require a certain sensitivity to fashion before they are able to
determine what is U and what is not U, in the same way that a certain moral sensitivity is
required to latch onto moral concepts.
'® Pettit (1991) p622
ibid., p611: “to assert epistemic servility is to say that in seeking out knowledge in a given area we 
have to strive to attune ourselves to an independent reality. To assert ontic neutrality is to say that the 
kinds of things which we succeed in identifying may be kinds that are of more than parochial interest”
” ibid., p623
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As substantial C-conditions cannot be established for U-ness, it follows that talk 
of U-ness will only be minimally truth apt. Only where the C-conditions can be specified 
in a substantial fashion will the discourse be apt for description in terms of response 
dependence or independence. According to Blackburn, response dependent accounts play 
a role in providing voice to expressivist tendencies, i.e. to subjectivist leanings. 
Obviously, the subjectivism inherent in ‘U-ness’ is too strong for a response dependent 
reading of the concept: hence the moderation which Pettit finds in the kind of 
anthropocentrism involved in such concepts. A discourse which is apt for construal in 
terms of response dependence or independence will therefore be more than minimally 
truth apt: provisional equations can be written for most concepts, but supplying 
substantial C-conditions is not such a trivial affair. Where there are substantial C- 
conditions, satisfying those conditions will lead to authoritative projection or infallible 
tracking of a concept; dispute in the truth value of statements in such a discourse will 
therefore be possible only where the C-conditions are met. So cognitive command will 
hold almost trivially for discourses apt for response dependent or independent construal.'^ 
At this stage it is worth distinguishing two different aspects of ed-concepts. One 
aspect concerns the way in which the extension of the concept is determined — it need 
not be that all cases where the extension is determined by a class of experts lapse into 
minimality as in the case of U-ness or morals. For example, the way in which new 
concepts are developed in mathematics might fit this general pattern, yet retain a high 
degree of epistemic servility. The second aspect concerns the correct application of a 
concept, and whether this depends on the responses of subjects under appropriate 
conditions. So rather than think of how the extension of the concept is laid down — 
which would focus on the origin of the concepts — the question becomes whether the 
extension is determined by, or reflected in best practice, which shifts the focus onto the 
use of the concepts in question.
Perhaps this is more easily seen with an example. Pettit describes a substance which is extremely light 
sensitive. Under certain fairly normal conditions it looks green; if the light stimulation is slightly more 
intense, even the addition of an extra quanta of light energy makes it look red. In such cases, further 
detailed examination of the substance in question will not resolve whether it is really red or green — it is 
a borderline case. Pettit claims that there is always the option of specifying that the substance is one 
colour or the other, but this is, as it were, to help reality along. Unaided, it fails to dictate how the 
concept should apply. So disputes will always turn on vagueness, and so cognitive command is trivially 
satisfied.
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XKXVÎ M athematics and response dependence.
There are a number of features of ed-concepts which are attractive in giving an 
account of mathematics. One is the line it gives on ignorance and error; another is the 
modal force of the provisional equations. Perhaps the most compelling aspect is the 
inherent anthropocentricism exhibited in the interplay between explanation and definition 
in left-to-right and right-to-left readings of the biconditional. As all access to mathematical 
objects and concepts is linguistically mediated, there is no sense in which it is possible for 
a mathematician to tune into an independent reality, without positing an intuitional 
epistemology à la Gddel.
i M athem atical concepts and C-conditions.
It seems obvious that if a discourse is to be apt for response dependent analysis, 
then it will be required to have cognitive command; then the Hilbertian formalism 
developed in §XXIX will fail to be response dependent, while structural mathematics and 
mathematical systems will be candidates for a response dependent account.
It is worth considering in some detail why formal mathematics fails to be response 
dependent — other than via the conclusion that it is because it fails to have cognitive 
command. However, examples are hard to find — what is taught in universities and 
schools is substantial mathematics, and it is therefore difficult to come up with examples 
of insubstantial sets of axioms. The simplest route is to take a mutually independent 
axiom set and negate one of the axioms. One example might be to take the four group 
axioms — closure, identity, associativity and inverse, and negate say, the inverse axiom. 
This will be non-empty — semi-groups are defined over the other three axioms, and 
differ in extension from groups, so there must be semi-groups which fail to meet the 
inverse axiom of group theory. Let a grape be a semi-group such that not all elements 
have unique inverses. Then, a collection is a grape, just in case it is judged to be a grape 
by mathematicians:
(GRA) (V a)(C ^((5 judges that a is a grape)*»A is a grape)
There is no more to a collection being a grape than meeting the stipulated conditions; it is 
the brute stipulation of such conditions that makes the status of the concepts so obvious:
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there is nothing to prompt the choice of axioms independently of this stipulation. So 
grape must meet the C-conditions — whatever they are — else it would be a genuine ed- 
concept.
Trying to specify what might pass as C-conditions to feature in mathematical 
provisional equations is not straightforward; most often, C-conditions concern some 
causal state of affairs.'® Recall that the C-conditions for colour were:
s knows which object x is, and knowingly observes it in plain view in normal 
perceptual conditions; and is fully attentive to this observation, and is perceptually 
normal and prey to no other cognitive dysfunction; and is free from doubt about the 
satisfaction of any of these conditions
In addition, certain relatively straight-forward conditions will have to be met — Miller 
and Divers suggest that these should include some simple reporting conditions (that what 
is written or said is not the result of a momentary lapse, a slip of the tongue, etc.) 
Background psychological assumptions will apply, such as:
(C) the speaker is sufficiently attentive to the object(s) in question, the speaker is otherwise 
lucid, and the speaker is free from doubt about the satisfaction of any of these 
conditions.®'
Further conditions include conceptual competence with those concepts directly and 
indirectly used in the statement P, including any concepts involved in acquiring collateral 
information, as well as knowledge of the objects in question, i.e. identifying knowledge.
Factoring these considerations. Divers and Miller give the following C-conditions 
for the arithmetical case:
” Divers and Miller (forthcoming, p23) point out that in Wright’s general discussion, the account of
response dependence moved from consideration of basic equations, such as
(BE) P**(C-> S judges that P)
to provisional equations of the form
(PE) C-»(S judges that P**P)
due to worries over the causal interference of the C-conditions on the truth conferring states of affairs. As 
mathematical facts are causally inert, the discussion could proceed in terms of basic, rather than 
provisional equations. However, as this Involves translating some of the discussion about other 
discourses from provisional equation form into basic equation form, for simplicity’s sake, all that follows 
is cast in terms of provisional equations.
Wright (1988a), pl5
Miller and Divers (forthcoming) p25
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(C*) S meets the conditions on reporting, on background psychological considerations and on 
conceptual competence and x  is presented to j  in a canonical mode of presentation®®
However, it is difficult to see just how grape would fail to meet these conditions — while 
another concept, say group, would pass them.
The difference between these two concepts is of course, that ‘grape’ is an empty 
formalisation: it has no subject matter. ‘Group’ on the other hand, is faithful to a 
heuristic: it was for this reason that structural mathematics was argued to have cognitive 
command, (See §XXX) Adding some notion concerning the grasp of background 
heuristics to the C-conditions is relatively easy: the hard part is the recognition for this 
additional proviso. Satisfying the C-conditions must involve some grasp of the subject 
matter at hand (a generalisation of Divers and Miller’s ‘background conceptual 
competence’ and ‘canonical mode of presentation’ and the usual constraints involving 
identifying knowledge.) Foiinal mathematics fails to satisfy the C-conditions not because 
of some failure of the Independence condition, but because there is not subject matter to 
be grasped in substantially specified C-conditions. Thus the C-conditions should read as 
follows:
(C**) S meets the conditions on reporting, on background psychological considerations and 
on conceptual competence (i.e. S is lucid and has mastery of the general concepts 
involved); s has a grasp of the heuristic underlying x (i.e . S has mastery of the 
particular concepts involved) and x is presented to 5 in a canonical mode of 
presentation
The first step to securing such an account of the respondence dependent nature of 
mathematics, is to show that the four criteria laid down by the order of determination test 
can be satisfied by structural concepts — i.e. the Substantiality, A priority, Independence 
and Extremal conditions will have to be demonstrated.
The A priority condition should require least demonstration, given the a priori 
character of mathematical knowledge. The C-conditions are non-trivial, whether they 
focus on spoken or written reporting of mathematical statements, so the Substantiality 
condition will be met. The C-conditions given will be independent of the actual extension 
of any particular mathematical concept — as the conditions are entirely general and are
Miller and Divers (forthcoming) p30
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formulated for all mathematical concepts. This is good enough to show that there are no 
logically prior assumptions about the extensions of particular predicates, so the 
Independence condition is met.
Meeting the Extremal condition — that no better account of the a priori covariance 
of best opinion and truth is available — is harder to demonstrate. Divers and Miller argue 
that until there is reason to doubt the satisfaction of the Extremal condition, i.e. until there 
is a better account forthcoming, then this condition should be considered to be met. While 
this is adequate for the puipose at hand, I think that muddies the water as to where the 
burden of proof lies. Wright’s entire strategy — proceeding from minimalism to show 
realism relevant properties across various discourses — firmly places the burden of proof 
on the realist’s shoulders. Minimalism is the default. Transferring this lesson to the case 
in point, it is up to the realist to show that the Extremal condition is not met: passing, 
rather than failing the Extremal condition should be the default. If this is so, then 
structural mathematics is a response dependent discourse.
The Euthyphronist now has a foot in the door; how far will this account go? It is 
possible that all mathematical concepts have their extensions detemiined by best opinion, 
or it could be that at some point between formal mathematics and arithmetic, mathematics 
switches side in the Euthyphro Contrast and becomes a detectivist rather than projectivist 
endeavour. The two obvious places where this could happen demarcate structural 
mathematics. The switch could occur — if it occurs at all — at the junction of fom al and 
structural mathematics, or it could be between structural and systemic mathematics, in 
which case it will be interesting to discover upon which side of the divide real analysis 
falls, as like arithmetic it has a wide cosmological role, but unlike arithmetic, notions of 
structure have epistemic priority over grasp of the objects involved.
ii  ArithmetiCj Real Analysis and Euthyphronic conception o f  truth.
It might be suggested that arithmetic and set theory are response independent 
discourses and so differ from structural mathematics in this respect. The first difference 
might lie in the status of the definitions which introduce the concepts, the second comes 
by way of contrast with real analysis. The definitions which introduce arithmetic, starting 
with N=, are formalisations of concepts which are in some sense pre-mathematical. It 
was contended above that the definitions of such concepts must remain faithful to their
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pre-mathematicai precursors. It could be argued that the definitions are established in such 
a way that best opinion reflects, rather than determines the extensions of the concepts 
involved. In the case of set theory, all of the structural concepts in mathematics rely on an 
‘ambient set theory’; the axioms which formalise set theory, therefore, have a different 
status from those which merely serve to define various structures upon sets. This might 
suggest that, given best practice on the part of mathematicians, the concepts of set theory 
have their extensions reflected in the formalisation of the concepts, and are not stipulated 
or determined by this process. Unfortunately, this contrast does not work: it might show 
that relative to some prior conception of Number, best practice tracks the extension laid 
down by that conception: it says nothing about how that conception might have arisen in 
the first place.
To establish the response independence of arithmetic, would at least involve 
showing that the pre-theoretical concept ‘Number’ is rich enough to provide for an 
infinite extension (co) — as, if the extension of any arithmetical concept is to be preserved 
by the formalisation, and the formalised concept has a transfinite extension, then the pre- 
theoretical concept must have a like extension, co: that the pre-theoretical conception 
provides this was demonstrated in §XX, Hi,
It was also argued in §XX, Hi that knowledge of the reals is dependent upon 
knowledge of the structure in which they occur — there is no grasp of an individual real 
number, qua real number, without appreciation of continuity and denseness, which are 
both holistic features. This priority of structural concepts separates real analysis from 
arithmetic, despite the similar width of cosmological role that they enjoy. This 
epistemological difference might be used to argue for a separation based on the ed-nature 
of the concepts of real analysis, contrasted with the supposed er-concepts of arithmetic.
As the concepts of real analysis are properly structural, provisional equations for 
real analysis meet the criteria for the order of deteimination test in the same fashion as 
other structural concepts do. Notice that although there is a fairly clear conception of the 
continuum, any characterisation of the continuum only ever captures one particular aspect 
of it — as a topological space, a complete ordered field, a smooth manifold, a dense 
spread of Cauchy convergent sequences, etc.. While there might be an argument for the 
response independence of the overarching concept of the continuum, any of the 
articulations of the concept is a stipulation which determines the extension of the formal
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concept, making it response dependent.
Y et in spite of these features — the extension reflecting nature of formalisations of 
the concept ‘Number’, and the contrast with the concepts of real analysis — the concepts 
of arithmetic wind up on the response dependent side the order of determination test.
As with structural concepts, the A priority, Independence and Substantiality 
conditions are easily satisfied, which leaves the Extremal condition as the decisive factor. 
Explaining the co-variation of truth and proof in arithmetic can be done by considering 
what counts as understanding or grasp of mathematical concepts. As mentioned above. 
Divers and Miller only briefly consider the Extremal condition; they argue that as there is 
no better account forthcoming, arithmetical concepts will satisfy the Extremal condition. 
Perhaps a (slightly) better argument can be offered.
One of the central features of the neo-Fregean account is the emphasis on the 
abstractness of numbers and the importance of the role of language — in short, that all 
access to mathematical objects is linguistically mediated. Were an account of content to 
show that meaning is response dependent, then given the lack of external contact with 
mathematical objects it would seem inevitable that all (substantial) mathematical concepts 
are ed-concepts.
In his response to Kripke’s meaning-scepticism, Wright attacks the reductive 
conception of meaning which Kripke adopts.^ Arguments concerning the status of 
intentions are parallel to those about meanings; Wright offers an account of intensions 
based on response dependence, which accommodates both the authoritative, non- 
inferential aspects of intentions, as well as their disposition-like features. So if intention is 
response dependent — and Wright’s account is persuasive on that point — then so too 
will meaning be response dependent; in which case arithmetic will be to.
Miller’s succinct gloss of this debate is followed by a sketch for an argument for 
the response dependence of concepts such as ‘means addition by perhaps a clearer 
argument for the response dependent nature of arithmetic comes from Azzouni’s analysis 
of linguistic mishaps. (§V, §X, iii). Recall that A-misfaaps involve confusing one
object with another; ‘A ’-mishaps on the other hand, involve confusing a name or 
description with another. The analysis of errors led to the conclusion that mathematical 
expressions display A-infallibility: mishaps where they do occur, such as confusing 5 and
Wright (1989)
See Miller (forthcoming), ppl58-64
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the fifth root of 625, either involve some ‘A ’-mishap, or else the subject in question was 
under some momentary lapse in concentration, or are judged on the basis of their error 
not to have a proper grasp of the concepts involved. In other words, mishaps only occur 
when the C-conditions are violated.
Formal mathematics fails to be response dependent because of the lack of 
underlying heuristic; C-conditions cannot be specified and so the ‘discourse’ is merely 
minimally truth apt. Discourse about structures and systems does support provisional 
equations with substantial C-conditions; in the stmctural case, these C-conditions are met 
in a relatively straightforward fashion. Although establishing that the C-conditions for 
arithmetical concepts are met is a more complex affair, they nevertheless do meet these 
requirements. Substantial mathematics — structures and systems — is a subject which is 
response dependent.
i ii  M ind independent objects and ed-concepts.
Pettit has claimed that response dependence is compatible with the realist’s 
descriptivist and objectivist claims. Descriptivism entails little more than the minimalist’s 
claims about the connection between language and truth conferring states of affairs; 
objectivism, on the other hand, comes in three different strengths — relative to minimal, 
substantial and robust states of affairs.
In their recent account of the response dependence of mathematics. Miller and 
Divers have argued that response dependence is compatible with arithmetical platonism, 
i.e. with a conception of mathematical objects as mind-independent. Possibly this could 
be equated with the claim presented in the previous Chapter that arithmetic displays 
realism relevant properties, i.e. mind independence need not go beyond the claim that the 
objects in question, have a wide cosmological role. Their argument runs by differentiating 
two notions of mind dependence. The first notion of mind dependence comes entirely 
from the response dependence of the associated concepts. They call this the Mi sense of 
mind dependence, and offer the following definition:
(Ml) if D is response dependent, then D-truth is mindi-dependent.
According to Divers and Miller, the notion of mind dependence that the platonist objects
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is a conception of arithmetical truth that entails the counterfactual dependence of the 
existence of numbers on the existence of (any) minds — i.e. a conception of 
arithmetical truth that entails that, if there had been no minds then there would have 
been no numbers, or that if minds had been different then numbers would have differed 
in their intrinsic properties.®®
Mind2-dependent is the counterfactual dependence of the existence of numbers on minds. 
They argue that response dependence ought to be unpalatable to the platonist only if 
mindi-dependent entails mindg-dependent, as it is only mind 2-dependent that the platonist 
takes issue with.
As the provisional equations provide truth conditions only for the cases where the 
C-conditions are realised, they give no guide at all to evaluating the truth conditions for 
the cases where they are not met: so a response dependent account will be silent on the 
question of the counter-factual dependence of numbers on minds, unless there are 
collateral factors which decide this issue.
While a response dependent account of arithmetic does not foreclose on the 
possibility of platonism, it does raise a number of problems. Aside from the usual 
problems in establishing the response dependent account for colour, there are no 
problems concerning the response dependence of colour and the mind independence of 
the bearers of those colours: they enjoy some properties (primary quality properties) 
which make this mind independence explicit. In the mathematical case, if any of the 
properties of mathematical objects are describable in terms of ed-concepts, then all such 
mathematical concepts will be ed-concepts, and hence mathematical discourse will be 
response dependent. This raises questions as to how there could be any grounds for 
claiming mind independence for mathematics, as unlike the colour case, there is no 
external handle on the bearers of the properties in question.
XX XV II Epistemic Constraint
The account given in the previous section to show the Euthyphronic nature of
mathematical discourse, did not focus too tightly on individual mathematical concepts, but
rather concentrated on more general features, such as the ways in which these concepts
are introduced by way of axiomatic definitions, and are supported only by linguistic 
®® Miller and Divers (forthcoming) p43
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contact with the ‘mathematical facts’.
Showing that the central concepts of a discourse have their extensions determined 
by best opinion, rather than reflected by that opinion, is not sufficient to show that truth 
in that discourse is evidentially constrained, for as has already been mentioned, there may 
be other concepts, aside from those central to the discourse, which introduce an element 
of indeterminacy. Tense is one example — even when the central concepts of a discourse 
are determined by best opinion, and the statements which involve these concepts alone, 
are decidable, there may be other statements in the discourse, say those involving some 
object falling under one of these central concepts, at some future date in time, which may 
nevertheless be undecidable. Moreover, the C-conditions may not be decidable: there may 
be no method for deciding in any case, whether the conditions have been met or not, and 
it is only when the C-conditions are met, that the provisional equations provide truth 
conditions for the concepts they concern.
Often it may prove fruitful to consider whether there is some restricted class of 
concepts of a discourse for which falling on the projectivist side of the order of 
determination test does entail the appropriateness of the EC thesis for the truth predicate. 
Y et, if the previous analysis is correct, all mathematical concepts — including those 
involved in structural mathematics, in real analysis and in arithmetic — will fall on the 
Euthyphronic side of the contrast. In spite of this, there do seem to be factors, such as 
logical complexity, which result in mathematical statements being undecidable.
In the first two parts of this section, two main classes of supposedly evidentially 
transcendent statements are considered: those which have open truth values, such as 
Goldbach’s conjecture, and those such as the Continuum Hypothesis, which have been 
shown to be independent of the best theories available to assess their truth. The third part 
collates these various arguments and by reflecting on the application of mathematical 
concepts such as ‘prime’, concludes that mathematical discourse is indeed EC.
i Open sentences
The first case of apparently evidentially transcendent truths are those, such as 
Goldbach’s conjecture — that every even number is the sum of two primes — which are 
often thought to be true, but for which no proof exists. For a long time, Fermat’s last 
theorem enjoyed this status; he famously wrote in the margin of Backet’s Diophantus that
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he had a marvellous proof that there is no integer solution to the generalised Pythagorean 
equation (for ns3) — but that the was not enough room for him to write it out. The 
generalised form of Pythagoras theorem — the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the 
sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right angle triangle — is the equation, with 
integer coefficients:
(PER) =
The grasp of these two conjectures is based on local examples; it is easy to be 
convinced that Goldbach’s conjecture is valid, merely by running through a handful of 
even numbers and discovering the pairs of primes which sum those numbers. Fennat’s 
last theorem has always been more contentious, but based on the same reasoning. The 
empirical test — checking that any set of numbers produced at random do not fit the 
formula — is intuitively weaker, as there are more cases to take in. For Goldbach’s 
conjecture to be proven, would require some way of producing, for every even number, 
the two component primes. The method by which the meaning of the conjecture is 
grasped (empirical induction on particular even numbers) cannot be expanded to produce 
the conclusive warrant required by mathematical proof, simply because there is no way to 
run through all of the even numbers. Similarly in the case of +y« = the inductive 
warrant — gained by plugging in numbers — cannot be extended to produce a conclusive 
warrant, as once again, there are infinitely many cases to consider. With both the Fermat 
and the Goldbach conjectures, the initial grasp of the problem is given by some method 
which, were it possible to complete, would provide warrant of the required standard to 
confer mathematical truth. If this characterisation is accurate — that the meaning of open 
results is initially grasped by way of uncompletable warrants — then this will explain the 
general attitude that such open sentences are valid. The meaning is given by a defeasible 
warrant, and they are seen to be unprovable, because that warrant is uncompletable.
It is hai'dly surprising that Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s last theorem is reached by an 
entirely different route. Like many modem attempts to solve the problem, it starts with the 
thought that without loss of generality, all that is required is to show the case for n=4 and 
where p  is an odd prime. Then, by the prime decomposition theorem, for any 
composite n, the solution is obtained by considering the behaviour of its prime
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components. Rather than tackle the problem directly, Wiles uses elliptical curves, i.e. a 
curve of the form:
(ELL) = Ax +Bx +Cx+D
for integer values of A, B, C and D.
Frey had earlier shown that if it is assumed that there is some odd prime p, such 
that xP + yP=^zP, then this would give the following elliptical curve:
(FREY) y^ = X (x -  a^){x+b^)
This strategy, proposed by Karl Rubin, is to show that the Frey curve is not elliptical and 
hence that the assumption that there is an equation of the foim x p  + y p  =  zP  is false. One 
route to this is through a result due to Richard Taylor, that all elliptical curves are 
modular. There is a famous conjecture, the Taniyana-Shimura conjecture, that the Frey 
curve is not modular. This is essentially the step which Wiles supplied, to prove Fermat’s 
last theorem.
The proof takes a route that is wildly divergent from that suggested by the 
intuitive method of completing the initial warrant. To argue that there are evident 
ti'anscendent truths is to argue — in the case of open results at least — that the completion 
of the inconclusive warrant is the only route to proving the result. Optimism on the other 
hand, is the attitude that there is always some other proof strategy available. If optimism 
is correct, then üuth in mathematics is evidentially constrained.
i i  Undecidable results.
Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is the claim that the cardinality of the 
continuum, c, is the first cardinality greater than that of the natural numbers, i.e. c=Ri.
Godel showed that CH is consistent with the axioms of ZF, by taking Zermelo’s 
cumulative heirachy V and interpreting it in terms of the sets which are definable at each 
level of the hierarchy, to produce a constructive hierarchy L. The axioms of ZF under the 
interpretation that Y=L, are consistent with the Continuum Hypothesis. In 1963, Cohen
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showed that the negation of CH is consistent with the axioms of ZF, thereby showing 
that the Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of ZF. Some have argued 
that despite its undecidable status, CH nevertheless has a truth value, and have pushed for 
its retention or rejection. Others have argued that there may be no determinate answer — 
that the best formalisation of set theory, i.e. ZF, nevertheless underdetermines specific 
results, such as CH.
There is a third line of response, due indirectly to Zermelo himself, which 
highlights the difficulties in looking for an absolute answer to the validity of CH. 
Zermelo’s 1930 paper was a response to Skolem’s arguments for set theoretic relativism. 
Skolem had shown in 1922, based in a result due originally to Lowenheim, that any first 
order theory with infinite models must have a model with cardinality co. Set theory is such 
a theory, so all of set theory must have a model with cardinality co. However, set theory 
involves non-denumerable sets, such as p (co). In fact, using an extension of these 
results, it is possible to show that if a first order theory has infinite models, then it has a 
model in every infinite cardinality. Relativism enters into the picture because there is no 
way to differentiate between these models using a first order language. Zermelo’s 
response was to give a way of differentiating between these various models, using a 
second order language. Each model of V can be given uniquely in teims of the number of 
urelements and the structure of the limit ordinals. This solves the problems posed by 
Skolem’s work — to differentiate the different models of set theory — but it also helps to 
reveal the situation with CH. In some models of ZF, where V=L, the hierarchy is 
countable, i.e. lcol=M, in which case, the Continuum Hypothesis fails. In other models,
lo)l<lp (w)l and there is so set x , such that l(ol<ljcl<l|?(co)l, so CH holds. So in every 
model, CH has a determinate answer — but this answer is, as Cauchy might have put it, 
‘piecewise’. There is no uniform answer to CH, as it varies depending on the structure of 
the model in question.
However, in each case, discovering whether CH holds or fails, may not be a 
simple matter — it may require much ingenuity and technical finesse on the part of the 
mathematician. The purpose of this discussion of CH was to clear the way for an account 
of epistemic constraint for mathematical truth. Diffusing the problems of finding a single 
answer to CH does not by itself, solve all of the problems in this area. If truth is to be 
taken to be genuinely constrained by the availability of evidence, then the burden of proof
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is to give some guarantee that CH will provably hold or provably fail in each model of 
CH, Le. that it will always be possible, given any particular model, to determine whether 
CH holds or fails to hold in that model. This is not the place for detailed exposition of set 
theory — but if such an account can be given, then independent statements such as CH, 
need not stand in the way of an account an evidentially constrained conception of truth in 
mathematics.
Hi M athematical proof, ed-concepts and C-conditions
The thought that is suggested by the examples of Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem and the Independence of CH, is that proof is not a matter of tracking 
mathematical facts, but that the proofs in question determine the mathematical facts, 
laying down what constitutes a proper extension of the mathematics already practised. In 
the case of open sentences, one proof procedure —- admittedly mathematically 
substandard — establishes the truth of claims such as Goldbach’s conjecture. With 
Fermat’s last theorem, an entirely different procedure is required to establish the result 
with any stability. With CH, one procedure involving reinterpretation of the language of 
set theory to produce a constructive model, results in showing the consistency of 
ZF+CH. Cohen’s method of forcing is required to show that ZF+-CH  is also consistent.
One route out of the impasse would be to argue for the priority of one method over 
another; alternatively Zermelo’s approach can be taken, as suggested above.
This gives a certain perspective on proof: take a concept such as ‘prime’. If this 
picture is correct, being prime is not a matter of tracking certain mathematical facts, but is 
the result of being judged to be prime, for example, by application of the sieve of 
Eratosthenes. Therefore, where there is no way to implement this procedure, then there 
will be no notion of primeness: take for example the rational numbers — there is no 
obvious notion of prime applied in such cases.
In discussion about any facts about inter-structural identification, Resnik and 
Shapiro both are of the opinion that questions, say about set theoretic interpretations of 
arithmetic, are settled by fiat. Before any such stipulation, the answer is indeterminate. 
This sits uneasily with their realism, yet this indeterminacy is an expected feature of 
response dependent discourse.
How would the concept ‘prime’ be extended, so that it covers the rationals too?
-  2 1 5
CHAPTER 6: EPISTEMIC CONSTRAINT 
One route might be to consider those items which can only be divided by themselves and 
by units — this notion is used in abstract algebra to talk about well behaved subrings and 
sublattices, such that they have no substructures other than the unit structure and 
themselves: they are called prime ideals. Extending the concept ‘prime’ to to rational 
numbers however, had been achieved by considering another feature of prime numbers 
— they offer a unique decomposition of any natural number. The problem arose in the 
following way: in trying to solve Fermat’s last theorem, Euler produced two proofs for 
the case %=3. His 1753 proof, contained in a letter to Goldbach, is correct; however his 
published proof (1770) contains a fallacy.
He assumed that where p  and q are co-prime — i.e. when they do not divide each 
other a whole number of times — then at a certain step in the proof, he shows that
=(p+ qy/-3)(p- qV-3)
by assuming that these behave as integers and that unique decomposition would hold. But 
notice that
4=2.2 but also 4=(1+ /•3)(1- V-3)
so unique decomposition fails.
The solution is to characterise the units which occur in such integral domains; then 
an element a is said to be irreducible if it is neither zero nor a unit, and has no proper 
factors. If the domain in question is the Integers (Z) then the irreducibles are the natural 
number primes and their negatives.
There is another way to define an extension to the concept prime: in an algebraic
structure such as a ring R . p ^ R  is said to be prime if it is not zero, not a unit, and i§?
divides a .6, then either p divides a ox p divides b. A prime element will always be 
irreducible, but the converse will not always hold: it is possible to characterise ring 
structures where the converse does hold, as unique factorisation domains.
By extending the procedures by which a number is judged to be prime, the 
concept — and associated concepts such as ‘irreducible’ — can be used in new areas. In 
each case, the extension of the concept is determined by how the mathematician thinks the
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previous concept ought to be extended into the new area, as is the case when ‘prime’ is 
extended so as to apply to algebraic cases (and therefore also to systems which exhibit 
such structure).
Recall that the C-conditions for mathematical discourse put forward by Divers and 
Miller were as follows:
S meets the conditions on reporting, on background psychological considerations and on
conceptual competence and x  is presented to S in a canonical mode of presentation.^
Consider the case of a mathematician wanting to apply the concept ‘prime’ to a certain 
element of a structure S ,  similar to a ring structure, but suitably different from it so that as 
yet no one has defined the concept for structure S .
Both the concepts involved in characterising the structure s ,  and the paradigms 
upon which any extension of the concept ‘prime’ are based, are sharp — there is no 
vagueness involved, nor will there be borderline cases where there is debate as to the 
applicability of the concept. Rather, until the concept ‘prime’ is extended to cover this 
new case, then there will be no clear content to the C-conditions. The indeterminacy 
arises out of the slack available due to the different levels of idealisation used to cash out 
the clauses ‘S meets the conditions on ... conceptual competence and x  is presented to S 
in a canonical mode of presentation’. What counts as conceptual competence in the use of 
‘prime’ in an area where it has hitherto never been applied? Or what is to count as a 
canonical mode of presentation of an element x of structure S? Wright has suggested that 
how lax or extreme the indeterminacy will depend on the degree of idealisation used in the 
specification of the C-conditions; again, this will affect whether meeting the C-conditions 
is decidable. As mentioned above, if meeting the C-conditions are not decidable, then this 
may corrupt the Euthyphronic nature of the discourse and allow room for the truth 
predicate to be bivalent, without this having the realist implications Dummett has 
associated with hi valence.
Treating mathematical concepts in this fashion — concentrating on the ways in 
which the extensions of the concepts are determined, rather than by considering the role 
of best practice in the routine use of such concepts —■ does only show the relative 
response dependence of, as in the case above, prime in arithmetic with respect to prime in
Divers&Miller (forthcoming), p30
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Other areas of mathematics. However, the arguments above (§XXXVI, ii) show that the 
central concepts of the base class are ed-concepts, and so arguments of this form are not 
suspect.
The moral to draw from all of these consideration is that the response dependence 
analysis of mathematical discourse allows for a number of features to be accounted for, 
including the indeterminacy of mathematical concepts in new areas, as well as giving 
some insight into the ways in which new fields of mathematics are opened up, and how 
concepts are extended to cover these new cases.
XXXVIII  R evisionism
Dummett has argued that it is meaningless to talk of statements having verification 
transcendent truth conditions. His motivation is summed up by the slogan ‘meaning is 
use’; if there is no way to establish the ti'uth or falsity of a statement, then there is no way 
to evaluate the contribution each part makes to the trath value of the statement, and so the 
notion of there being such statements, makes no sense.
Bivalence is usually taken as the motivating factor in any account of evidence- 
transcendence truths; if every statement is determinately true or false, then the stoiy runs 
that there may be true statements which we might never know to be true. Hence Dummett 
takes Bivalence to be the hallmark of realism, and he similarly takes the rejection of 
Bivalence to be crucial to an anti-realist account. The Law of Excluded Middle and 
Classical Logic quite generally are taken to be the usual consequences of rejecting 
Bivalence, due to the truth functional account of connectives based on the Bi valence of 
truth. If, on the other hand, truth is taken to be constrained by the evidence, then where a 
statement is true, there will be evidence for it. It may not, however, always be in our 
power to utilise that evidence, and so there will be statements which have been proven, 
those disproven, and those as yet, which have no truth value. This is an epistemic 
constraint (EC) on truth.
Adopting an EC notion of truth prompts revisions — to classical logic and hence 
to classical mathematics. The task at hand is to show how, despite the obvious 
connections between response dependence and EC, it Is possible to have an account of 
mathematics as response dependent, without having to accept revisionist consequences. 
The first subsection sketches Dummett’s arguments for revisionism; the second considers
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a number of objections to revisionism, including a line which accepts that the arguments 
do force a change in logic, but claims that this then only forces a change in mathematics 
when classical mathematics is misdescribed. The third subsection considers this 
mischaracterisation in greater detail, and explores the thought that ‘finite’ is an ed- 
concept, and hence, may possess a certain indetenminacy.
i D um m ett
In his first major defence of intuitionism, Michael Dummett bases the adoption of 
intuitionistic logic upon a theory of meaning. He acimowledges that this leads him away 
from Brouwer’s work, for Brouwer took it that the activity of the mathematician is quite 
distinct from the language in which mathematics is expressed."^
He concentrates his account on the logical basis of intuitionism, rather than 
offering any justification for some of the other peculiarities of Brouwer or Heyting’s 
constructivism, such as free choice sequences.
Any justification for adopting one logic rather than another as the logic for mathematics
must turn on questions of meaning.^
There are a tightly knot bunch of considerations which Dummett advances, 
stemming from the central thought that meaning is use, i.e. meaning determines and is 
exhaustively determined by use. The considerations raised include the communication of 
meaning, the manifestation of meaning and the acquisition of meaning. It must be 
possible, according to Dummett, to communicate all the meaning which a statement has, 
so that any representation of meaning by symbols or formula, must be able to convey the 
meanings solely by the use made of the symbols. The entire content of the meaning must 
be able to be transmitted.
The flip side of this is that it must be possible to tell if someone knows the 
meaning of a particular symbol or formula. This need not be a linguistic demonstration — 
for such could be circular. Instead, Dummett argues that it must be possible to give
” Wittgenstein is reputed to have attended Brouwer’s lecture ‘Mathematics, Science and Language’ 
(Brouwer (1929)) in Vienna in 1928, where he put forward the view that the activity of the mathematician 
is a solitary endeavour, and that the expression of mathematics in language is only the final stage in the 
mathematical process. Might the private language argument have started out as a response to these 
thoughts of Brouwer’s?
“ Dummett (1973a), p97
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criteria whereby someone meeting those criteria is taken to have mastery of the meaning. 
This depends on there being an observable difference between the capabilities of those 
who understand particular meanings, and those who do not.
Another strand in his argument is that it has to be possible to learn or acquire 
mathematical meanings:
To suppose that there is an ingredient of meaning which transcends the use that is made 
of that which carries the meaning, is to suppose that someone might have learned all 
that is directly taught when the language of a mathematics theory is taught to him, and 
might then behave in every way like someone who understands the language, and yet 
not actually understand it, or understand it only incorrectly. But to suppose this is to 
make meaning ineffable^®
The argument from ‘meaning is use’ to the revision of classical logic, is brought about by 
the claim that each statement of mathematics must have determinate individual content — 
content cannot be shared by implicit connections between statements in a holistic 
fashion.^"
In a simple setting, deciding whether something, say x, has a property F, is a case 
of running through all instances of F, or checking the relevant objects to see which, if 
any, are F. In cases where there are a finite number objects, the status of all vague or 
borderline cases can be stipulated, so there are no exceptions to the Law of Excluded 
Middle. In general, where the domain is decidable, and the discourse is EC, then truth 
will indeed comply with the Bivalent conception of truth which accompanies the Law of 
Dummett (1973a), p99
Wright puts the argument from EC to logical revisionism in the following way (1992, pp41-2)
(EC) If P is true, then evidence is available that it is so
Suppose that there is no evidence for P, then by contraposing on P, it is not the case that P is true.
(NE) ‘ "It is not the case that P” is true if and only if it is not the case that “P” is true.
By NE, it is not the case that P is true leads to the truth of ~P. So the unattainability of evidence for P 
confers truth on -P , which would appear contrary to the central intuitionist claim that there may be some 
statements for which there is no evidence — or insufficient evidence — to decide the issue one way or 
another. Wright points out that:
(A) If no evidence is available for P, then evidence is available for its negation 
which is a consequence of EC + NE, requires
(B) Either evidence is available for P, or it is not 
in order to transform (A) into (C)
(C) Either evidence is available or P, or evidence is available for its negation.
In order to be open to the possibility of undecidable statements requires the rejection of (B), i.e. the 
rejection of Bivalence. Wright concludes that these considerations
must enjoin a revision of classical logic, one way or another, for ail discourses where 
there is no guarantee, at least in principle, to decide between each statement of the 
discourse concerned and its negation.
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Excluded Middle.
Returning to mathematics, arguing that truth in mathematics is not Bivalent 
suggests an argument that the domain is undecidable. Dummett argues, drawing on 
Brouwer’s account of intuitionism, that this guarantee which decidability brings to a 
discourse, vanishes when the domain of the discourse is (potentially) infinite.
In the final chapter of Frege: Philosophy o f Mathematics, Dummett adds to the 
standard arguments that ‘meaning is use’ considerations arising from quantification over 
infinite domains. He argues that it is illegitimate to quantify over an infinite totality, 
because it is impossible to complete an infinite process. If such a move were legitimate
statements formed by means of such quantification [would] be detemiinately true or
false, and hence obey classical logic.^’
The argument is complicated and less than obvious. It is based on one simple thought and 
one subtle thought. The simple thought is that in the finite case, to show something about 
all the members of a finite domain, requires only a procedure for running through all 
objects in the domain, to check whether they have the property or properties under 
investigation. Whether practical or not, this is always a theoretically possible task. Where 
the collection is infinite, no such task can be carried out to completion, not even 
theoretically. Here the subtle thought enters: the impossibility of completing the infinite 
task concerns not so much the the size — i.e. taking the infinite to be very, very large, 
creates the idea of finitely many such task as being a medical impossibility — but rather 
the nature of infinite collections. According to Dummett, a collection is infinite when it is 
generated by rules, such that whenever any greatest member is produced by these rules, 
the means become available to create a new greatest member: something of the form:
Dummett claims ‘set’, ‘ordinal number’ and ‘cardinal number’ as examples of 
such concepts, falling in line with Poincaré and Russell, who based their diagnosis of the 
paradoxes of set theory on indefinitely extensible concepts.^" For example, an+i=j(an).
Dummett’s argument has therefore two stages to it: the first is an argument that Bi valence 
of the truth predicate cannot hold globally over a discourse with an infinite domain — call
Dummett (1991), p313
See Dummett (1991), pp310-21; also (1978), pp186-202
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this the Infinity Thesis — and secondly a guide to the application of this Thesis: call this 
the Doctiine of Applicability.
Both stages are crucial to the Intuitionist’s claims for revival: yet it seems 
someone could agree to the first clause without accepting the second, Dummett’s 
identification of infinite collections with the extensions of indefinitely extensible concepts.
i i  O bjections
Most of the attempts made in the literature to resist Dummett’s revisionism focus 
on blocking the revision of classical logic, e.g. Tait, Wright, Peacocke, Divers and 
M i l l e r O n  the other hand, Peter Clark has concentrated his attack on the Doctrine of 
Applicability. He claims:
Dummett’s argument has three stages. The first is the claim that, properly understood, 
set theory is the theory of indefinitely extensible concepts, as is shown by the common 
core of the paradoxes. The second claim is that for domains that are indefinite, classical 
quantification is in general inapplicable, and the third is the claim that quantification 
construed intuitionistically is appropriate for the study of indefinitely extensible 
concepts.
Clark’s threefold distinction is similar to the distinction drawn between the Infinity Thesis 
and the Doctrine of Applicability: he reaches a similar conclusion as to the source of the 
confusion: it rests upon a misunderstanding of set theory — it is not a theory of 
indefinitely extensible concepts; hence set theory does not fall prey to Dummett’s attack.
Dummett claims that certain concepts are indefinitely extensible, and hence their 
extensions cannot be thought of as complete infinite sets. Taking transfinite sets to be 
actual and infinite, rather than as potentially infinite, is a common way to interpret 
Cantor’s work; it is a view held by Frege, Russell and Zermelo. '^^ However, Cantor 
himself considered the transfinite as an extension to the concept of ‘finite’, not as a 
contrast to the potential infinite. This becomes evident when reading his exchange with 
Kronecker; it also becomes apparent that he took there to be a genuine infinite above and 
beyond the transfinite.
“ See Tait (I986)rWright (1993), Essays 8 pp262-77, 15 pp433-58 and 16 pp45S-79; Peacocke (1986) 
and Divers&Miller (forthcoming). Another route, more in keeping with the response dependence strategy 
adopted here, would be to argue that although the central concepts of mathematics are ed-concepts, factors 
such as logical complexity conspire to frustrate the applicability of the EC thesis.
^ See for example, Frege (1879) §§84-6, Russell (1919), Ch8, and Zermelo (1930)
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First, it will be shown that if there is a coherent notion of finitude — call it the 
‘Cantor-finite’ — based on the notion of limitation of size, then this will offer a way out 
of the conclusion of Dummett’s revisionist argument, for it takes the sting out of the 
Infinity Thesis. Secondly, based on some arguments advanced independently by John 
Mayberry and Michael Hallett, it will be shown that there is indeed such a cogent notion 
‘Cantor-finite’.
According to Dummett, the revision of classical logic is based on the Doctrine of 
Applicability. Roughly, this has two components:
i) classical logic is inappropriate for dealing with the infinite in mathematics
ii) most mathematics deals with the infinite
The notion of finitude that the intuitionist uses is due to Euclid:
(EUC) The whole is greater than the parts^ ®
That is, a finite collection is larger than any of its proper subcollections. Where a 
collection is equinumerous with a proper subcollection, that collection is said to be 
infinite. Rather than talk in terms of infinite collections being equinumerous, the 
intuitionist will talk in terms of the generation of elements occurring in tandem — 
different accounts of this are possible, but it is enough for the purpose of the argument if 
the underlying classical notion is grasped.
This gives a gloss on the Doctrine of Applicability:
(APP) If a collection is finite in the sense of Euclid, the Intuitionist will accept that there will, 
at least in principle, be a guamntee that evidence will be available for any statement P 
about the collection, or for its negation.
Now assume that there is a cogent and coherent account of the Cantor-finite. Any 
set which is Euclid-finite will be Cantor-finite, but not the converse. Given that this 
notion is a cogent notion of finitude, then it will follow that there will be no bar to 
reinteipreting the Doctrine of Applicability as follows:
“  Euclid (1956), Book I, Common notion 5. See also Boyer (1968), pp 116-7
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(APP*) if a collection is Cantor-finite there will, at least in principle, be a guarantee that 
evidence will be available for any statement P about the collection, or for its negation.
(APP*) follows by force-marching the argument for the guarantee of evidence on any 
(Euclidean) finite set; as the Cantor-finite is a cogent notion of finitude, then none of the 
steps used to establish (APP) will be threatened by this extension. If such a notion can 
indeed be secured, then Dummett's attack on classical mathematics is due to a 
mischaracterisation, a conflation of the Euclid-infinite with the Cantor-infinite. This does 
hang on the tenability of the intuitionist’s own position: provided that the Doctrine of 
Applicability is stable, and not liable to inflate or deflate, then likewise, classical 
mathematics is stable. This conclusion may be more suggestively phrased: transfinite sets 
are not indefinitely extensible as they are finite.
Of course, justifying this notion of the ‘Cantor-finite’ may not be so straight- 
foi*ward; many mathematicians talk about infinite sets when they properly mean transfinite 
sets, and such confusion does not aid the issue.
Mayberry has argued that
A set is an extensional plurality of determinate size, composed of definite, properly 
distinguished objects. A set is itself an object, which can be an element of further sets. 
Whatever things there may be, the pluralities of determinate size composed of those 
things are themselves things, namely sets.^ ®
He calls this the intuitive notion of set, upon which the axiomatic method of definition 
rests, and with it much of modern mathematics. It recalls a definition due to Eudoxus, of 
arithmoi (apiGpoi) as a plethos horizmenon (jrUGoai^opiÇjxevov), a limited plurality.
By rejecting the Euclidean dictum that the whole is greater than the parts. Cantor’s 
notion of set is of a finite or limited collection. Given this perspective, Mayberry argues 
that the axioms of set theory ‘consist primarily of finiteness assumptions’. Axioms such 
as pairing or union should be uncontentious in this respect; Mayberry targets the Power 
Set Axiom ” and the so called Axiom of Infinity — Cantor’s crucial notion that the natural
Mayberry (1994), p32
The Power Set Axiom states, essentially, that if % is a Cantor finite collection, i.e. a set, then the 
family of all subsets of X (i.e. p  (%))ls also Cantor-finite, and hence a set
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numbers, œ, are Cantor-finite 
Mayberry concludes that
we may then describe Cantor’s achievement by saying, not that he tamed the infinite, 
but that he extended the finite^®
The axioms of set theory develop quite naturally from considerations which are finite in 
the sense of Euclid. Were the axioms and schemata of set theory then applied without 
further justification to collections which are infinite in Euclid’s sense, then there would be 
no justification for any of the results obtained; unfortunately, this was the reception 
Cantor’s work often received when it was first published.
If on the other hand, the claim is that the notion of set can be extended from the 
Euclidean conception to the Cantorian one, without jeopardising any of the axioms, then 
none of the problems of infinite collections need be dealt with.
Hi The concept ‘finite^
The picture that emerges when both the Euclidean and Cantorian notions of 
finitude are taken seriously, is of a finite body of mathematical objects with an infinite 
head. Where the line is drawn between the head and the body differs between these two 
accounts. What does this say about the concept ‘finite’?
In his discussion of response dependent concepts, Pettit contends that such 
concepts may invoke a certain sort of indeteraiinacy. He writes:
Any response dependent concept, no matter how exact It seems to be, may turn out to 
be vague in certain regards; there may be cases where reality ~  unaided reality — fails 
to dictate clearly how the concept should apply. We may prefer to leave the concepts 
vague at such limits or we may decide to stipulate on how they should be extended to 
cover the problematic cases. But either way we must acknowledge that, tested against 
the unamended concept, reality is relatively unforthcoming.*
The axioms of set theory (ZF) are: Extensionality (sets with the same elements are equal); Foundation 
(every non-empty set has an element which is e-minimal); Comprehension (if F is a property given by a 
function / ,  then Y={xeX such that Fx} is a set); Pairing (for any two sets, there is always a third 
containing them both); Union (for any set X, there is a set containing all elements of all elements of X); 
Replacement (a set can be replaced by its image under a mapping); Infinity (co is Cantor-finite), and 
Power Set (if X is a Cantor finite collection, i.e. a set, then the family of all subsets of X is also Cantor- 
finite, and hence a set)
Mayberry (1994), p33 
* Pettit (1991), p619
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The Euclidean and Cantorian definitions are just such stipulations — they 
prescribe how the concept may be extended to cover problematic cases. Several short 
corollaries follow. The first that suggests itself is whether these two notions of finitude 
are the only compelling stipulations available. While it would seem natural to think that 
further stipulations might evolve only in response to new problems; it has been contended 
that Liesniewski’s mereology offers a third account of finitude,
A second corollary comes by reflection on other ed-concepts. Consider for 
example, whether in a particular borderline case, an object should be taken to fall under 
the concept ‘green’ or not. If it is stipulated, one way or another, this fixes a new 
concept, which might as well be labelled ‘green*’. This new concept can be used in place 
of the old one; it may even make it redundant. However, it does not mean that the old 
concept, ‘green’, cannot be used. Similarly, ‘finite*’, i.e. the Cantorian conception of the 
finite, may generally replace the Euclidean notion — but this need not mean that the 
Euclidean notion can no longer be used. Consequently, while the aim has been to show a 
revision of classical logic need not lead to a revision of classical mathematics, a corollary 
to this is the vindication of the Intuitionist conception of mathematics.
This may defuse some of Dummett’s comments about indefinitely extensible 
concepts. Two aspects of transfinite sets led Dummett to discuss such concepts — an 
inherent vagueness coupled with the ability to always find a use of the concept going 
beyond that which was already given. Sometimes he implies that this method of going on 
beyond what has already been given should be some sort of recursive procedure, but he 
does not stick by this characterisation. It would seem then that if ‘natural number’, 
‘cardinal number’ and ‘ordinal’ are indeed indefinitely extensible, the moral to draw is 
that this is due to the underlying indefinite extensibility of the concept ‘finite’. The 
notions of Euclidean and Cantorian finite are only two possible articulations of this 
response dependent concept: because as it is response dependent concept, it admits 
indeterminate cases; because it is established by stipulation, it is always possible to give a 
new, more extensive definition.
If the argument of the past few pages is correct — unless the Cantorian notion of 
finitude is coherent, neither is the Euclidean one — then demonstrating that the indefinite 
extensibility of various mathematical concepts as a secondary effect, due entirely to the
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underlying notion of finitude, then Dummett’s argument will only work provided that he 
is prepared to take on what might be called the anti-platonist conclusions for the finite 
proportion of Intuitionistic mathematics. Dummett’s use of indefinitely extensible 
concepts relies is a crucial way on their identification with notions of infinity, and his 
arguments no longer work when applied to the finite.
The argument shows that each part of classical mathematics is finite and apt for 
ti’eatment according to the laws of finite domains, i.e. the truth predicate will be Bivalent: 
no revision of classical logic is required at the local level. On the other hand, classical 
logic is taken to be the logic only of finite domains, and not globally applicable: the 
Infinity Thesis plus the Cantorian Doctrine of Applicability suggest that any collection 
which is not limited in size will be Cantor-infinite and the Law of Excluded Middle will 
fail for discourses with such domains.
i V Category theory
Fortunately, this picture of the transfinite is more than metaphysical speculation 
— it is manifest clearly in category theory. Category theory emerged as a codification of 
various general features of mathematical structures. Earlier, it was mentioned that of the 
two notions of structure — the model-theoretic and the category-theoretic — it is the 
notions of category theory which are closer to those of working mathematicians. Now it 
is time to explain this comment.
Rather than rely on the description of a structure in a formal language, and the 
consti'aints which this puts on the models of a theory, a mathematician will use mappings 
to isolate, describe and compare different kinds of mathematical structure. Having picked 
out a structure, such as a group, much of the work in group theory is to examine the 
properties of group-preserving mappings. Given a mapping f  from one group A  to 
another /?, the restrictions which must be placed on / :  give clear insight into group
structures
A category C consists of a collection of objects and structure-preserving 
mappings on those objects, such that the following conditions hold:
i) for every pair of objects A, B of C, there is a set of morphism Morc(A, B), called the
■“ A mapping /  between two groups A ,  /:  A~^^  is a group homomorphism if: 
(HOM) V <31,^2 G/Z, f (ai. /q a2)=f(a i ) ,^  f(a2)
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set of morphism from A to B. 
ii) for every three objects A, B, C in C, a mapping Morc(A, B) x M orc(B , C) entails a
map Morc(A, C) described by ( / ,  g)t->/og such that:
a) for every object A there exists 1 A^Morc(A, A) which is a right identity under 
o for the elements of M ore (A, B) and a left identity for the elements of 
Morc(B, A)
b) o is associative, i.e. when the mappings are defined ho(go/)=(hog)o/
Where the collection of objects is a set (rather than a class, such as the collection 
of all sets) the category is said to be concrete. Examples of non-concrete categories 
include: Set, whose objects are all sets and whose morphism are simply set mappings; 
Grp whose objects are all groups and whose morphism are group homomorphisms; Top 
whose objects are all topological spaces and whose morphism are continuous mappings, 
and Ring whose objects are all rings with a 1, whose morphism are 1-preserving ring 
homomorphisms.
It has already been noted that a system or particular mathematical object may 
exhibit various structural aspects; for example the unit circle in the plane is a group; it 
is also a topological space and a smooth, 1-dimensional manifold. Each aspect of the unit 
circle can be picked out by focussing , on the mappings from Si to another object. 
Certainly, each of these aspects can be described model theoretically, but this may not 
lead to the structural properties being obvious — for example, the basic notion of 
structural equivalence in model theory is elementary equivalence'^^ ,-which is a stronger 
notion of equivalence than isomorphism.
Awodey summarises the advantages of category theory — doing mathematics 
‘arrow-theoreticallyas it were, as follows:
any mathematical property or construction given solely in terms of structure-preserving 
mappings — i.e. in a given category — will necessarily respect isomorphism in that 
category, and will thus be structural. Since all categorical properties are thus structural, 
the only properties which a given object in a given category may have, qua object in 
that category, are structural ones.
*  A structure A  is elementary equivalent to ^  (/Zsf^) just in case /ÎNP IJNP for any statement P in 
the underlying formal language of the two theories. See Sacks [19721, pp20-22
* Category theory is often described as the theory of objects and arrows, because of the arrow diagrams 
depicting morphisms from one object to another.
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Logic may even be studied using category theory — the objects are the formulas and the 
morphism are deductions from premises.*”
It is possible to single out categories which have a logical structure in addition to a 
mathematical one. A species of category consisting of:
i) objects with some arbitrary structure (i.e. morphism-admitting objects), and
ii) ‘everything that can be constructed from these by logical means’
will be a topos.**^
Above I claimed that the Infinity Thesis is correct and that coupled with a 
Cantorian Doctrine of Applicability, gives grounds for restricting classical logic to the 
finite, while taking intuitionistic logic as a generalisation of classical logic which deals 
with both finite and infinite domains. It was also argued that Dummett’ s arguments for 
revisionism are based on an unnecessarily narrow Doctrine of Applicability, and that 
when this Doctrine is more generously stated, both the Infinity Thesis and the practices of 
classical mathematics can be retained. While mathematical results cannot substantiate 
philosophical conclusions, the category theoretic perspective at least accords with these 
results. In general, the logic of topoi is intuitionistic.**® However, the logic of concrete 
topoi is classical; moreover. Set is a topos and its logic is classical.**’
XXXIX C onclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to show that mathematics is governed by a 
Euthyphronic truth predicate, and that despite a revision in logical principles — from 
classical to intuitionistic — this need not entail any revision of classical mathematics.
One way of deciding whether truth is constrained by the evidence in mathematics 
is to examine the central concepts of the discourse; if these concepts pass an order of 
determination test, they follow a Euthyphronic truth norm; otherwise the truth norm is
Awodey (1996) sketches such a treatment; for a fuller description, see Koslow (1992)
Although topoi are closely related to logical considerations, they arose from Grothendieck’s work on 
algebraic geometry, where they appear as generalisations of topological spaces. See McLarty (1990) and 
(1994) for detailed historical accounts.
* Awodey (1996), p233; see also Lambek & Scott (1986) and Fourman (1977).
*  In topoi, the law of excluded middle follows from the axiom of choice (Dlaconescu (1975)). This 
guarantees that the logic of any concrete topos will be classical. Set is unusual — its objects are non­
concrete, yet because its objects bear ‘‘a particularly ‘pure’ logical structure’ it obeys classical principles.
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Socratic.
By considering the way in which formal mathematics fails to be apt for analysis in 
terms of response dependence and independence, a clear picture of the requirements for 
C-conditions is obtained for structural and systemic mathematical discourses. Once in 
place, these C-conditions can be shown to pass the order of determination test. Then, 
despite considerations based on the nature of axiomatic definitions, to do with whether 
these definitions reflect or determine the extensions of the concepts involved, it is shown 
that if structural mathematics is governed by Euthyphronic truth, so too is truth in 
systems such as arithmetic.
The prima facie case for the existence of verification transcendent truths was 
considered in the middle of the chapter — such truths need to be ruled out if a case is to 
be made for epistemic constraint. This is done by considering the types of warrant which 
support the assertion of such statements and the ways in which those warrants can be 
improved to meet the requirements of mathematical truth. A large class of candidates for 
evidentially unconstrained truth fail to display a warrant which could be improved to meet 
such standards, but rather than think this will leave them undecidable, optimism suggests 
that other routes will be found to an appropriately conclusive warrant. The other main 
case for consideration in this area involves statements such as the Axiom of Choice, 
which appear independent of the best theories available. In each model of second order 
set theory, however, the Axiom of Choice has a determinate truth value, as does the 
Continuum Hypothesis; but this is not the same truth value in each model. There are good 
grounds for claiming that the concept ‘set’ therefore exhibits an ineliminable 
indeterminacy, for there is nothing to go on, to pick and choose between these models, 
other than a desire for find a model with or without the Axiom of Choice.
The claim that truth is constituted by best opinion — that mathematical statements 
are true, because they are provable, is usually taken as a starting point for revisionist 
arguments. Dummett’s line is that due to considerations of meaning, classical logic 
should be abandoned in favour of intuitionistic logic, and that such a shift will enforce a 
revision of classical mathematics. As such a revision of mathematics is unpalatable to 
many, the revision of classical logic is often dismissed. Here, however, I have argued 
that while intuitionistic logic might be globally applicable, classical logic is appropriate for 
use in most local (finite) settings. The adoption of Intuitionistic Logic as the overarching
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logic only entails a revision of classical mathematics if mathematics is taken to have 
genuine Cantorian infinite collections as subject matter; as classical mathematics is 
expressible in set theory, this makes the subject matter finite, rather than infinite.
This philosophical account accords with several features of category theory; in 
particular, it is revealed that the underlying logic is intuitionistic, but that in certain special 
cases, such as Set and in categories with a set-like collection of objects, classical logic is 
valid. To conclude — tiuth in mathematics is wholly dependent upon proof, and this has 
no revisionary import into the working practices of mathematicians.
XXXX Summary and F inal Words
At various points in the preceding Chapters, the major motivation underpinning 
this work has been mentioned: to find the proper shape of the disagreement between 
arithmetical platonism and structuralism. On the face of it, Fregean logicism — or 
something close to it — is philosophically persuasive; yet structuralism seems a much 
better account of actual mathematical practice, which is something that the platonist seems 
to neglect. Holding onto both accounts looks impossible — a case of having one’s cake 
and eating it — as the structuralist slogan ‘All mathematics is structural’ is incompatible 
with the Fregean account of numbers as self-subsistent objects.
Despite this incompatibility, the arguments put forward by both platonists and 
structuralists fail to deliver a decisive advantage to one side or the other.**® The structuralist 
focuses her attention on showing that structuralism about arithmetic is tenable; the 
platonist holds that it is not.
What has served as a key insight into cashing out the intuition that there is 
something valuable in both arithmetical platonism and structuralism is the thought that 
having one’s cake and eating it is best achieved by cutting one’s cake in half. There are 
objects and there are structures. The structuralist is wrong about arithmetic, because what 
is required is an objects based account. But she is right in her report of the nature of much 
of the rest of mathematics — because most modern mathematics is stiuctural.
This still leaves the problem of cutting the cake: arriving at a clear and 
philosophically perspicuous distinction between the objects which feature in mathematical 
systems, and the structural areas of mathematics.
Some of the reasons why this impasse continues are outlined in §XX.
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i S tra tegy
Turning these motivations into a coherent position has not been straightforward. 
Firstly the stability of the Fregean account of arithmetic had to be secured — this task was 
detailed in Chapter 2, and was relatively straightforward, given the availability and 
accessibility of the Wright/ Hale logicist revival project.
Secondly, the untenability of structuralism about arithmetic had to be shown; this 
was the central theme of Chapter 3. Two components were involved: demonstrating that 
there were no philosophical grounds for advancing the ‘All mathematics is structural’ 
line, but that this claim is proposed on purely structural grounds, and secondly arguing 
that this strategy is ultimately unfruitful.
This second set of considerations in place, the compromise position could be 
stated — which occupied most of Chapter 4. It was shown that the Fregean thesis — that 
singular terms in true indicative statements refer to objects — can be systematically 
weakened to accommodate non-objects based areas of mathematics, as the statements 
concerned are subjunctive, rather than indicative. Equivalently, this thesis could be stated 
as describing how the structure based accounts can be systematically strengthened to 
supply Frege’s thesis. The strategy adopted was to concentrate on the ways that Frege’s 
thesis might fail, based on considerations of suppositions and non-indicative contexts, 
such as subjunctives or hypotheticals.
Treating statements of structural mathematics as suppositions is in most cases 
equivalent to analysing them as subjunctives. Statements occurring in the indicative 
mode, containing singular terms, involve reference to objects; in the subjunctive 
however, this fails. This allows the modest structuralist to admit that singular terms 
feature in these statements, without having to accept a commitment to places in structures 
as bona fide objects.
These arguments establish a position that I have styled modest structuralism; the 
last two Chapters have examined the position, and consider its place in the greater scheme 
of realism/ anti-realism debates.
The basic requirements for a discourse to count as mathematical are entirely 
minimal; however, it is unlikely that such minimal mathematics will be very interesting. 
Interesting mathematics begins with structures, which have a heuristic content, but which 
do not involve particular objects. Discourse about structures displays cognitive command:
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disagreements over the representational content of such statements is due either to 
vagueness, ambiguity or error.
The structural areas of mathematics can be differentiated from the non-structurai 
areas in two ways: by epistemological and semantic differences. In a structure, 
identification of any place in that structure requires prior knowledge of the structure; this 
is contrasted with systems where elements are identified without prior grasp of the 
structures in which they occur. Based on this distinction, algebraic structures such as 
groups, rings and fields are collected together with ‘systems’ such as the real and 
complex numbers. On the other hand, based on semantic considerations, statements of 
structural mathematics make no reference to particular objects, while those concerning 
mathematical systems do. This can be accounted for in terms of the type of context in 
which the statements occur: statements in discourse about mathematical systems are 
indicative, while statements about structures are subjunctive. Looked at in this light, 
although by epistemological criteria, real analysis is structural, statements concerning real 
and complex numbers have a semantic character more similar to those of arithmetic and 
set theory, than they are to those concerning group or ring structures.
Despite the possession of robust realism relevant properties, mathematical 
systems are still not apt for full blown realism, as mathematics is not a process of 
discovery but of conceptual invention: this was shown above. Mathematical concepts are 
response dependent concepts. In the discussion of the relationship between the central 
concepts of a discourse being ed-concepts, and the characteristics of the truth predicate 
over that discourse, it was argued that factors such as tense, or the undecidability of the 
C-conditions, could result in a response dependent discourse failing to have a 
Euthyphronic truth predicate. It wasa rgued that as mathematics is not complicated by 
factors such as tense, mathematical discourse is (globally) Euthyphronic. As classical 
mathematics deals only with discourses which have a (Cantor) finite domain, this global 
Euthyphronism does not entail revisionism.
i i  C onclusions
Although the focus has been largely on Wright’s framework**  ^and applying the
framework to mathematics, the overall strategy of treating the truth predicate as varying
over different areas of mathematics, allows for insights gained from the traditional
* This framework is proposed in Wright (1992)
-  2 3 3  -
CHAPTER 6: EPISTEMIC CONSTRAINT 
positions to be accommodated,
Hilbert’s formalism describes mathematics as a purely symbolic activity, 
concerning arbitrary objects arrayed in entirely arbitrary arrangements. Rather than take 
this as descriptive of all mathematics, Hilbert can be interpreted as describing the minimal 
constraints on a discourse to count as mathematical. This deflationary approach picks out 
one aspect of mathematics, and the truth predicate governing such discourse lacks all 
realism relevant features.
Structural mathematical discourse displays cognitive command — but nominalists 
such as Field are correct in showing that the application of such structures fails to justify a 
more robust realism for such structures. Field shows that where mathematical structures 
are used in a modelling capacity in a scientific theory, that use can be circumvented by 
incorporating the mathematics directly into the physical theory. This includes the theory 
of (o-sequences, which Field wrongly equates with arithmetic.
Distinguishing systems from the structures which support them, provides a way 
of capturing the essence of Putnam’s Quinean Indispensability Argument, without 
accepting Quinean holism. Rather than aigue that all mathematics has an application in the 
physical sciences, which results in the appropriateness of mathematical realism, the claim 
becomes that the areas of mathematics which have an application of a type suitable to 
support realism for that area, will be more than stractural.
Each of these apparently incompatible positions — formalism, structuralism, 
nominalism and platonism — is shown to be consistent with each of the others by 
restricting the scope of the application of the arguments. This shows that the positions are 
inspired by different areas of mathematics — by algebraic and concrete structures, by 
systems, formal theories, etc. and that by overgeneralising on these paradigms, 
philosophical conflict arises.
One position which does not arise from concentrating on overly local areas of 
mathematics is intuitionism. The appeal of intuitionism is that it takes mathematics as a 
human endeavour: mathematics involves the concepts we possess and the connections 
that are forged between them. Mathematical methods offer ways of creating new concepts 
and establishing new connections; so it is a constantly growing body of knowledge — 
but it is not progressive discovery of an abstract realm, rather a systematic and objective 
creation of such a realm. This appeal also poses a challenge — the open endedness
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threatens Bivalence, for how can the middle way between truth and falsity be excluded, 
before all the facts are in? Typically, acceptance of this train of thought results in some 
form of revisionism; but revisionism is necessary only so long as it is assumed that 
classical mathematics is unaware or unsympathetic to these pressures. Many of the 
techniques of classical mathematics are used to limit the scope of mathematical theories 
and to create finite-like domains, so that quantification does not range over an open and 
unbounded universe. In cases where such grand universal quantification is used, such as 
in categoiy theory, the shape of the mathematics already leads the mathematician to use 
intuitionistic logic, without any pressure from revisionism.
Mathematics is not one single discourse, with the philosophically salient features 
evenly distributed across the subject: instead, it can be seen to be — as Wittgenstein 
described it — a m o t l e y o f  different subdiscourses, each with a distinctive semantic 
characterisation. Many of the debates in the philosophy of mathematics result from 
treating these separate discourses — and the underlying paradigms corresponding to 
those discourses — as representative of all mathematics. Platonists concentrate too 
closely on the special cases of arithmetic and real analysis; structuralists take algebra to be 
central, while intuitionists concentrate too closely on Eudoxus conception of the finite. 
Broadening these different paradigms, and fitting the different viewpoints into a unified 
framework orchestrates a new approach to the philosophy of mathematics.
Wittgenstein (1964) II—46
I should like to say: mathematics is a MOTLEY of techniques of proof.—And upon this 
is based its manifold applicability and its importance.
— 235  —
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